After Brussels, Moscow? Diplomatic struggle continues unabated
The dynamics of the negotiation process between Baku and Yerevan show that the sides agree on issues in accordance with their degree of complexity. Now, after another Brussels round, the main unresolved issue is presented clearly- the financing by Yerevan of the remnants of the self-proclaimed entity in Karabakh and the presence of Armenian army units and militant groups of local Armenians on the territory of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh economic region.
Without curtailing these activities, which are clearly interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan, Yerevan's assurances about recognising Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity will look unconvincing.
Moreover, the complexity of the issue lies not only and not so much on Yerevan's position, but also in the policy of Moscow, which for many years has been a guarantor of the separatist "myatsum" project, assuming the functions of guarding the Armenian-Turkish border and generally acting as a guarantor of Armenia's security, which is the reasoning behind the deployment of the Russian military base in Gyumri.
Under roughly the same pretext of aid and assistance, the Russian Federation squeezed out all possible preferences in the economic sphere, establishing a monopoly of its state corporations on several strategic industries in Armenia.
The construct was maintained until Azerbaijan became strong enough to regain its sovereignty over Karabakh. Russia could not formally enter the battle for it because it itself recognised it as part of Azerbaijan. However, the Russian peacekeeping contingent’s indulgence of the illegal administration and Armenian armed formations on the territory temporarily within its zone of responsibility actually crystallised the essence of the problem: the full restoration of Azerbaijan's sovereignty does not meet Russia's geopolitical aspirations, and it is looking for an acceptable option to maintain its presence in Karabakh.
At the same time, all of Moscow's actions aimed at strengthening the illegal entity in Karabakh and even giving it some kind of subjectivity - starting from the passage of foreign persons, as well as personnel and military cargo from Armenia, sending Vardanyan and ending with the guardianship of the Armenian military in Karabakh - have failed. The installation of the Lachin border checkpoint made it impossible to feed the criminal group demanding status and autonomy for its illegal offspring.
The recent demonstration of disrespect for the Azerbaijani state flag on the bridge over the Khakari River shows Moscow's lack of effective political tools to influence Baku.
Baku, not allowing itself an automatic reaction to this incident (which was probably expected of it), went even further in really ensuring its sovereignty - closed the Lachin checkpoint for all purposes except medical, while offering all interested parties to use the Agdam-Khankandi road.
Baku's style is impeccable adherence to international law, and the humanitarian situation on the ground, as well as the proposal to use an alternative road, do not correlate in any way with the hysteria raised by the Armenian side around the alleged humanitarian disaster, which prevents Armenians and their patrons, particularly Moscow, from replaying the situation in their favour and making Azerbaijan look like an oppressor of Armenians.
The achieved basis left no room for speculation and facilitated further progress in the negotiations in Brussels. It is not surprising that Moscow, almost during the trilateral meeting, hastened to issue a very contradictory statement through the Foreign Ministry.
However odious this declaration may sound, some of its theses have been voiced by Moscow before and have not become a big revelation. On the one hand, the Kremlin dramatises the humanitarian situation by urgently demanding the opening of the "Lachin corridor" and presenting itself as an intercessor for the "persecuted" Armenians, and on the other hand, it declares that "under these conditions (Armenia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity - ed.) one should not shift responsibility for the fate of the Armenian population of Karabakh to third countries", i.e. actually denying them military and political support.
It seems that Moscow is responding to Erdogan's statement about the imminent withdrawal of peacekeepers in 2025 in such a somewhat panicky way and at the same time leaving room for bargaining.
The following paragraph of the statement also draws attention from this perspective: "In view of the above, the Russian side confirms its intention to actively contribute to the efforts of the international community to restore normal life in Nagorno-Karabakh". Thus, for the first time, Moscow expressed itself in a complimentary manner towards the Western mediators, although previously it had consistently maintained the idea of the exclusivity of its role in the South Caucasus settlement.
Besides, this thesis safely rhymes with the preamble of Charles Michel's final statement, in which he mentioned Moscow as a "legitimate" negotiating platform.
However, in any case, the statement was so ambiguous that the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry rushed to comment on it, and then the real tennis match began.
The mutual statements were followed on July 17 by a meeting between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko and Azerbaijani Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia Polad Bulbuloglu, in which the Russian diplomat called the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry's statement incorrect.
On the same day, Foreign Ministry Jeyhun Bayramov accepted copies of the credentials of the newly appointed Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mikhail Yevdokimov, along with greeting the Russian diplomat, voicing the position of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, which had already been cited.
In particular, it was stated that the definition of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan with reference to the position of the Armenian side does not correspond to the specified framework.
While the sides were throwing the ball over the net, the ringleader of the illegal entity in Karabakh, Araik Harutyunyan, announced with a provincial bluntness that he was going to the extreme measure by announcing... a sit-in.
"I am forced to take this extreme step so that Armenia, Russia, the US, France, the EU, the UN Security Council and others cannot ignore Azerbaijan's present and future aggressive actions and crimes, and afterwards fulfil their obligations under the trilateral statement, international court ruling and others," Harutyunyan reasoned his act.
All over the world, a strike aims to force those who suffer major losses from it (companies or governments) to accept the terms of the strikers. In this regard, the question is - who and what losses will be incurred in the world from the fact that the Khankandi foreman stopped going to work?
Time after time, the sluggish protest events of the Karabakh Armenians, who are not calming down, are increasingly taking on the character of a farce, which only emphasises that there is nothing to oppose the process of reintegration of the region with Azerbaijan in reality.
The representatives of the self-proclaimed authorities should surrender to Baku's mercy. Armenian formations, including local units, should leave the territory of Karabakh (it is not excluded that they will be given a corridor and time). Neither Yerevan, Tehran, Washington, Brussels, Paris, nor even Moscow will join the fight on the side of a bunch of bandits.
Moscow will negotiate. It has something to gain economically in Azerbaijan. And these prospects are so great that it would be an unacceptable mistake to sacrifice them for the sake of a phantom presence in Karabakh, especially since the key word here is "phantom".
It is not excluded that in parallel to the diplomatic ping-pong, other conversations are taking place, in particular on the topic of the next round of negotiations in Moscow, where the Russian capital, in order to be in the trend so desired by it, should promote peace in the region on the principles of justice put forward by Baku.