Moscow convenient with solving regional issues with Baku than Yerevan On Lavrov's visit to Azerbaijan

Although timed to coincide with the anniversary of signing the Russian-Azerbaijani Declaration on Allied Cooperation (February 22, 2022), Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's two-day visit to Azerbaijan [on February 27-28] also demonstrated that Moscow currently prefers Baku to Yerevan in matters of regional cooperation.

The fact that Lavrov did not visit Yerevan before or after his visit to the South Caucasus, as he has done in the past demonstrates this. And the reason for everything is Yerevan's increasingly open pro-Western policy, which was especially visible in the light of the European mission's recent arrival in Armenia. Naturally, it is not simply Armenian-Russian relations that prompted official Moscow's reaction, which was far from favourable.

The Kremlin's dissatisfaction with Armenia's policy is aided by the fact that Armenia seeks to exit the trilateral format of settling relations with Azerbaijan through Russia's mediation, preferring negotiations on the European track, primarily with France's participation. Moscow will not tolerate the insult inflicted on it as an ally and mediator by Yerevan's demarche on the eve of the trilateral talks scheduled for December last year. Then Armenia defiantly refused the Moscow meeting, referring to another tall tale - this time about the "blockage of the Lachin road by Azerbaijan" and the humanitarian catastrophe that fell because of this on the mythical "120,000 Armenians of Karabakh". In fact, Yerevan has shown that it does not want constructive talks, particularly under Russia's moderation, as it avoids fulfilling its obligations under the trilateral statements, which both Baku and Moscow continue to insist on. As a result, the December talks in Moscow were attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov, with [Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat] Mirzoyan absent. Nonetheless, the parties agreed on the dynamics of work on the implementation of the Russian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian leaders' trilateral statements dated November 10, 2020, January 11, and November 26, 2021, as well as October 31, 2022.

In the current situation, two conclusions suggest: If earlier Russia equally called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to normalise relations, now Moscow has good reasons to put pressure on Yerevan using its own leverage to achieve its goals and conclude a peace treaty.

And in fact, Moscow has already firmly adopted the main political argument in favour of Baku - Azerbaijan, following the results of the war in Karabakh in 2020, returned the territories that belong to it. This is one of the main messages of Sergei Lavrov's recent statement in an interview with the Rossiya-24 TV channel.

"Azerbaijan's territories were occupied by Armenia, Azerbaijan returned its lands," the Russian foreign minister stressed, addressing this message primarily to Yerevan and at the same time recalling that Armenia itself recognised Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

Thus, Russia, having clearly voiced issues of fundamental importance both for it and for Baku, made it clear to Yerevan that it would continue to adhere to objectivity in matters of the regional agenda in the post-conflict period. The same policy of Moscow can be seen in the opening of the region's most important transport arteries, particularly the Zangazur corridor, which is strongly hindered by Armenia.

In general, there is no doubt that Armenia sees an alternative to peace with Azerbaijan in torpedoing talks, introducing destructive forces into the region, cultivating revanchist sentiments and a new war. Everything that Yerevan is doing today goes against Moscow's interests, which clearly does not need the presence of foreign emissaries in Armenia for two whole years. Moscow more than ever needs to reach a Baku-Yerevan peace agreement exclusively under its own moderation and preferably in the near future. This will allow it to maintain its influence in a strategically important region and at the same time increase its political importance as a peacemaker, which is especially necessary now that it is up to its ears in the war with Ukraine.

At the same time, given Baku's commitment to peace and the implementation of trilateral statements, the strengthening of Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation promises a favourable prospect for the entire region both from the point of view of its security and trade and economic relations, and the Declaration on Allied Cooperation is also an opportunity to coordinate steps to implement a peaceful perspective.

Sergei Lavrov's statements that he voiced in Baku fully fit into this context: regional security remains the most relevant topic in Azerbaiiani-Russian relations not only bilaterally, but also multilaterally; only the deepening of Azerbaijani-Russian allied cooperation will give a positive impetus to the entire region.

In this regard, at the meeting with Lavrov, the Azerbaijani president pointed out Moscow's special role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani normalisation, noting that Baku is determined to work positively and constructively with both Armenia and Russia to quickly turn the page of hostility and return peace to the South Caucasus. However, as Yerevan's destructive policy shows, the Armenian authorities are by no means ready for similar realities of the region's peaceful future.

Russian expert on the South Caucasus and the Middle East, public figure and journalist Dmitriy Verkhoturov, who spoke to Caliber.Az, confirmed Moscow's current priority position, stressing that Baku, unlike Yerevan, abides by the agreements reached and thus achieves progress in its foreign policy.

"But Moscow is not so sure about Yerevan. Therefore, it is convenient for Lavrov to resolve a number of issues related to the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea, through Baku, which, in principle, he does. Therefore, there is no doubt that Russian-Azerbaijani relations will continue to develop dynamically on a number of issues. And judging by Lavrov's desire to negotiate in the '3+3' format with all the [South] Caucasus countries, apparently, the Russian Foreign Ministry considers the Azerbaijani line as a means to improve the overall regional situation," Verkhoturov said, adding that under certain conditions Baku can become the moderator of this political process desirable for Moscow.