Will Armenia and Azerbaijan sign the peace deal before COP29? The clock is ticking
Recent events in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace settlement process suggest that positive shifts may be occurring. Initially, US President Joe Biden, through his special representative Michael Carpenter, sent a letter to President Ilham Aliyev urging for a peace agreement by the end of the year. A similar message was conveyed to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Notably, Biden highlighted that his administration is prepared to pursue "bold initiatives" to pave the way for peace, which Carpenter was expected to discuss with Aliyev, as mentioned in the letter. Following this, a one-and-a-half-hour meeting took place between delegations from Azerbaijan and Armenia, led by their respective leaders in Kazan, Russia.
Recently, the French ambassador to Yerevan, the well-known Olivier Decottignies, remarked in an interview with Armenian media that "Azerbaijan must sign a peace agreement with Armenia before COP29."
Just the day before, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan made several notable statements while discussing the country's budget in parliament. In addressing the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan, Mirzoyan emphasized that significant progress had been made in 2024, particularly concerning the delimitation of the interstate border. He characterized this as a well-established fact. However, he did not stop there.
Before delving further into Mirzoyan's comments on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, it is important to highlight his remarks on another closely related issue: the state of relations with Türkiye.
"Dialogue is ongoing regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the reopening of the border, and the unblocking of transport and other communications," Mirzoyan explained.
According to him, experts from both countries have assessed the infrastructure along the border. A similar assessment of the Gyumri-Kars railway infrastructure will be conducted in the near future. At the same time, the Foreign Minister noted that Ankara is linking normalization to the Armenian-Azerbaijani process. Yerevan views this as "somewhat unconstructive," yet remains optimistic about the normalization of relations. In contrast to previous statements, there is now less rigidity regarding Türkiye's uncompromising stance.
Mirzoyan then made what may be considered his boldest statement as Foreign Minister, particularly in terms of how it will be perceived by the broader Armenian public: "Regarding the international recognition of the 'Armenian genocide' [quotes added], as you might infer from the fact that I did not mention this issue when listing our priorities, it is not our primary task. The study of the tragic chapters of our history, the examination of the 'Armenian genocide,' or elevating this issue to priority number one is certainly not on the agenda of the Armenian Foreign Ministry." The list of immediate tasks focuses primarily on the normalization of relations and the signing of a peace agreement with Baku, as well as the delimitation of borders and the unblocking of communications.
Mirzoyan then noted that "Azerbaijan has semi-officially welcomed Armenia's proposals for unblocking transport communications in the region." "We have conveyed proposals to the Azerbaijani side that were... semi-officially welcomed. I mention this to highlight that a certain positive atmosphere has developed here," Mirzoyan stated.
According to him, Yerevan will continue to work with the Azerbaijani side in the near future on both the issue of unblocking communications and other areas where agreement can be reached at this stage.
Finally, in an interesting development, the Armenian Foreign Minister expressed optimism regarding the peace agreement with Azerbaijan. "I will express cautious optimism that we will soon be able to reach consensus on one or two formulations, after which the agreement will be ready for signing," Mirzoyan said.
Given the history of inconsistent statements from Armenian officials, it is wise not to jump to conclusions about Yerevan's readiness to resolve the remaining unresolved issues of the peace agreement draft. However, it may be worthwhile to examine the aforementioned sequence of events in light of their potential internal logic.
Let’s entertain the hypothesis that the White House has managed to convince Yerevan to agree to include at least the intention of conducting constitutional reform in the peace agreement. Additionally, let’s assume that in response to this agreement, Baku expressed its willingness to sign the peace treaty by the start of COP29.
At this point, the French envoy Decottignies enters the scene, literally demanding that Azerbaijan sign the peace agreement before the climate summit. From the perspective of exerting pressure on Azerbaijan, this move seems utterly pointless, indicating that the rationale behind it must be found in another dimension.
This raises the question: Could it be that Paris, having learned from its American counterparts that the parties have reached an agreement on all points and that nothing stands in the way of signing the document by November 11, is attempting to present the situation as if it were a result of its pressure on Baku—essentially trying to save face while making a loud exit?
However, there are no naive players in this scenario. If the above assumptions hold true, Paris's efforts would appear laughable in light of Yerevan’s agreement to align its legislation with these developments.
The real question is how close our assumptions are to the truth. As the saying goes, "time will tell." The deadlines are approaching.