From Arlington to Brussels and thereon: the progression of one thread How long will “the last mile” be?

In mid-May 2023, despite recent lethal clashes and the undiminished potentiality for further flare-ups along the conditional Azerbaijani-Armenian interstate border, the post-2020 Baku-Yerevan dynamics appear to be within a constructive phase. Although a final comprehensive deal itself currently remains elusive, contrary to the recent upbeat remarks of the Western mediators, it would probably require no stretching of the imagination to suggest that it is nearer, as of today, than ever before.

There is currently a shaky momentum propped up by the joint EU-US efforts at normalisation, with the sides, albeit at a pedestrian pace in want of acceleration, journeying towards a final peace deal, the most trenchant expression of the progression attained being the near-absolute approximation of the respective positions on the vital issue of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity. Progress is slow, yet discernible, but what it lacks are the element of propulsion and enhanced expediency.

The pressing question now is whether this window of opportunity will endure sufficiently to spawn some definable agreement, if not a peace treaty itself, but a solid precursor, or if its life will be prematurely curtailed, giving way to another period of heightened tensions, frustration, and deadlock. The record of the past two and a half years indicates that the process could go either way, for momentums in the negotiations have traditionally been extremely prone to slackening, due to a variety of external factors.

What forms the food for thought for present musings is the story of the progression of one thread, initially spun in Arlington, Virginia, USA, whereupon, during four strenuous days from 1-4 May, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia engaged in long and arduous negotiations. Once the discussions were concluded, commentators and pundits were at a loss to find something tangible to envision what might have been agreed, for the post-meeting statement of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, via whose good offices the bilateral talks took place, was one of indicative of loosely-defined hope, and devoid of crispy details.

“A final agreement is within reach” and “the last mile of any marathon is always the hardest” – punchy, yet equally vague points from the chief US diplomat’s statement – were all positivity-infused, albeit in need of further crystallisation and formulaic pungency. Lucidity came 10 days later, after the trilateral meeting of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, mediated by EU Council President Charles Michel in Brussels on 14 May. The latter’s clearly compartmentalised press remarks constitute the sole official reference point elucidating on what has been agreed and is yet to be attained.

Territorial integrity: the Almaty Declaration

If to judge by the post-meeting statement released by Charles Michel subsequent to the trilateral convocation, the principle of mutual recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, agreed in Prague in October 2022, and later reaffirmed in Sochi on 31 October 2022, has assumed a promisingly trenchant wording, with no room for ambiguity. The statement reads: “the leaders confirmed their unequivocal commitment to the 1991 Almaty Declaration and the respective territorial integrity of Armenia (29,800 km2) and Azerbaijan (86,600 km2)”.

This is of pivotal nature for, as many commentators have opined, the key obstacle towards a final agreement has been mostly, albeit not exclusively, centred around the attainment of unambiguity as to this critical element, which now appears to be agreed. Baku has long contended that Yerevan is disingenuous in its declared readiness to recognise Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, Karabakh included, and any Armenian asseveration as to the adherence to the aforementioned declaration was a mere pretence aimed at blurring their true intentions.

The truth, insofar as it can be ascertained, is that the scope for manoeuvrability that Nikol Pashinyan’s government could exercise in relation to this central peace tenet has reached its elastic limit. In fact, it has now reached a point of a near-complete exhaustion with no discernible leeway. However, Yerevan could still chip away at the pillars of an accord on the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, by pointing to the augmented Azerbaijani military positions along the conditional undelimited interstate border, which Armenia continues to claim constitute a violation of its own sovereignty.

This takes us back to the fundamental differences as to how the two sides have long understood the reference to the Almaty Declaration. For Baku, it is about territorial integrity as a principle, whereas Armenia considers that which was signed in 1991 to be a foundation for border delimitation, for during the post-2020 phase, subsequent to a series of escalations, Azerbaijan improved its standing along the undelimited zone between the two countries.

Consequently, although recognition of the Almaty Declaration as a cornerstone of a future peace deal is indubitably justified and vitally critical, in terms of the exact delineation of the interstate border, its role remains limited on two accounts. Firstly, at the time of its signing, the Azerbaijani-Armenian border was not delimited, let alone demarcated. Secondly, as a reference point, this can only be truly appreciated in conjunction with the current facts on the ground and their correlation with Soviet-era maps preceding the 1991 independence of both Azerbaijan and Armenia.

This intricate nuance seems to have been recognised in the current phase of the negotiations: the post-meeting press release issued on 14 May states that “the leaders agreed on the resumption of bilateral meetings on border issues”, and “the ultimate delimitation of the border will be agreed through negotiations”. In addition, another thorny subject on the agenda remains to be the fate of enclaves, regarded as territorial quirks resulting from maligned Soviet-era border cartography, which require further elucidation.

Karabakh Armenians

As to the fate of Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan, the latest Brussels meeting reaffirmed a two-track process, from the prism of which the subject in question remains firmly within Baku’s internal domain. The key obstacles are Armenia’s continuous efforts to procure an international mechanism guaranteeing the rights and security of the region’s population and Azerbaijan’s steadfast determination to obviate any form of interference in its internal affairs.

To this effect, the 14 May meeting seems to have tilted the balance more towards Baku’s worldview, with the subsequent press release employing a carefully worded lexicon, intended to be palatable to both sides. What is noteworthy is that it refers to the rights and security of “Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast”, leaving no space for an organisationally-defined form of territorial agency. It makes no reference to any international mechanism as such, but merely states that Azerbaijan is encouraged “to engage in developing a positive agenda with the aim of guaranteeing the rights and security of this population, in close cooperation with the international community”, essentially meaning that the process should be visible to and understood by the outside world. Finally, it is stated there is a need “for transparent and constructive dialogue between Baku and this population”.

Zangazur Corridor

On the connectivity agenda, the opening of an overland passage between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan continues to loom large as a key centrepiece. It can be inferred that “the railway connections to and via Nakchivan” is now in the process of being agreed in terms of principles, modalities, and a concrete timetable, with the immediate prospect of concurrence on the highway currently remaining elusive. It is also stated that the parties agreed “to draw upon the support of the World Customs Organisation”.

In essence, this could be construed as the reaffirmation of the principle of sovereignty over communication routes that has always been central to the Brussels format and, with the installation of the border checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin Road by Azerbaijan on 23 April, has acquired a new degree of unavoidability.

The net effect of this development elicits a simple truth: Armenia, in principle, should be less aghast in terms of its extraterritoriality concerns over the passage traversing its southern territory, with Azerbaijan no longer being insistent on unobstructed movement, as had hitherto been the case. It follows that Yerevan is now encouraged to install its border checkpoints at both ends of the Zangazur route.

However, what remains as a source of considerable uncertainty is how security along the corridor itself will be managed, for Article 9 of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement clearly allocates this task to Russia. This remains a key friction point between the Moscow and Brussels formats. Armenia is unwilling to concede a control element to Russia throughout the passage, in contravention of the aforementioned provision. Either some solution allied to the gist of Article 9 is to be found, or Yerevan now needs to agree a new bilateral arrangement with Moscow.