Russia’s faltering sway over Baku-Yerevan dynamics faces a moment of epiphanic truth Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

In the most recent edition of “Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov”, the author argues that the consequential import of the meeting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers on 19 May will assume a more definable nature after the summit of the leaders in Moscow on 25 May. Amashov contends that Russia, having been ensconced in a comfortable perch as conflict manager for too long, must now be conscious of the necessity to accommodate the recent agreements achieved between the sides in Washington and Brussels into the Moscow platform and reconsider its self-serving and self-anointed “exclusivity” as chief mediator between the two nations, its role over Karabakh and in relation to the Zangazur Corridor.

"The latest meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers, which took place in Moscow on 19 May has not engendered boisterous hopes. The expectations anticipating this were not blue-sky either. Firstly, it is generally perceived that, when there is a degree of dynamism in the Brussels-Washington platform, Moscow feels an inexorable urge to be seen as active, initiating meetings for the sake of keeping an appearance of being a central mediator, despite having no real intention of attaining progress and actually seeking to derail the train leading to peace. Secondly, in the context of the meetings between the chief diplomats of Azerbaijan and Armenia undertaken under the aegis of Russian mediation, a peace treaty element has usually not been very explicit, the main focus being the delimitation and demarcation of the intestate border and the unblocking of communications.

These misgivings remain relevant. However, the present context, shaped by the installation of the border checkpoint by Azerbaijan at the entrance to the Lachin Road and a constructive atmosphere engendered by the recent four-day Washington talks by the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers in early May and the 14 May convocation of President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan via the good offices of EU Council President Charles Michel, offer a more positive outlook.

Russia wants to maintain its centrality, does not want its sway over the negotiations to falter and could still act as a self-serving spoiler. But what is also true is that, to remain relevant, Moscow needs to be receptive to developments taking place under the aegis of Western mediation. One method would be the incorporation of what was agreed in Brussels on 14 May into some form of a signed statement in Moscow, as was the case back in October 2022, where the principle of mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity declared in Prague earlier in the month was later reconfirmed in Sochi after the trilateral meeting of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian leaders.

On 19 May, the chief diplomats of Azerbaijan and Armenia discussed an agreement on “Peace and the establishment of interstate relations”, alongside delimitation of the interstate border and the unblocking of communications. The likely probability is that the question as to what those talks have or will spawn will be clarified on 25 May, when President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Putin will meet in Moscow.

Hopes are rife that, on 25 May, the parties will reiterate their commitment to the Almaty Declaration and the respective territorial integrity of Armenia covering 29,800 square kilometres and that of Azerbaijan, amounting to 86,600 square kilometres. If this key point is not confirmed in Moscow, the Kremlin’s mediatory efforts will look backwards, obsolete, insufferably beleaguered and even more self-serving. 

In terms of the Karabakh component of the wider peace agenda, Russia has, to date, been hellbent on placing emphasis on the indispensability of its so-called “peacekeepers”, currently temporarily stationed in the region, lacking any appetite to give impetus to dialogue between Baku and the Armenian population of the area, thereby demonstrating a complete disinterest in the removal of the remnants of the illegal Armenian armed forces, in line with Article 4 of the 2020 tripartite statement.

The two-track negotiations and separation of the interstate Baku-Yerevan domain from the integration of the Armenians residing in Karabakh into wider Azerbaijani society, as an internal process, has been integral to the latest negotiations in the West. Russia’s willingness to see the Karabakh component exclusively in terms of preserving the present status quo is manifestly untenable. Therefore, it is not unthinkable that, after the meeting of the leaders in Moscow on 25 May, we will belatedly see some signs of Russian readjustment.

In terms of the delimitation and demarcation of the interstate border, the final solution is undoubtedly going to be based on the Almaty Declaration, within the general framework of which the parties will need to strive to achieve an accord on the basis of Soviet-era maps and the facts on the ground. There have undeniably been some positional changes within the undelimited zone along the border, and this must be reflected.

Russia has a role to play here. The perusal of the Soviet maps, which are actually a collection of conflicting reference points, with topographic and General Staff sources differing, will form part of the process and require some Russian cooperation. There is also a bilateral commission, created pursuant to the 26 November 2021 Trilateral Statement, on the delimitation and subsequent demarcation of the interstate border, envisaging Russian consultation. This also gives Moscow some leverage.

However, the process is ultimately bilateral and the requirement for Russian mediation is largely contrived, mostly propagated by the Kremlin itself. In this vein, it is likely that Moscow will try to convince the parties on the suitability of the deployment of the mission of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) along the border, on the Armenian side, of course.

It is also interesting to predict how the question pertaining to control over the Zangazur route will pan out in Moscow on 25 May. The logic of the negotiations in Brussels firmly favours the principle of sovereignty over communications routes, calling upon the experience of the World Customs Organisation. By installing the border checkpoint at the entrance to Lachin Road, Baku has sent a clear message to Yerevan that the latter should be encouraged to install its own border checkpoints at both ends of the Zangazur Corridor.

Nevertheless, the regime of the route is shrouded in uncertainty. Russia is unwilling to relinquish its exclusivity, namely, its prescribed control over the road, as envisaged in Article 9 of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement. It is possible, although by no means certain, that some fluid formula, entailing a joint Russian-Armenian arrangement, could be developed in the interim, with Yerevan eventually assuming full control. In some ways, the question as to the regime of the Zangazur Corridor, traversing Southern Armenia, has become a point of contention between Russia and Armenia, with Baku displaying signs of being content with any arrangement, irrespective of the party exercising control over the road.

Ensconced in a comfortable and self-serving perch as the so-called “conflict manager” between Azerbaijan and Armenia for far too long, Russia is now facing a relevance and reality test. It has already displayed some signs of compromising on its self-anointed exclusivity on the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process. If, in the context of the peace treaty negotiations, Russia is conscious of accommodating the results arising from the Brussels and Washington platforms, in relation to border delimitation and unblocking communications, it has been adamantly protective of its mediatory framework, to date. Moscow’s outlook on Western efforts has been a patchwork of indignation and reluctant acquiescence. On 25 May, it is likely to behave as a spoiler with depleting resources, straining under the duress of being reasonable to remain relevant".