Iranian expansionism: goals, tactics, outcomes Mikhail Shereshevskiy's analysis

During the uprising in Syria which started in 2011, Bashar Assad's regime was on the verge of a breakdown. It was helped to survive by external forces, especially Iran and Russia, which sent troops there. When the Iranians suffered heavy losses, they relied on funding their proxies, Shiite militias from all over the Middle East, who entered Syria in the tens of thousands. These forces, together with loyalist military units and Assad's militias, now control what is called regime territory - about 60 per cent of the country, including the capital, Damascus.

Who will help the Iranian regime today during the riots in Iran itself, which have been raging for 10 weeks (since mid-September)? What if the regime fails to deal with them? This is an important question, the answer to which sheds light on what the modern Iranian state is.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is an expansionist regime building its empire, but it uses very peculiar tactics. The typical tactic of colonizers, expansionist empires, is to use their armies to invade a number of regions and then send their settlers there and displace the local population. The leaders of the IRI act differently.

During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, the US and the Soviet Union simultaneously supported (starting from a certain period) Iraq in order to prevent Iran from winning. Then the regime of the Islamic republic realized that direct military expansion was impossible for it because no one can oppose all the key powers of the planet at once. Therefore, the Iranians' tactics changed fundamentally. The American researcher of Iranian origin Arian Tabatabai calls it the principle of "No Conquest, No Defeat".

Iran uses some active elements among Shiite Muslims, pumping them with weapons and financial aid. In this way, they are able to oppose local governments and other forces in their countries, forming a dual power. In some cases, pro-Iranian militias virtually seize power, as happened in Lebanon: the country has fallen under the control of the armed Shiite party Hezbollah (despite the fact that it probably does not even have majority support among the Shiite community, which represents about a third of the Lebanese population, and has only 13 seats in the Lebanese parliament out of 128). Hezbollah terrorizes regime opponents and commits political assassinations. Mass protests by the Lebanese population in 2019-2020 were dispersed in large part with its involvement, including Lebanese security forces under the control of Hezbollah supporters. Hezbollah does not rule alone. It is in coalition with various ethnic-confessional parties and factions, while the latter is influenced by the country's richest families. In fact, Hezbollah has assumed the role of armed protector of the ruling class, helping to break up protests against social injustice - protests in which millions of disadvantaged people have participated.

In Iraq, pro-Iranian militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and others largely control the country and the regime. As in Lebanon, these forces suppress demonstrations of opponents of the Iraqi government, protecting the privileges of the ruling class. In 2019, pro-Iranian militias, along with the Iraqi police and army, shot protesting youth, unemployed, and workers, killing about 600 and injuring about 20,000. Pro-Iranian Shiite parties affiliated with these militias form the core of Iraq's current government.

In Syria, there are numerous militia groups from Lebanese and Iraqi Hezbollah, Afghan Shiite Hazara (Fatemiyoun Brigade), as well as Syrian militias close to the Iranians (such as the so-called Local Defence Forces, LDF). These groups are closely intertwined with the Assad regime. Pro-Iranian militias and the Iranian military itself have joined the 4th Division, run by the dictator's brother Maher Assad, and other important units of the regime. As a result of these organizations' civil war and terror, some 7 million people have fled Syria, according to the UN. At the same time, foreign militias from pro-Iranian formations easily obtain Syrian citizenship.

The Iranian regime seeks to gain influence wherever Shiites or similar religious movements live and wherever fundamentalists, i.e. supporters of political Islam, can be found among them and attracted to its side. In the ideal state, as envisioned by these groups ("Velayet-e Faqih"), the country would be ruled by a theologian jurist with near-absolute power. From the perspective of many Shiite fundamentalists, Iran's spiritual leader (de facto dictator), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is also their spiritual, political, and military leader.

Iran's influence is not limited to the Shiite crescent. It has penetrated into Yemen, where the pro-Iranian Hussite rebel movement (they profess a religious doctrine close to Shiism, Zaydism) controls about 40 per cent of the country. In the event of a successful expansion in Yemen, Iranian supporters could take control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which is of great economic and strategic importance. This intercontinental strait between the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and the northeastern part of the African continent (Djibouti and Eritrea) connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden of the Arabian Sea. A trade route from Europe to South and East Asia passes through it.

The Iranians have also infiltrated Nigeria, where Shiism is now spreading rapidly, gaining millions of followers. Some Nigerian supporters of Hezbollah and Tehran are receiving military training from Iranian and Lebanese instructors.

However, in no case should we put an equal sign between pro-Iranian forces and Shiites. The latter, of course, are very different. Among them, there are millions of opponents of Tehran and those who are indifferent to the Islamic Republic. Most of the protesters of the poor, working class, and students in Iraq and Iran itself, as well as a large part of the Lebanese protesters, are Shiites.

In addition, the Iranians also fund some influential Sunni Islamist groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (IJ). The group's leader, Ziyad Nahala, is competing with the head of Lebanon's Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, for a key role among Iran's allies in the region.

According to the Deputy Chief of the Israeli General Staff Yair Golan, the advantage of the Iranian strategy (we are not talking here about the moral side of the matter but about efficiency) is that the Iranian regime gets maximum benefits from expansion, with minimal losses in the course of foreign operations. Using these tactics, Iran has largely (though not completely) subjugated vast territories - Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, creating the so-called "Shiite crescent" - a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut. With considerable proxy forces in these countries, the Iranians can quickly move them from one country to another, for example, from Iraq to Syria and from there to Lebanon. This allows them to control the region. Finally, the reaction of the West, especially the US, has not been as harsh as during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988.

This is how an Iranian empire from the borders of Afghanistan to the Mediterranean Sea emerged in the last decade. Some Israeli analysts believe that Iran's strategy is aimed at creating a second Shiite crescent in the future, through Shiite-populated Bahrain and several regions of Saudi Arabia to Yemen. In this case, the Iranians would be able to take the Middle East in a geopolitical "jaw". Of course, such a development is unrealistic today, since Saudi forces are firmly in control, including their occupation of Bahrain.

However, Iranian proxies are not only designed to project Iranian power outward but also to quell unrest in Iran itself. Some protesting Iranians say they have seen militants speaking Arabic in the streets; Lebanese Hezbollah helped suppress the protesting "green movement" in Iran back in 2009.

The Iranian regime has been expanding its influence in the world, and especially in the Middle East, for years by funding and equipping various armed groups and militias. But it has been pursuing many goals. One of them is to use these militias to suppress protests within Iran itself.