ISW: Russian troops trying to break out of positional warfare

According to the analysts of the US-based think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare.

A prominent Russian milblogger stated on January 23 that Russian forces need to figure out how to break out of positional warfare but that Russian forces cannot concentrate in numbers sufficient to break through Ukrainian lines because Ukrainian forces strike all force concentrations larger than a battalion, Caliber.Az reports citing ISW.

The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces target Russian force concentrations even in near rear areas. The milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces still target small Russian groups of one-to-two infantry companies and 10 armored vehicles with drone strikes, preventing Russian forces from even reaching Ukrainian forward defensive lines.

The milblogger complained that Russian forces’ only solution thus far has been to attack with 10-20 dismounted infantrymen with armored vehicles supporting at an “extreme” distance behind the infantry. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger responded in agreement with the first milblogger, claiming that Ukrainian technological advancements have made it difficult for Russian forces to concentrate several divisions in a discrete geographic area without Ukrainian forces detecting the force concentration.

The milblogger emphasized that Russian forces need to both obtain indirect fire superiority over Ukrainian forces and overhaul Russian command-and-control (C2) to break out of positional warfare. The milblogger stressed that Russian forces on the frontline need to be able to quickly communicate to minimize the time between spotting and striking a target and that this change will only occur with a significant change in C2 processes.

The characteristics and problems of positional warfare that Russian milbloggers have identified in recent discussions overlap with many systemic issues in the Russian military that the milbloggers have been complaining about for a long time.

Russian milbloggers have complained generally about poor Russian C2 as it pertains to indirect fire, the attrition of Russian forces through unproductive “meat assaults” against Ukrainian positions, poor tactical and operational planning, and the struggle to counter Ukrainian drone operations on the front line and in near rear areas.

There are no indications that the Russian military command has materially improved on any of these identified issues at the operational level necessary to break through a positional front in one or more areas of the theatre.

Russian forces have recently proven themselves capable of making marginal tactical advances during intensified offensive efforts even with these systemic issues, however, particularly near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Western states reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) at the 18th Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 23.
• NATO concluded contracts on January 23 for the purchase over 200,000 artillery shells, likely either to allow NATO to send additional aid to Ukraine or to replenish NATO stockpiles.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22-23 with a new strike package likely meant to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Palestinian National Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki as part of efforts to deepen Russian relations with Middle Eastern actors.
• The Russian Baltic Fleet is conducting a coastal missile exercise likely to posture against ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely deliberately misrepresenting population statistics in occupied areas to encourage people to relocated to occupied settlements.