How long will Yerevan rush from Russia to EU and back? Pashinyan and gendarmes
Another crisis is brewing in recently difficult Armenian-Russian relations, the cause of which is Yerevan's military-political adventure under the brand "EU mission". In any case, the Russian Foreign Ministry's harsh reaction came immediately after the European Union announced a long-term mission's arrival in Armenia on February 20.
In the person of its Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow immediately announced what this could threaten Russia. The Russian diplomat said that Moscow sees in the EU mission exclusively a geopolitical background, far from the interests of normalising the situation in the South Caucasus and an attempt to squeeze Russia out of the region.
And this is not the first statement of the Russian Federation of such content, to a greater extent, like all the previous ones, due to the turn of Yerevan to the West, which could not but cause dissatisfaction with the position of the Russian authorities' closest ally.
"Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have recorded the desire of the European Union and the West as a whole to gain a foothold in our ally Armenia by any means. Everything is being done to weaken the historical role of Russia as the main guarantor of security," Zakharova said, recalling that Azerbaijan's publicly expressed negative assessments of the deployment of Europeans in the South Caucasus in such large numbers and for such a long time are ignored.
It is clear that Baku's position on this issue is of particular importance for Moscow now. Firstly, it shows Azerbaijan's commitment to the implementation of the trilateral agreements reached in November 2020, which Russia constantly refers to. Speaking about the EU mission, Zakharova did not fail to note once again that the agreements of the Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders remain a key factor in ensuring regional security and stability and providing for their implementation, including unblocking transport communications, delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as negotiations on the elaboration of a peace treaty. And this is completely in the interests of Baku, and it clearly contradicts Yerevan's policy.
Secondly, the coincidence of Baku and Moscow's positions on this issue means that Azerbaijan and Russia doubt not only the effectiveness of the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations but also the possibility to achieve the entire region's security.
That is why official Baku unequivocally stated back in January 2023 that the creation of the EU civilian mission in Armenia should take Azerbaijan's legitimate interests into account and the structure of European envoys itself should not turn into an instrument to undermine the Baku-Yerevan normalisation.
"Azerbaijan records the decision of the EU Council on the establishment of the EU civil mission in Armenia and remains firmly committed that this initiative should not be abused to undermine the process of normalisation of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, including the process of border delimitation, which should be carried out on a bilateral basis," the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said.
Meanwhile, the new mission's goal is formally declared by the need to contribute to stability in the region, ensure security on the ground and create an atmosphere for efforts to normalise Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. The EU even stressed its readiness to "work with both countries for the sake of long-term peace in the South Caucasus", but for some reason did not bother to enlist Baku's opinion and consent for such "work", taking into account only Yerevan's wishes and interests.
Therefore, Baku's categorical statement is more than logical that sending an observer mission from Europe to the conditional Armenian-Azerbaijani border may hinder the Baku-Yerevan normalisation.
Moscow's sharp criticism of the EU is also natural – it would be strange if Russia reacted differently to the categorical statement of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that a long-term EU mission consisting of 100 people would arrive in Armenia. It is clear that such a situation seriously strains Moscow. She is equally annoyed by the EU's attempts to present its South Caucasus mission as a peacekeeping one.
After a recent meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, von der Leyen tried to assure everyone that the EU is a reliable partner of Armenia and that the EU mission will contribute to regional peace and stability. For Moscow, which sees only its own military contingent in the role of regional peacekeepers, this is a rather vulnerable moment.
That is, while Europe is making calculated steps, trying to present itself as a peacemaker in the South Caucasus, Moscow is confident that the Russian peacekeeping contingent (deployed in accordance with the statement of the Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders on November 10, 2020) is a key factor determining stability and security in the region. That, in fact, was what Maria Zakharova was trying to convey to Europe.
Moscow's well-founded claims against Yerevan also lie in the fact that Armenia, "having not brought the work on the direction of the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation] mission to its logical end, preferred to make a choice in favour of the EU".
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently stated that if Armenia is interested, it can use the CSTO potential. In this regard, Prime Minister Pashinyan made harsh statements in January about Moscow's and the CSTO's role in the settlement, as well as Yerevan's refusal to host CSTO exercises in Armenia in 2023, and, most importantly, stated that it would be preferable if Russian peacekeepers were replaced by an international mission in the future.
Reproaches against Russia were voiced at Pashinyan's press conference for the Armenian media on January 10, where he accidentally mentioned the possible replacement of Russian peacekeepers. Accordingly, it can be assumed that Moscow has hardly put an end to the issue of deploying the CSTO mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and will most likely continue to press Armenia until it achieves its goal.
It is important for Russia to continue to defend its interests in the Caucasus and keep its finger on the pulse there. This is the first. Secondly, the term of stay of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh expires in two years, and the fact of presence of European missionaries-intelligence officers-gendarmes on the conditional Armenian-Azerbaijani border, after the Russian peacekeeping contingent leaves Karabakh, inevitably causes alarm in Moscow. On the other hand, Russia has effective financial, political and even military instruments to put pressure on Armenia and can use them in case of urgent need. Armenia's serious economic dependence on Russia, which it will most likely remain in the coming years, will hardly allow it to withdraw from the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union] and the CSTO. And this means that Yerevan will have to accept Moscow's conditions, that is, shy away from Russia to the EU and in the opposite direction. However, how long Armenia will be able to simultaneously dance to two tunes – European and Russian, is an open question...