Armenia’s restless separatists and the path to peace Concessions or conflict?

In Armenia, former Karabakh separatists are becoming increasingly active and restless. In Yerevan, the so-called “Artsakh representation” continues to operate, which, from a logical standpoint and for the sake of self-preservation, should have dissolved, dispersed, and gone into hiding, trembling with fear, a couple of years ago. This suggests that Armenian authorities have not abandoned their revanchist ambitions and aggressive policies; they still covet Azerbaijani lands.

The Armenian Constitution’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan are the clearest evidence of this—it's a “greedy appetite enshrined in legislation.” And this situation is not without reason. Armenia is being “nourished and entertained” with promises and support: 10 million from the European Peace Fund, joint American-Armenian military exercises—essentially, they are being patted on the back and promised sweet rewards. While the candies are not yet in sight, the rustle of wrappers is promising.

We fully understand that the actions of both the US and the EU are overtly one-sided and favour Armenia, with their steps indicating a policy of creating dividing lines in the region. Essentially, without a peace treaty, the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia remains provisional. Armenia needs a peace treaty far more than Azerbaijan does, especially since Armenia is isolated from regional communications and international infrastructure projects—essentially sitting in the corner and sulking, like a forlorn character that no one wants to befriend but everyone is willing to play with a bit, without any binding commitments.

However, these “comrades” fail to grasp that the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh problem” no longer exists; the issue has been resolved once and for all. Justice and international law have prevailed, with territorial integrity being a cornerstone upheld by the Azerbaijani army, regardless of whether people like it or not—that’s the least of our concerns. In fact, we find the feeble protests from neighbouring patrons somewhat satisfying because they serve as the best evidence that we are on the right path and will continue to be, no matter what others think.

So how should Armenia behave to avoid regretting “a life wasted”? It needs to act responsibly and constructively. To achieve peace, Armenia will have to meet Azerbaijan's requirements. They can label it however they want—whether as one-sided concessions, capitulation, or a threat to their statehood—the fact remains that the loser foots the bill. That’s the rule of the game, and it’s always been this way. No one will trust Armenia on credit, and no one will be swayed by promises like, “We’ll definitely amend the constitution after signing the peace treaty and reopening regional communications.” No. First, the constitution should be amended (this can be done without a referendum; a parliamentary majority can handle it, saving both costs and time. If I’m not mistaken, a similar precedent occurred during the pandemic when constitutional changes were made through a simple parliamentary vote). Next, Armenia should request the OSCE to officially dissolve the Minsk Group, given its obsolescence. Finally, criminal penalties should be introduced for any calls to change borders by force or through other means in the region (to prevent any “artsakhs,” “javakhs,” or “western armenias”).

In general, making territorial claims should be a criminal offence under Armenian law. The penalties should include both a substantial fine and imprisonment—a fine initially, followed by a prison term. Revanchists have limited options: they can either face relatively lenient punishment at home, in a more private and familial setting or endure severe and costly consequences from external actors (such as the elite special forces unit of the Azerbaijani Army). This, along with other measures (though not exclusively—no one will forget about the return of Azerbaijanis to Western Azerbaijan, which remains a separate issue) will serve as strong evidence of a genuine commitment to peace and may help build trust and foster further development of bilateral relations.

Regarding Western Azerbaijan, Armenia must ensure the compact settlement of Azerbaijanis and legally guarantee their right to internal self-governance. We should voice this fair demand on every platform available, from the UN to the OSCE, and our non-governmental organizations should actively pursue this goal. Thus, Armenia's path to peace lies exclusively through making concessions. Whether these concessions are painful or not depends on their own perspective.

Let's be honest—Armenia itself is not particularly valuable. The West wants to push Russia out of Armenia, especially its 102nd military base, while Russia aims to prevent the West from gaining enough influence in Armenia to achieve this. Who exactly controls the Zangezur corridor is ultimately insignificant; we would be satisfied with a 30% stake in this project. But, of course, not less.