Israel, Türkiye, Iran: reshaping the Middle East The 2022 results with Mikhail Shereshevskiy

Three factors are defining key features of the modern Middle East. There is the weakening influence of the United States in the region; Arab Spring, which has undermined the ability of a number of Arab states to influence events; and the rise of three non-Arab states - Israel, Türkiye, and Iran.

The United States is much more concerned with the other two regions, East Asia and Europe. American national security strategy points to China, the rising economic and military superpower, as a "strategic challenge" and sees the PRC as a multi-layered problem. It is about the economic competition (the US fears that China, with its decades-long economic growth, will turn into a giant super-rich Hong Kong) and a possible military confrontation over the island of Taiwan. On the other hand, due to developments in Ukraine, Russia is seen in Washington as the most "acute threat".

Louis Simon, director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Government, also says that the importance of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region to the United States compared to other regions is usually justified by the fact that they are the only two regions with the demographic, industrial, technological and military potential that would allow any dominant power in them to seriously challenge and eventually threaten the United States. This is the difference between them and the Middle East.

The Middle East has been central to US policy for as long as it has remained a major supplier of energy to the world market. But today, American interest in the region has diminished as the US, thanks to the shale revolution, has achieved energy autonomy.

For all this, it is important for Americans to maintain a military presence only in the Persian Gulf, which supplies oil to East Asia, protecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and a number of other countries from Iranian expansion. Otherwise, it is more advantageous for the Americans to shift their attention and resources to East Asia and Europe, to rely on allies in the Middle East, and to pursue a policy of careful bloc balancing there. This reinforces the importance of regional powers. Most importantly, the decline of American attention to the region has created a power vacuum, a void into which the regional powers are being drawn. Each seeks to fill it. This creates growing tension and competition between them. Therefore, the Middle East has become more dynamic.

On the other hand, the Arab Spring, the revolutionary wave of 2011-2013, has severely undermined the political stability of Arab states. Libya, Syria, and Yemen are still mired in civil wars. In addition, the armies of foreign powers, which support one faction or another, have been introduced into these countries. Although intensive hostilities in these three countries on the same scale as in the past are not taking place at the moment, the conflicts cannot be considered over and new outbreaks are possible at any moment.

In Syria, the interests of Türkiye, which supports anti-Assad Arab and Turkoman militias, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, with Russia and Iran on its side, and the Kurdish forces, which receive support from the US, clash.

In Yemen, a ceasefire between pro-Iranian Hussein rebels and Saudi-backed government forces was agreed upon in the spring. The ceasefire expired on October 2. In the current situation, which is neither peace nor war, the Saudis continue to close the skies over Yemen to flights and armed clashes could resume.

In Libya, Türkiye is providing military and political support to the government in Tripoli led by Abdulhaimeed Dbeiba, while Egypt is supporting politico-military groups in the east that oppose that government.

Egypt, the most populous Arab country with a large army, is the former flagship of the Arab world. Cairo was able to emerge from the internal strife sparked by the Arab Spring. A military coup has established the regime of dictator Fatah al-Sisi in this country of 100 million people. But despite a growing economy, Egypt's authoritarian leadership feels insecure. The army ("deep state") rules this country. However, Egypt is dependent on international economic aid and fears a repeat of the 2011 revolution.

Under such conditions, three non-Arab countries have come to the forefront playing key roles in the region - Israel, Türkiye, and Iran. Linked to them are the three main blocs currently forming and competing in the Middle East.

In Israel, elections were held in 2022, ending political uncertainty. For several years in a row, none of the party alliances could win a majority. Israel's 2019-2022 political crisis was a period of instability, with five snap elections to the parliament, the Knesset, within three years. But in November 2022, a bloc of right-wing nationalist and religious parties led by Benjamin Netanyahu, a political longshot and heavy hitter, won a solid majority and now forms a majority government. This government, unlike its predecessors, has a chance of governing for a long time. However, many things about it are causing dissent in society.

The high profile of religious parties has fuelled suspicion and mistrust among a large secular section of the population. The huge role ultra-nationalists have come to play in the government worries the Arab sector, which has engaged in revolts in the recent past. Finally, there is the controversial personality of Netanyahu himself, who is being tried on corruption charges. One part of the country thinks highly of him, the other part sees him as an enemy. Netanyahu's bloc rule may bring many surprises.

A group of predominantly Sunni Arab countries, above all the UAE and Bahrain (Bahrain is ruled by Sunnis, but the majority is Shiite), have normalised relations with Israel in the framework of the Abrahamic agreements and expect to strengthen economic and political ties with Israel. Saudi Arabia, the richest Arab country, is moving in the same direction. So far, however, it has avoided establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. Egypt and Jordan, which have long had diplomatic relations with Israel, also join the alliance. As Amos Harel, an Israeli political-military expert has noted, "Jordan is better at securing Israel's eastern flank than we are".

But the influential Shiite pro-Iranian bloc is in a state of turbulence due to political instability and economic failure. The rule of the Iranians and their allies has created an economic crisis caused by corruption and incompetence in officials, the huge role of an inefficient public sector economy living off workers' taxes, and gangster forms of privatisation. The enrichment of the upper classes here can come largely at the expense of the impoverishment of the lower classes and the embezzlement of public funds. While grassroots uprisings swept Iraq and Libya in 2019, today they have spread to Iran itself.

For the Iranian regime, 2022 was an era of uncertainty, triggered by an uprising that began in mid-September following the murder of 22-year-old girl Mahsa Amini by the vice police. Thus there is uncertainty at the heart of the Iranian bloc, caused by persistent protests and uprisings that primarily involve the social grassroots and skilled workers and professionals. Iran's theocracy - the regime of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - is facing the threat of revolution. It is in a stalemate - the protests cannot topple the regime, and the regime cannot quell them. The situation is becoming more and more reminiscent of Syria in 2011, following the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, the Sourah. Iran's ethnic minorities, including Kurds, Baluchis, and Azerbaijanis, are the most active and one wonders whether all this will lead to the country's disintegration in the Syrian scenario.

Türkiye continues to forge alliances with a number of states, consolidating its influence in the Greater Middle East and the world. Türkiye's main allies are gas-rich Qatar, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan (in contrast, the Israel-Sunni Arab bloc is getting closer to Pakistan's adversary, India). In addition, as mentioned above, Türkiye maintains close ties with the opposition in Syria and with the government in Libya. In Central Asia, Ankara is forming the Organization of Turkic States (which includes Azerbaijan). This association is in principle capable of forming a new economic and military-political bloc with a population of 160 million, a combined GDP of more than $1.5 trillion, and a military partnership. If the Turkish bloc becomes a strong force, it will contain Chinese and Russian influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

In 2022, Türkiye's leadership has sought to soften the tensions with competing blocs. A rapprochement with Israel and the UAE is looming. However, attempts at rapprochement with Egypt have so far come to nothing, as there is a serious dispute between the countries over Libya (mentioned above) as well as the controversy over the disputed gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea.

In northern Syria, near the Turkish-Syrian border, Türkiye is preparing a military operation against Kurdish formations linked to the PKK. But so far, Ankara is not carrying out the operation due to diplomatic opposition from Russia and the US, which are seeking to contain Türkiye's growing influence.

The Turkish-Iranian economic partnership persists and there is no evidence of Ankara's interference in Iran's domestic politics. But if South Azerbaijan resists the Iranian regime and becomes an arena of increasing bloody clashes and suppression by forces loyal to Tehran, Türkiye is unlikely to be able to stay away.

Finally, while Israel held elections in 2022, Türkiye is due to hold them in June 2023. This period is characterised by fierce electoral struggles that have and will undoubtedly have an impact on Turkish foreign policy.