President Aliyev's theses, Kyiv's struggles, Syria's next chapter Caliber.Az weekly review

The Caliber.Az editorial team presents the latest episode of the program “Sobitiya” (Events) with Murad Abiyev, which covers the week’s main news concerning Azerbaijan and beyond.

Azerbaijan – Armenia

President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, gave an interview to Dmitry Kiselev, Director General of the International News Agency Russia Today. A significant part of the conversation was devoted to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement, which we will discuss in more detail later.

At the outset, I would like to draw attention to a key point raised by the president in response to a journalist's question about Azerbaijan's stance in the event of a full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO. Aliyev emphasized Baku’s geopolitical independence and its ability, thanks to this very factor, to act as a mediator between the parties to ease tensions.

Thus, Azerbaijan has once again firmly reaffirmed its non-aligned status while also underlining its active role in promoting peace and stability in the region and the world.

Regarding the settlement between Baku and Yerevan, President Aliyev issued a stark warning: "Armenia will not stand the arms race with us, despite the fact that they get most of the arms from the West for free or on loan, which, of course, will be written off. But even in this case they will not withstand an arms race with us." The president said that in the event of an armed conflict, none of Armenia's patrons will come to its aid.

The president then outlined four key points that currently serve as stumbling blocks in the peace negotiations. Two of these are directly tied to the content of the peace agreement: refraining from filing international lawsuits against each other and rejecting the deployment of representatives from third countries along the border.

The proposal to refrain from lawsuits should be seen as a gesture of goodwill, as the damage inflicted by Armenia during its occupation of Azerbaijani territories, according to the president, exceeds $150 billion—a burden that would weigh heavily on Armenia for years. It is important to note that Armenia's claims against Azerbaijan are legally far less substantiated but are politically motivated.

Azerbaijan's proposal to forgo lawsuits primarily reflects its desire to eliminate the atmosphere of mistrust that prolonged legal disputes inevitably create, demonstrate goodwill, and achieve peace by turning the page on hostility.

Regarding the non-deployment of representatives from third countries along the border, this point specifically applies to Armenia and the controversial EU monitoring mission, which, according to Aliyev, essentially functions as NATO infrastructure.

The other two points, while not directly included in the draft treaty's content, are equally critical as they serve as necessary prerequisites for concluding the agreement. These include Armenia's obligation to remove territorial claims against Azerbaijan from its constitution and to formally endorse the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The rationale here is clear: as long as Armenia maintains constitutional claims to Azerbaijani territories and refuses to sanction the dissolution of an institution whose mission was to mediate the Karabakh conflict, Baku has every reason to believe that Yerevan does not consider the conflict resolved and harbors aspirations for revenge.

The very next day, Prime Minister Pashinyan responded to President Aliyev’s statements. Addressing the first point, he indicated that, in general, the idea of refraining from lawsuits is acceptable to the Armenian side.

Commenting on the issue of non-deployment of third parties along the border, Pashinyan stated that the Armenian side adheres to the principle of applying this measure only after the delimitation of the respective sections. This contradicts Baku’s stance, which holds that the presence of the EU’s intelligence-gathering mission is precisely what obstructs the delimitation process. This creates a vicious cycle.

In response to the constitutional condition, Pashinyan once again presented the familiar counterarguments, whose invalidity we have repeatedly demonstrated in our analyses. Additionally, he put forth several laughable claims. For instance, he argued that Karabakh did not participate in the 1995 constitutional referendum, nor in subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections in Armenia.

“Furthermore, if the Azerbaijani interpretation of Armenia’s Constitution were correct, the recognition of our Karabakh sisters and brothers as refugees by the Republic of Armenia would have been impossible,” Pashinyan added.

The Armenian Prime Minister once again pretends not to understand the essence of the issue. The point is not what Armenia has done, but what it could and can do according to its Constitution. Moreover, what nuances of applying Armenia's Constitution to Karabakh can even be discussed, given that Armenia blatantly occupied this land for thirty years, stationed its military there, and financed a separatist administrative apparatus?

Regarding the OSCE Minsk Group, Pashinyan initially called Aliyev’s proposal constructive but quickly undermined his own position. He artificially linked progress on this matter to ending Baku’s discourse on Western Azerbaijan, claiming that it supposedly reflects an aggressive policy towards the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

And once again, we see deception at play. It’s as if Azerbaijan had occupied Armenia’s territories for thirty years. Pashinyan cannot fail to understand that the first move in this direction must come from Yerevan—by renouncing its legislatively enshrined territorial claims against Azerbaijan and ceasing to exploit the issue of Armenians returning to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, not to mention providing guarantees for the return of Western Azerbaijanis.

In summary, Yerevan appears to accept only one point, which means it is far from ready for peace. This reluctance is evidently influenced both by the position of its external patrons and by the excessively high revanchist sentiments within Armenian society.

Ukraine – Russia

Russia continues its offensive on several fronts in Ukraine. Fierce battles are taking place near the city of Kurakhove in the Pokrovsk direction, where Ukrainian Armed Forces units risk being encircled. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces struck one of southern Russia’s largest chemical plants, the Kamensky complex in the Rostov region, using American and British missiles.

During his traditional Direct Line session, Vladimir Putin proposed a "21st-century high-tech duel" to the United States, involving a strike with Russia’s “Oreshnik” missile on Ukraine’s capital:
“Let them designate a target for us in Kyiv, concentrate all their air defense and missile defense systems there, and we will launch a strike with the ‘Oreshnik.’ Let’s see what happens. We are ready for such an experiment. Is the other side ready?” Putin stated.

The term "Oreshnik," which has gone viral thanks to internet users, distracts from another, far more important word in Putin's message—Kyiv. And not merely Kyiv as a geographical location (as strikes there have occurred before), but as the decision-making center. Shortly after this statement, a massive missile strike was launched against Kyiv. According to Russia's Ministry of Defense, the targets included a command center of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Luch Design Bureau (responsible for designing and manufacturing missiles and missile systems), and Patriot air defense missile system positions.

This strike on Kyiv can be seen as yet another illustration of Russia’s hardened stance ahead of upcoming negotiations on Ukraine with Donald Trump.

Middle East

Intensive negotiations between Israel and Hamas over a hostages-for-prisoners exchange have resumed in Doha. Reports suggest the sides are closer than ever to reaching a deal, though the issue of the Israeli army’s presence in Gaza remains a major sticking point. Israel insists on maintaining a military presence in the "Philadelphia" and "Netzarim" corridors.

Meanwhile, following a series of rocket attacks on Tel Aviv by Yemen's Houthis, Israel launched airstrikes on the group’s infrastructure in the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and the Ras Isa oil terminal on the Red Sea. In a second wave of strikes, Israeli aircraft targeted Houthi energy infrastructure in Sana’a.

Given Iran’s noticeably weakened position in the region, it is likely that pressure on the Houthis will intensify.

At the same time, the new Syrian authorities continue their efforts to stabilize the situation in the country and rebuild foreign relations. Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, hastened to assure the Western world in an interview with the BBC that Syria would not become a second Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a high-level U.S. delegation visited the Syrian capital, and it is already known that the new authorities are in talks with Washington about lifting sanctions on Syria.

Perhaps the most interesting question is how al-Sharaa will shape Syria's statehood and how effectively he will navigate the contradictions between major global players to achieve this goal.