Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative a gamble? Maximizing benefits

On October 17, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China for the first time since the Russo-Ukraine war unfolded in 2022 for a high-level meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The leaders are each hobbled by crises of their own making: Russia's disastrous war on Ukraine and China's economic stumbles, which have frayed confidence in Xi's management.

The two-day trip comes as Xi hosts one of the biggest events of China’s diplomatic calendar this year, the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, to mark the 10th anniversary of the $1 trillion infrastructure building program.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has faced criticism over concerns that China is luring economically vulnerable countries into unsustainable debt through large-scale infrastructure investments. 

A signature policy of President Xi Jinping, the BRI is aimed at stitching China closer to the world through investments and infrastructure projects. With an unprecedented glut of cash pumped into nearly 150 countries, China boasts it has transformed the world - and it is not wrong.

Vladimir Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s meeting is also an opportunity to showcase their alliance and partnership against the United States and other Western nations at a moment of global tumult. Undoubtedly, Chinese and Russian foreign policy agendas are based on pragmatic and mutual interests, particularly at a time of global geopolitical uncertainty.

For example, unlike the Western bloc, which demonstrated unilateral support to Israel in its war against the Hamas militant organization in Gaza, Moscow and Beijing criticize Tel Aviv’s systematic air raids and bombings of the world’s most densely populated settlement. Moreover, Russia and China have carefully avoided describing the October 7 Hamas attack that killed more than 1,400 Israelis as terrorism.

Beijing has rejected Western criticism of its partnership with Moscow even as the war in Ukraine shows no sign of ceasing, insisting that their ties do not violate international norms and that China has the right to collaborate with whichever country it chooses. The ambitious BRI project gradually became an effective tool for China to promote its global and regional interests while forging new alliances.

Although Russia does not openly oppose the BRI-led infrastructure projects in its neighbourhood, it possesses specific concerns regarding Beijing's ambitions in Central Asia and Caucasus. China’s private companies are also becoming more active in a space once dominated by policy banks and state-owned companies.

As such, Central Asian leaders were also present at the summit, including Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. A decade later, Central Asia stands largely on the sidelines of BRI-generated trade growth.

According to data published by the China Daily, a Chinese government mouthpiece, Beijing’s annual trade turnover with BRI participating countries topped $ 2 trillion in 2022, but Central Asian states accounted for just over 3 per cent of that total, or roughly $70 billion.

Nevertheless, Chinese investment in BRI projects recently has tapered off as the world’s second-biggest economy slows. Recipient countries are struggling more than ever to repay their debts amid global economic headwinds from the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

In contrast to the US and Western allies, Russia is satisfied with China’s striving ambitions and its confrontation with the West as it perfectly matches Moscow’s interests. As of the end of 2021, 26 out of 33 projects were completed, but there has been little shift in investment or trade.

As a result, the US, which sees the BRI as a tool for Beijing to extend its global influence at the expense of American power, has proposed its own investment program to boost global infrastructure development.

Despite the criticism in Western media, the reports and independent sources suggest that the BRI has produced tangible economic benefits for participating countries, giving countries comprising the Global South options for additional and alternative sources of much-needed financing that provide more opportunities for developing country agencies. Even with the slower pace of investment, Xi’s imprint means BRI won’t fade away.

Notwithstanding Russia's support and Central Asian countries' interest in engagement with the China-led BRI project, the West will put enormous efforts to counter Beijing's influence. For example, major Pacific powers such as the US, Australia, and Japan have dedicated more resources and efforts to re-engage with Pacific Island countries. On the tenth anniversary of the BRI, the Western media will keep further describing it as a "Chinese neocolonialism" project, which still lacks fundamental logic and argument.