Azerbaijan-Armenia confrontation: Will there be a new escalation? Playing with the fire

The ongoing stalemate in the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia for months is about to become a new source of the upcoming confrontation with the risks of deadly armed clashes in the Garabagh region. In 2022, Azerbaijan and Armenia's leaders gathered in Prague to discuss the possible peace treaty to be signed by the end of 2023.

However, the internal power dynamics within Armenia, the de-facto separatist regime's unwillingness to disarm and dismiss the illegal armed groups, and Azerbaijan’s decision to tighten its grip over the region due to national security concerns did not raise optimism regarding sustainable peace anytime soon.

The frequent minor incidents in the region involving illegal armed groups and sabotage attempts forced Azerbaijan to take a firm stance and additional security measures, such as limiting the move through the Lachin checkpoint to prevent arms smuggling to the region. Unsurprisingly, such a decision provoked a reaction from the Armenian government and international community, which essentially undermined the evidence from Azerbaijan regarding the illegal arms transfer via the Lachin Road.

Since 2021, Azerbaijan has criticised the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed in Garabagh for not “taking enough measures to prevent the arms transfer in Garabagh,” despite numerous warnings from Baku. As for Azerbaijan, the transfer of weapons has been disguised as “peacekeeping humanitarian aid."

The list of the arms transferred to the zone of temporary responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping mission includes anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, automatic small arms, including easel machine guns, sniper rifles, 122mm mortars, ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) “Fagot”, ATGM “Cornet”, grenade launchers, portable communication devices, and ammunition.

The well-known Armenian diaspora orchestrated the continuous arms transfer and criticism against Azerbaijan and was supported by the pro-Armenian Western countries, such as France, Canada, and Germany. Indeed, in the last two years, the diplomatic relations between Baku and Paris deteriorated significantly due to the latter’s accusation of Azerbaijan for causing a “humanitarian catastrophe” and “famine” in Garabagh.

The situation ignited further with the fact that mayors of Paris and Strasbourg recently paid an official visit to Armenia intending to dispatch humanitarian aid to the region via the Lachin road without coordinating efforts with the central government of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan assessed such a move as an interference in domestic affairs and summoned the French ambassador to present the note of protest. Also, on August 31, the US State Department issued a new statement, which emphasised the importance of re-opening the Lachin Road for food supplies. While the statement does not align with the US peace mediation between Baku and Yerevan, it risks to estrange Azerbaijan and undermine the achieved milestones.

Moreover, to diffuse further allegations and accusations regarding the "famine and humanitarian catastrophe", the Azerbaijani Red Crescent Society dispatched 40 tons of humanitarian aid on August 29, to the Armenian residents of Garabagh through the alternative Aghdam-Khankendi route.

Notwithstanding the criticism and pressure, Azerbaijan reiterates the idea of using the alternative route for food supply to Garabagh and that the Lachin road is unnecessary for food shipments. However, as of September 1, the de-facto regime in Khankendi did not allow the aid cargo to enter the region.

Moreover, the closure of the Lachin checkpoint and the growing pressure of Azerbaijan triggered instability in Garabagh, sparking protests in the light of uncertainty. Although the conservative part of the Armenian society calls for "strict measures against Azerbaijan," the de-facto regime and official Yerevan apprehends the risks of gambling.

Since 2020, Azerbaijan has gradually strengthened its footprint in the region and established permanent control over the territories populated by ethnic Armenians and temporarily guarded by the Russian peacekeeping forces to react to any provocation adequately.

As a result of the uncertainty and mounting domestic instability, on August 31, the heads of the de-facto regime, Arayik Harutunyan and Gurgen Nersisyan, resigned from their posts. The reason may vary, and the upper hand of Azerbaijan on the ground is among them. Moreover, the officials of Baku do not deny Azerbaijan’s intention to re-establish sovereignty over the part of the Karabakh region that is under temporary control of Russia’s peacekeeping mission.

Under current circumstances, Azerbaijan will only re-open the Lachin road for free movement to and from Armenia if its demands regarding the dismissal of armed groups in Garabagh and the opening of an alternative route from Aghdam are fulfilled. Azerbaijan seemingly is not ready to compromise on its efforts to restore territorial integrity and will keep further attempts to capitalise on that.