"Moscow's leverage over the South Caucasus is becoming increasingly limited" Conversation with historian Konstantin Pakhalyuk

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Russian-Israeli expert and historian Konstantin Pakhalyuk.

- What are the risks of suspending Russia's participation in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and does this mean the world is actually on the brink of nuclear war?

- Indeed, Russia has frozen its participation in the START. The contract itself does not imply such a form of behavior of one of the participants. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) provides for the right of a state to suspend its participation in treaties. In this case, both sides (Russia and the US) continue to comply with all strategic nuclear weapons quantity control numbers. However, Russia currently has far more pressing security concerns than a new nuclear strategic race - it should be able to cope with the production of conventional weapons... Mutual verification of compliance with the START took the fall, but in fact, the same mutual inspections have not been carried out since the pandemic and became virtually impossible after the war against Ukraine began.

Naturally, it is not a good thing that the treaty on the control of strategic nuclear forces between the two countries, which account for 90 per cent of the world's nuclear stockpile, is no longer in force. Let us not forget that China is now actively upgrading its nuclear forces, but it has not yet become a global nuclear power. According to SIPRI (a Swedish think-tank that studies peace and conflicts, arms control and disarmament in particular), by 2022 Russia had 4,477 nuclear warheads, the US had 3,708 and China had just 350. Incidentally, France had 290, and the UK had 180. Putin's decision is rather aimed at the domestic public - once again to show "independence" and "readiness to confront the conditional Western world to the end". It is important for him to achieve two goals simultaneously: on the one hand, to convince ordinary Russians that he is generally in control of the situation, and on the other, to frighten the global West: conventionally "the whole world is against us, so Russian citizens have no other choice but to unite around the authorities". So far there is no talk about the real use of nuclear weapons, either strategic or tactical.

- So the fears concerning the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation against Ukraine are groundless?

- Threats of using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine should not be discounted, let's not be naive: states create them to use them in emergencies. The problem is that not for Russia but for the current political elite a military defeat is a death sentence. Since the Kremlin sincerely believes that they are the whole of Russia, it sends a formidable message to the outside world: "Nothing will stop us".

I think the Kremlin hopes that sooner or later it will be able to resolve the conflict "on its own terms". But if you cannot win on the battlefield, then you have to play up the stakes by saying: "Guys, I will go all the way and you will get hurt, so you better accept my terms".

- How do you see the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war?

- It is a thankless task to make forecasts, including those regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. The Russian leadership is aiming for the army to reach its limits (which no one is talking about publicly) and to move the conflict further into a frozen phase. Ukraine will seek to de-occupy its territory, here the goal is much clearer and more understandable. But even if it is imagined that it will return to the borders of 2013, how can it further protect itself from revenge attempts? In any war, the main thing is to defeat the enemy's army and crush its will, so I wouldn't get too attached to the movement of the front lines.

There's another thing to understand: for Ukraine now it's a question of statehood and generally the possibility of living its own life. For Russia, it is not a question of survival (unless, of course, the state is confused with the elites): even if it returns to the borders of 2013, the country itself will not die. Accordingly, completely different motivations on different sides. Yes, this is a new form of war - a war of attrition, where the internal political stability of each of the participants plays a high role, and the possibility of compromise and peace increases with the arrival of new forces.

- I would like to hear your views on Russia's policy in the South Caucasus, in particular in relation to the EU mission to Armenia.

- Over the past decades, Russia has consistently sought to increase its own military and political role on the world stage, acting as a power broker: first in conflicts in the post-Soviet space, then in Syria and some African countries (if one considers that the Wagner PMC still acts on behalf of Moscow). The war against Ukraine, launched ostensibly because of security threats, has led to exactly the opposite consequences. Ironically, everyone expected the Russian economy to collapse because of foreign sanctions, but at least in 2022, it has survived. And vice versa: no one expected the Russian army to perform so poorly on the battlefield. Naturally, the latter threatens Russia's role as a power broker, at least in the eyes of those who do not believe in its victory. Russia will certainly not withdraw from the South Caucasus: For Moscow, albeit now occupied by Ukraine, it is a significant region, but its resources of influence have become increasingly limited over the past year.

Turkey is strengthening its position. The EU, too, has not come here today, trying to offer itself as an alternative player to Moscow - a politico-military mediator. I can assume that Pashinyan's behaviour is both a demarche against insufficient assistance from the CSTO and Russia and a hedging of risks of Russia's weakening at the expense of the EU, and at the same time an element of pressure on Moscow.

Armenia cannot fail to understand that today it does not have many allies to throw them around. However, Moscow is also aware that economically and militarily Armenia is too dependent on it. It is doubtful that the EU is capable to provide similar support. Russia will certainly do everything to preserve its influence in the South Caucasus. Although over the year it has gained a) widespread isolation; b) a protracted and not very successful war against Ukraine; c) a threat of NATO expansion (which is held back only by Türkiye).

In relations with China, Russia will play a rather subordinate role: in Beijing, it is called the "big sister" for a reason: sisters are generally respected, of course, but they are not treated as equals. Against this background, to allow itself to be knocked out of the South Caucasus is a tangible defeat.

- Is there any possibility of the introduction of the CSTO peacekeeping force in Armenia?

- For Moscow, this would be an ideal solution, as it would allow it to say to the world: "Look, we can resolve conflicts, there are countries ready to follow us. However, there are too many contradictions between the CSTO states, and to agree to such a mission would be a gift to Moscow. Why, exactly? Naturally, Russia, which is used to playing on Azerbaijani-Armenian differences, would be glad to sign a peace agreement, but only if it is its main guarantor. Imagine a different situation: suddenly Baku and Yerevan conclude a peace treaty, find a consensus on borders supported by an absolute majority of the citizens of their republics (I understand that this is a very idealistic picture) and then peaceful life begins. It is possible to preserve their own at the expense of economic, political, infrastructural, and cultural projects. What can modern Russia offer in these conditions? The answer seems to be obvious.

So I would be wary of making any predictions. There is a big role of external forces in the region: Türkiye - Azerbaijan, Iran - Armenia, Russia as a traditional power broker, and attempts of the EU to strengthen the position of a political mediator. Much depends on the internal stability of the incumbent authorities in Türkiye  (due to elections), Iran (which has to survive a wave of protests), and Russia (the war against Ukraine is not really popular, which creates potential risks for political stability).