Will the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia ally against Iran? Shereshevskiy's scenario

At the end of July, news surfaced in American media about the possibility of a new grand bargain - a political agreement between the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. We are talking about perhaps the biggest change in Middle East policy since the Abraham Accords, or maybe something much more significant.

The Abraham Accords are a series of joint normalisation agreements initially between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco effective since September 15, 2020. The US during President Trump's administration brokered the deal. The treaty opened up significant opportunities for the formation of an Arab-Israeli coalition against Iran.

The Abraham Accords are linked to the growing Arab-Iranian rivalry and the expansion of the IRI, which has achieved military and political dominance in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as in North Yemen. Tehran has built a "Shiite crescent," a sphere of influence from the borders of Afghanistan to Beirut. This Iranian strengthening has brought the Arab-Iranian conflict to the forefront, overshadowing the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

Against this background, the US was able to achieve cooperation between Israel and the Gulf Arabs. There is even talk of an Arab-Israeli bloc to counter the Iranian bloc. Perhaps such plans have some basis, but a lot has changed since then. Back then, everyone expected Saudi Arabia, the largest and richest monarchy in the Gulf, to join the Abraham Accords. That didn't happen. On the contrary, the Saudis restored diplomatic relations with Iran and promised to invest about a billion dollars in its economy. Earlier, the UAE also restored relations with Iran. Both countries are discussing joint security projects with Tehran in the Persian Gulf, which is especially important since the Iranians regularly attack oil tankers, and their proxies in Iraq and Yemen bombard industrial plants and airports in Saudi Arabia.

In addition, Saudi Arabia has been defiant toward its ally Washington. Despite the Biden administration's demands not to reduce oil production, Riyadh not only failed to do so but also agreed with Moscow within the OPEC+ framework to reduce production in order to ensure a rise in oil prices - a measure highly disadvantageous to the US.

Of course, contradictions between the Saudis and Iranians persist. Riyadh fears Iranian expansion. It insures itself by investing in developing ties with Iran, whose dilapidated economy and rebellious society desperately need at least some financial support. The Saudi monarchy has grave concerns about any external operations by the Iranian theocracy, in part because it fears an intensification of pro-Iranian forces both in neighbouring Yemen and in its own Shiite territory.

So, the Saudis could go for recognition of Israel and a deeper politico-military alliance with Washington. This decision would strengthen Riyadh's political independence and its military power in confronting the Iranians, ensure the modernisation of the army and civilian infrastructure with the latest Israeli technology, etc.

But there are two problems. Riyadh is not assured of protection from its ally America, and it has serious objections to diplomatic relations with Israel.

First, the Saudis claim to be the flagship of the Arab world, its political, economic and military centre. The country is home to the main shrines of Islam, while many Arab engineers and workers from all over the region dream of getting jobs in wealthy Saudi companies. Meanwhile, the Abraham Accords are extremely unpopular in the Arab world because Israel maintains control over the Palestinian Arab territories of the West Bank. Therefore, in exchange for recognising Israel, the Saudis demand restrictions on Israeli settlement policy in the Palestinian territories.

Second, Trump's statements about US reluctance to get involved in armed conflicts over allies, and the Biden administration's policy of discussing the partition of Ukraine with Moscow, have raised a series of questions among Washington's friends, from the Saudis to the South Koreans, as to what value, in principle, American commitments to protect allied countries have. Yes, Saudi Arabia has an American military. Yes, the U.S. is a major arms exporter to that country. However, how prepared is the U.S. to defend its ally in the event of military action? What if, for example, Iranian troops or their allies manage to occupy part of the country's territory, and Washington says, "It can't be helped, we'll have to negotiate with Iran about where is whose and who is whose"? This is especially likely to happen if Iran acquires its own nuclear weapons, which is a very real prospect. The US will probably not want to "escalate a conflict with a nuclear power".

The most important reason for the Saudis to avoid a deal with Israel and the US is America's growing weakness, its perceived inability to protect allies, and its gradual withdrawal from the Middle East due to its pivot to rivalry with the new superpower, China.

With all this in mind, the Saudis are now making a number of demands not only of Israel but also of the US. They would like increased supplies of advanced weapons from America, US assistance in developing a civilian nuclear programme, and, most importantly, the status of an American military ally similar to that of South Korea and Japan. This status in the case of Korea means that the US is obliged to provide direct military assistance to the Koreans in the event of an attack by a third country on their territory; in turn, South Korea commits itself to participate in any of Washington's regional military operations in the Pacific at the request of the US (as part of this agreement, the Koreans took an active part in the American war in Vietnam). Such an alliance does not provide 100 per cent guarantees either, but it is at least something. This is the kind of alliance the Saudis are seeking today.

At the same time, politicians in South Korea themselves are increasingly saying that they can no longer rely on the United States as a military partner and that it would be good for them to acquire their own nuclear weapons, since North Korea already has them and the United States has shown weakness in conflicts with nuclear-armed states.

US officials believe that negotiations with the Israelis and Saudis on the deal have a chance of success and could be finalised in about a year. However, there are serious doubts about the success of this venture.

Firstly, Israel. It would seem that mutual recognition with the Saudis and extensive economic and possibly military cooperation with them opens up unlimited prospects for the Israelis. This means entry into the wider Islamic and Arab world, access to colossal investments from the richest oil monarchy in the Persian Gulf, a sharp increase in exports of military equipment, and the formation of a full-fledged anti-Iranian alliance. In other words, the Saudi-Israeli-American agreement closes many problems at once, ensuring the formation of a powerful pro-American Middle Eastern military-political and, possibly, economic anti-Iranian bloc.

However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party are in power thanks to their cooperation with a multi-party coalition of radical supporters of religious Zionism and settlement. They are strongly opposed to any restrictions on settlement policy in the West Bank. And without an alliance with these parties, Netanyahu will not be able to maintain the ruling coalition and power, especially in the current political crisis in Israel. So it is doubtful that Israel will be able to make the concessions the Saudis are asking for.

The second problem is the US itself, primarily the Biden administration. It does not inspire confidence in American allies, both for the reasons discussed above and because there are no guarantees of supplies of the latest American weapons to the allies - such supplies are being discussed at length with no obvious results. For example, no final decision has yet been made on the sale of 120 F-16 Block 70 aircraft to Türkiye, which is the reason why Türkiye has not yet ratified the decision to admit Sweden to NATO.

Finally, the failure of US negotiations on another grand bargain - the Iran nuclear deal - also does not inspire optimism about Biden's diplomacy.

Therefore, although the US is making serious efforts to conclude a trilateral deal with the Saudis and Israelis, and theoretically the deal could be beneficial to all three parties, which means there is a chance of its conclusion, there are reasonable doubts about the success of this idea.