"Interests of South Caucasus firmly aligned with European integration and West" Dmitry Tsotniashvili for Caliber.Az

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Georgian political analyst Dmitry Tsotniashvili.

- As you know the European Union has granted the status of candidate membership to Moldova and Ukraine, but Georgia was told to address certain issues. Why did the EU do that?

- Personally, I have a bundle of thoughts, considerations, and conclusions on this issue, which may partly coincide with the opinion of the Georgian government, partly - with the opinion of the Georgian opposition, and also partly - with the official position of some members of the European Parliament.

Let's start with the fact that all three countries (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) were granted the so-called European perspective and only two (Ukraine and Moldova) were granted the EU candidate status.

In the case of Georgia, the European perspective means that the candidate status will be granted automatically as soon as certain conditions of the EU are fulfilled. I will not enumerate them all - they are in the public domain, but I would just stipulate that 11 of them are completely dependent on the Government and the ruling party of Georgia and only one - on the opposition. Anyway, this is what high-ranking EU officials Michel, von der Leyen, Borrell, etc. told us. They made us happy, so to say, that the EU's doors remain open for us. And in fact, there is nothing ironic and sarcastic here - it is a very important statement. However, in the light of the reforms already carried out (including constitutional reforms), legislative changes and the firm will of the people and the government not to stop on the way to harmonizing Georgian legislation with European legislation, we really expected much more, and this irony and sarcasm is the mood of a certain, quite large part of society in Georgia, who consider it an injustice. Moreover, the mentioned process, where we are already about halfway, has not yet begun or is just beginning, that is, it is in its infancy in Ukraine and Moldova. For example, Ukraine and Moldova have specific, often quite impressive problems in terms of combating corruption, transparency of budget issues, or the situation in the penitentiary system, while Georgia in these issues (and in many others) occupies quite high positions in the relevant world rankings. This is what the confidence of the government and the overwhelming part of our society in a more acceptable EU decision was based on, and the disappointment of the resulting decision is understandable.

On the other hand, the EU and our Western friends and partners, in general, have quite a few comments about the judicial system and the relationship between the opposition and the government: in the first case it is a general distrust and the urgent need for deep reform and improvement of the entire system, in the second - an extreme polarization, almost absolute rejection of each other and almost complete absence of any points of contact.

The most important reason for granting candidate status to two of the three countries that applied is the war in Ukraine. In the case of Ukraine, this gesture is a kind of advance, an incentive to start a long process of reform, to raise the spirit of resistance and resilience of the people against the background of the bloody aggression of Russia. In the case of Moldova, it was a transparent step of support for the pro-Western president in the confrontation with rather strong pro-Russian sentiments both in the government and parliament and in society. In addition, Moldova is constantly under the gun of Russian troops after their invasion of Ukraine, who make no secret of their intentions to "break through a land corridor" to their grouping in Transnistria.

The decision of the EU to delay granting candidate status to Georgia was also influenced by the fact that the Georgian opposition has much more substantial support in European structures than the ruling party: the former ruling and now main opposition Georgian party, the United National Movement, is part of the European People's Party (EPP) - the largest and the leading party in the European Parliament, while the current ruling Georgian Dream has no such powerful partner. It is the powerful party lobby that explains quite a negative attitude of various European structures to the current authorities and the political situation in Georgia, restrained and/or critical resolutions on various topics and issues, and, as a consequence, the cool attitude of decision-makers to the Georgian authorities. At the same time, it must be admitted that the Georgian opposition has much stronger and more effective support in the European structures than among the voters in Georgia, in contrast to the Georgian Dream, which just enjoys stable support from the majority for 10 years, although during all this time it has never established work in the European structures and cannot find strong support.

It is unfortunate that in Georgia, in the heat of political struggle and constant fierce fights for power, neither the government, the ruling party, nor the opposition can find common ground and common language in matters that directly affect the interests of the state and the people. Both sides put party and personal gains above the interests of the country and the people, although the fact that membership in the EU or NATO is very important for Georgia as a state is even enshrined in our constitution.

It is because of such radical confrontation with respect to each other that the first of the 12 conditions for EU candidate status is overcoming the polarization between political and social groups.

In my opinion, the most curious reason for "circumventing" Georgia in the issue of granting candidate status to the EU was named by the President of France. They say that it is all about geography: Ukraine and Moldova are Europe, while Georgia is not. It is difficult to argue with this, but with such logic, NATO is also a North Atlantic Alliance, whereas, for example, Türkiye, Greece, or Italy are also quite far away from the North Atlantic. So, for purely geographical reasons, their membership in NATO is nonsense. Although we are well aware that military, political or economic alliances are very rarely based on geography and this, if I may say so, excuse by Macron is simply ugly and unethical, to say the least.

Actually, here are the reasons for Georgia's delay in granting EU candidate status: the war in Ukraine, polarization, and the lobby in the European structures.

- Can such a verdict of the EU be considered political, related in particular to the fact that Georgia has not opened a second front against Ukraine? Do you think that if Saakashvili had been in power, would Georgia have been given the coveted candidate status?

- Answering the first part of this question, I can say firmly: no, that is not the reason for the delay in granting candidate status to Georgia. Of course, there were and there are certain forces and groups in the West, in Georgia, in Ukraine, and in Russia that would like Georgia to enter the war, but fortunately, nowhere have these forces influenced the situation. And this means that they do not have enough power or influence to promote their interests.

As for the second part of the question, I would put it more delicately: history does not like the subjunctive mood. We cannot say what would have happened if things had gone that way. But we can firmly say how things would have gone when things went this way. Under Saakashvili, Georgia had very big problems with human rights, property rights, media freedom, and many other political and social aspects. Much bigger than the ones that caused the EU to delay granting us candidate status. That is why I doubt very much that under Saakashvili Georgia would have been given this status.

- Will Georgia's aspiration to the EU subside after that?

- No, of course not. This is the will of the people, it's written in the constitution. If the current government fails to cope with the issue of Georgia's EU membership, we will choose another one. Europe is the natural place for Georgia.

- And yet, how will this neglect of the EU towards Georgia affect its ties with the West?

- If you mean the Georgian Government, it has already had a negative impact, but the people and the society at large have not changed their attitude in any way.

- In your opinion, should Georgia keep moving towards the West or look East sometimes - towards Azerbaijan and Türkiye?

- I think that the formulation of the question is not quite correct: for Georgia, there is no choice between East and West. If our country moves towards the West, it does not mean that it moves away from the East. On the contrary, it links the West and the East.

Historically, Georgia has always been at the crossroads of worlds, cultures, and mentalities, and when we had peace and prosperity, the West and the East coexisted peacefully and harmoniously, but as soon as there was tension between them, Georgia first became a field of battle and confrontation between these two worlds. We see ourselves as a small, but still a link between the cultures and mentality of the West and the East. By the way, note that Azerbaijan and even more so Türkiye are also interested in integration with the West, and Ankara is even a candidate for EU membership. So both these brotherly states also aspire to European civilization, of course, taking into account their own state, mental and national peculiarities. In general, the interests of our whole region are closely intertwined with European integration and the West, and, to my deep conviction, to look back or turn away in any direction to the detriment of the other is fundamentally wrong and erroneous behavior. In the twenty-first century, the normal existence and development of any state without multi-vectors and multilateralism is impossible.

- Recently, a number of deputies left the Georgian Dream. Can we talk about a split in the ruling party?

- I believe that there is no split. The party itself simply decided that in the matter of criticizing the West and expressing dissatisfaction with the decisions of the country's leadership, more radical wording was needed than the ruling party could afford. So these deputies took on the function of harsh criticism and expression of extreme dissatisfaction with both individual figures (e.g., US Ambassador to Georgia Kelly Degnan) and the collective West. At the same time, the government and the ruling party are in a very advantageous position, since these deputies express the kind of radical approach that high-ranking officials and more loyal deputies do not dare to take, since this radical approach could be interpreted as the state's official position. And so they simply say that these deputies are not members of the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, and their opinion is not the official position of the government and the party. It's very convenient: everybody's happy! As the saying goes, both the wolves have eaten much and the sheep have not been touched.

But this is fundamentally wrong because it is clearly seen that the ruling forces in Georgia are trying to play not even double but triple game: on the one hand, they do not stop curtsying to the West, on the other - its criticism, and on the third - further radicalization of political and social processes and relations with the West. And all this under the name "Georgian Dream". Apart from the fact that all the above-mentioned are trumped up and it is well seen in the West, in our country too few people like such behavior.

But there is no split in the Georgian Dream because the core of this party is not a political platform or allegiance to ideals, but the desire for as much power and money as possible, and to keep all that its leaders have already achieved.

- In December, the EU is to make a new decision on Georgia's status. Will it be negative, as in June, or positive?

- In the light of the events that have already been taking place here after the EU's decision not to grant Georgia candidate status I cannot even say with certainty whether the December decision of Brussels will be positive or negative (by the way, the other day there was information that the decision on granting candidate status for Georgia is postponed to 2023, i.e. additional approximately 6 months). Now it's all up to Georgia and although the government has already started to develop and present the action plan and solutions for the 12 EU conditions, the opposition has again become radical and is not willing to participate in the processes on a par with the government and the ruling party, saying that they will cheat and bail again.

Of course, there may be some truth in such statements, but with its radical approach, the opposition is digging its own grave and giving trump cards to the ruling party: the latter can always say that it is doing everything to level out polarization and fulfill the EU conditions while presenting the mentioned plans and solutions, but the opposition still does not want to cooperate and work substantially, thus throwing a spanner in the works of the EU candidate status process.

I think more clarity must be expected by September: at the moment the Georgian parliament has already finished its work and gone on vacation (although an extraordinary session may well be called) and without the parliament and certain legislative changes it is impossible to fulfill some of those 12 points. That is why I estimate the possibility of a positive or negative decision by the EU on granting candidate status in December as half-and-half. Everything will be clear when autumn comes.