Iran’s anti-government uprising poses dilemma for US policy

Stimson Center has published an article that says that structuring Iranian policy exclusively around negotiation with the Iranian government could prove to be a strategic mistake. Caliber.Az reprints this article. 

A year ago, there was a collective uproar against the regime in Iran sparked when Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, was fatally beaten while in custody for violating the regime’s dress code of mandatory hijab.

This was the third major uprising in Iran since January 2017 and the most profound. The “Women, Life, Freedom” movement had significant costs for the Islamic Republic’s global legitimacy. Despite government efforts to block the dissemination of videos of the protests, the uprising attracted unprecedented international attention on social media. Notably, the UN Commission on the Status of Women ended Iran’s already controversial participation, and the US Ambassador to the UN called Iran’s membership “an ugly stain on the Commission’s credibility.” 

Despite such criticism, however, the Joe Biden administration did not fundamentally change its approach toward Iran. It continued to seek Iranian steps to curtail its nuclear advances — albeit without formally reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — and negotiated with Tehran to secure the release of dual national hostages by greenlighting the unfreezing of $6 billion of Iran’s oil revenues held in South Korea.  

So far, US policy towards Iran has failed to adequately adapt to an emerging new political reality exemplified by periodic, quickly evolving, widespread protests.  Structuring Iran’s policy exclusively around negotiation with the Iranian government disregards the defining force in Iran and could prove to be a strategic mistake.

The Mahsa Amini movement showcased a generational transformation in the country and has massive political implications for the future. Since the Green Movement erupted in 2009 following rigged elections, the Islamic Republic’s lack of legitimacy has been prominently on display.  However, as a younger generation takes the stage, the conflict between Iranian society and the government is fundamentally mutating in nature and scale. 

In January 2017, Iranians in nearly 100 cities took to the streets in the largest demonstrations since 2009 and bluntly called for the end of the Islamic Regime. The new crowds distinguished themselves by abandoning the old reformist alternative to the state’s core authority.

They chanted “Reformists, Principlists [hardliners], the game is over!” which remains one of the most popular slogans in Iran to this day. 

Iranian society has been drifting away from the government and established political factions at an increasing pace for the last two decades.  Iranians born between 1997 and 2010 (known as Generation Z) account for only about seven per cent of the population but have been at the forefront of protests since 2017.

They are proficient in using social media and despite government efforts to heavily regulate online content, are well-connected to the global flow of information. Their wider access to data gives them a unique ability to reflect on their lives in Iran by making cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons. They have a positive view of Western political and societal values such as democracy and individual liberty and are not interested in old solutions to the issue of authoritarianism in Iran.

Iran’s Gen Z has lived through political turmoil since a young age and can lead uprisings with exclusive taglines, martyrs, and creative ways of resistance that range from chanting “Death to the dictator” to dancing on the streets to a song by American pop star Selena Gomez. 

This deepening gulf between the government and society combined with a collapsing economy portend a continuation of increasingly radicalized uprisings.  

In recent days, there has been talk about raising the price of gas in Iran.  The last time the government increased the price, in 2019, nationwide protests erupted, and the regime’s legitimacy took another major hit. Today, the Islamic Republic is faced with a decision whether to increase the price of gas, causing another major spike in the already severe inflation rate and risking triggering another uprising on the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, or keep spending oil revenues to continue to subsidize gas consumption.  

All available evidence suggests that tensions between the Iranian government and its citizens are rapidly escalating. This widening disparity constitutes the most serious threat to the Islamic Republic’s existence, far above any external threat.  

From the US perspective, policymakers should note the impact their steps involving Iran will have on this underlying conflict as it fundamentally will affect American security interests in the region. Instead of continuing negotiations, there should be a stronger reliance on deterrence to contain threats like nuclear proliferation and proxy warfare, investment in more channels to transfer humanitarian aid, and more technological support to help Iranians maintain communications with each other and the outside world when protests break out. 

Ultimately, the future of Iran will be decided by Iranians, not foreign powers. However, US policy now will be crucial in shaping how Iran’s rising generation relates to the West and whether young Iranians will continue to look to the US as a model for their own society and political system.