How far can Türkiye-Syria detente go? Peace dialogue under bullets

After the critical re-election in the recent elections in Türkiye, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan faced robust challenges in foreign and domestic policy, such as the flow of Syrian and Afghan immigrants, deepening inflation, occasional explosions and missile attacks on the border areas.

The border insecurity phenomenon emerged in Türkiye in 2012 when the civil war in neighbouring Syria reached the point of no return, leaving major cities devastated and thousands of dead civilians behind. The violent civil war exacerbated Türkiye’s security concerns and power vacuum in the border areas.

However, after many years of rivalry, Ankara and Damascus, with the support of Russia and Iran, restored diplomatic talks and initiated political reconciliation. It is a symbolic step: Türkiye has been at the forefront of supporting the armed and civilian opposition against the Bashar Al-Assad regime.

After a long pause, the first-ever Turkish-Syrian ministerial meeting occurred in Moscow in December 2022 to discuss the management of the long-shared border, Syrian refugees, and joint efforts to combat extremist groups.

Although Russia is the main mediator in the Damascus-Ankara peace dialogue, another notorious regional actor, Iran, welcomed the process and joined it to address its concerns and interests.

Unlike Türkiye, Iran has been the Assad regime's major supporter from the civil war's first day and provided it with critical military and technical support for more than a decade. Tehran assisted the Syrian forces in combating various rebellion groups, radical Islamist groups, and Turkish-backed opposition forces across the country, which put Ankara and Tehran at odds.

In the early stage of the revolution in Syria, Türkiye's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups, thus reiterating the idea of establishing local governments with the same ideology in its neighbourhood, including Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Nonetheless, rather than becoming the leader of these regional neighbours, it became a country that had problems with almost all of them.

Despite the ongoing diplomatic talks and frequent meetings, Turkish and Syrian detente is complicated and challenging. The Syrian government demand the complete withdrawal of the Turkish forces from its northern areas as the main precondition for diplomatic normalization, while Türkiye is reluctant to do so, referring to the existence of the Kurdish militia (Syrian Democratic Forces) in these territories.

Consequently, the Kurdish militants’ factor is the source of concern for Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran, considering the area of their operations on Syrian soil. The SDF is a militia that the United States strongly backs in the fight against the remnants of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group, which is active in the eastern Syrian desert.

Despite Damascus's insistence, after the re-election, the new Turkish Defense Minister, General Yasar Guler, reiterated Ankara's position regarding the withdrawal from northern Syria, boosting the fears of Bashar Assad. Nevertheless, the Ankara-Damascus ministerial dialogue did not disappear, as Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Moscow on August 30 to resume the coordination efforts.

Although Ankara maintains a certain level of dialogue with Damascus via Russia and Iran, the normalization talks are stalled due to the Assad government's precondition and the renewed anti-government rallies in Syria.

A new anti-government mass rally flared up on August 24 in southern Syria, namely in Suwayda town, denouncing the deteriorating living conditions in the country and the rising number of detained civilians without any trial.

The protests quickly sparked in other areas, such as Daraa in the south, Deir ez-Zor in the east, and Aleppo. Indeed, such protests should come as a little surprise considering that after a decade-long civil war, Syria’s economy remains in tatters with raging corruption and poor governance.

As such, it seems unrealistic that amid the growing domestic discontent, Assad's regime will actively engage in diplomatic normalization talks with Türkiye while the latter will maintain a military presence in the northern borders. Ankara believes that with quick withdrawal from Syria, the incompetent Syrian forces will be unable to confront the better-armed and trained Kurdish militia with further potential power change in the region.

On the other hand, Russia and Iran will likely keep pushing for Ankara-Damascus thaw to neutralize the former’s regional ambitions and focus on other regional developments. The top priority for Russia is now the Ukrainian front, while Iran is not struggling with the Iraqi Kurds and internal political instability. Therefore, the potential Syrian reconciliation will enable all regional states to stop diverting resources and focus on internal affairs.