On the heels of the Sixth Brussels meeting: So near, yet so far Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

In the latest edition of “Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov”, the author predicts that the second half of this summer is going to be eventful in terms of the way the circumstances on the ground are anticipated to change, with Baku further entrenching its sovereignty in Karabakh and over the Lachin Road, which will act as the groundwork for a new factual reality of diplomatic progress in the succeeding period.

In Amashov’s view, what could be construed as a substantively new understanding emanating from the 15 July meeting of President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan, mediated by the EU, is that now there is a growing emphasis on the humanitarian supplies to Karabakh Armenians going via Aghdam, which could represent an important step towards the reintegration of the region into Azerbaijan, justified on the grounds of sovereignty and practical exigencies.

"The wheels are definitely in motion in the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process. Indeed, the Pope is irrefutably Catholic. However, the tempo remains insufficiently presto, merely being the minimum required to maintain the momentum.

I will return to the point about the momentum later, but let me mention, at the outset, that any dynamism in the process achieved, to date, is solely attributable to those measures taken by Baku on the ground in response to the irregularities in the part of Karabakh wherein the Russian "peacekeepers" are temporarily deployed and regarding the Lachin Road.

In his press remarks, made following the Sixth trilateral Brussels meeting between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan, mediated by EU Council President Charles Michel, the latter said “even though our meeting took place in the context of a worrying increase in tensions on the ground, I noted important momentum in the political discussions and efforts”.

This, without reading too much into the EU President’s words, could be construed as an implicit acknowledgement that, in the Azerbaijani-Armenian context, the changes on the ground, emanating from tensions, are, if not intrinsically necessary, the circumstantially unavoidable concomitants of diplomatic progress leading to peace.

So, what is the main import of the latest Brussels convocation?  Charles Michel’s traditionally compartmentalised post-meeting statement was a reiteration of the previous agreements, to which some new elements were added, with the language employed aimed at conveying that a lot had been decided, despite giving a mere glimpse of the substance.

Needless to say, the reaffirmation by the sides of each other's territorial integrity with cast-iron specifications, their understanding of the necessity to delimit the interstate border in line with the 1991 Almaty Declaration, the importance of releasing detainee-soldiers who inadvertently crossed the border and the emphasis on sovereignty, jurisdiction and reciprocity in the context of the unblocking of communications, including the Zangazur route, are all very important.

It would be perfectly possible to dwell on these and discuss them at length. However, as to the question about what is substantively new on the agenda, it is possible that this comprises the possible fresh arrangement enabling humanitarian supplies to Karabakh Armenians to go through via Aghdam, through Azerbaijan, thrust into the discussions due to the foiled smuggling attempts to use the vehicles displaying the ICRC emblem by the Armenian side through the Lachin Road, leading to the part of Karabakh under the temporary control of the so-called Russian "peacekeeping" contingent.

Some may consider it purely semantic, but the use of the term “Lachin Road” instead of “Lachin Corridor” stands out as noteworthy in many respects. Having said that, the EU Council President, within the self-same statement, referred to the Lachin route twice, on one occasion employing the term “corridor”, and, on the other, the word “road”, the net effect of this interchangeability seemingly indicating that “the corridor” logic in this context is gradually becoming of lesser relevance from the European perspective if, indeed, it was really understood in the first place.

As to what bearing this will have on the situation on the ground, it is likely that the Lachin Road, for the time being, will remain indispensable for the transfer of hospital patients, whereas the Barda-Aghdam Road will become increasingly vital in the context of humanitarian supplies. Consequently, the ICRC will need to restructure its arrangements accordingly. This confirms Azerbaijan’s increasing drive to reintegrate the part of Karabakh populated by Armenians into its internal socio-economic infrastructure.

Charles Michel’s encouragement for “direct dialogue between Baku and representatives of Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” is nothing new, being a mere reiteration of the point entailed in his 14 May press remarks. However, there is no hint at any form of international involvement, which appears to indicate Baku’s worldview on the subject is gradually prevailing.

Yet the question is how this objective will be achieved. With the recalcitrance of the separatist clique in Khankandi showing no signs of emollience and visible reciprocity to President Aliyev’s call for self-liquidation, the assumption could be made that some legitimate measures by Azerbaijan on the ground will be of inexorable necessity. Any step taken by Baku to this effect will be deemed as unpopular and publicly decried by the EU, Washington and Moscow, with belated implicit acquiescence and eventual approbation eventually emerging.

It should be also noted that not everything that was discussed between the sides was touched upon in Michel’s post-meeting statement, with one significant exception being the return of Western Azerbaijanis to their ancestral homeland which is modern-day Armenia. This component has been vigorously advanced by Baku, and the likelihood of it being incorporated into a final deal is on the rise.

The Azerbaijani-Armenian peace agenda is being shaped, to a large extent, by the circumstances on the ground. In relation to any illegality, either in the part of Karabakh populated by Armenians or regarding the Lachin Road, Azerbaijan has displayed swiftness, and issued a series of warnings regarding irregularities, allowing time for reciprocity and then acting decisively, changing the facts on the ground, thereby dictating the penumbra of negotiated items.

For instance, the 14 May meeting which took place in Brussels was an important milestone, for the sides recognised each other’s territorial integrity within mathematically-specified parameters, prior to which, on 23 April, Azerbaijan had established a Lachin border checkpoint. 

In the same vein, in anticipation of the 15 July meeting, Baku publicised the ICRC-covered smuggling into Karabakh, giving a new impetus to the argument that humanitarian supplies to the area should go via Azerbaijan, not through Armenia, and this was acknowledged in Charles Michel’s press remarks.

This summer gives a firm indication of being eventful. We are presently in the midst of this, and much is to come. Prior to the next convocation in Brussels, which is likely to take place in September, the circumstances on the ground will remain in a constant state of flux.

And something should be agreed by the end of the year, if not by October. One seemingly generic, yet crucial provision in Charles Michel’s press remarks was that “real progress will depend on the next steps that will be taken in the near future”.

This may sound trite. But its meaning is, in fact, substantial. Although the Karabakh component is not going to be included in the final peace deal, the progress therein is a vital piece in the peace jigsaw puzzle.

The demilitarisation of Karabakh, that is the withdrawal of the remnants of the Armenian armed forces therein, direct dialogue between Baku and the representatives of Karabakh Armenians and other related developments should take place.

To this effect, there seems to be some expectation, on the part of Baku, that Yerevan could exert influence on the separatist regime in Karabakh to enable the pace of internal dialogue to be accelerated. Otherwise, Azerbaijan reserves the right to take legitimate measures on the ground in Karabakh to exercise its sovereignty. 

One way or another, by the end of the summer, circumstances will be different. The greater the degree of change, the more probable the imminence of a peace deal."

Below is the link to the video version of the analysis: