Azerbaijan-Armenia: progress, sensitivities and the art of "fixing the fixable" Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

While Azerbaijani-Armenian normalisation continues to retain the traction gained recently, it is also true that some of the toughest decisions to be made lie ahead. Baku and Yerevan understand the reference to the Almaty declaration as a basis for further delineation of the interstate border differently, with the divergent views likely to subsequently manifest themselves. However, for the time being, the precept of “fixing what is fixable now” should guide the border talks, for the sake of steady progress over delimitation. 

Far from being stalled, Azerbaijani-Armenian normalisation is presently undergoing one of its constructive and productive phases, with the latest meeting of the foreign ministers of these two nations and the 15 May joint Protocol-Description on delimitation of the Qazakh-Tavush section of the border being widely perceived as encouraging, and rightly so. 

We know very little about what was actually agreed between Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers respectively, in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 10 May, for the press statements issued by both sides, despite their overall positivity, were short of crispy specifics, the impression being given that Baku and Yerevan have already made some tangible progress on the text of the prospective peace deal and that their approaches on the subject of the opening of communications are slowly reaching some form of consensus. 

However, what I would like to focus on today is the realm of border delimitation and demarcation wherein there have been some publicly announced progress. On 15 May, as a result of the 9^th meeting of the State Commission on the Delimitation of the State Border between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commission on the Matters of Delimitation of the State Border and Border Security between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the parties signed what is called a Protocol-Description on the segments of the border line located directly between the residential areas of Baghanis Ayrim, Ashagy Askipara, Kheyrimli and Gyzylhajily in Azerbaijan; and Baganis, Voskepar, Kirants and Berkaber in Armenia, respectively. The press release also states that the segments of the border should be aligned with “the legally-justified inter-republican border that existed within the framework of the Soviet Union at the time of its dissolution, taking into account the clarification of coordinates based on geodetic measurements on the ground in accordance with the topographic map of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces of 1976, which underwent the duty procedure in 1979”.  

All of this sounds incredibly technical and perhaps somewhat boring. What should we make of this jargon-infused press release?

What it effectively says, in much-needed simple terms, is that Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed on the delimitation and demarcation of the 10-12 km section of the northern part of the interstate border in accordance with the relevant legitimate 1976 Soviet map, procedurally confirmed in 1979. It also means that, within that very section of the border, Baku and Yerevan effectively recreated what must have been a legally-justified delineation line between them in 1991.

This latest progress also signifies that Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed on a critical issue bilaterally, without any external involvement and with no employment of military means. What we observe today is, to some extent, a projection of the spirit of the 7 December 2023 joint statement into a wider peace agenda, exemplifying the logic that has to see us through to a peace deal. 

However, in relation to the reference to the 1991 Almaty Declaration as the basis for further delimitation and demarcation of the interstate border, Baku and Yerevan continue to maintain some differences, an inconvenient fact that both nations are presently trying to avoid.

The Armenian view seems to be that the construct ingrained in the 15 May protocol should subsequently apply to the whole of the interstate border. Yerevan believes that the current border delineation is not about drawing new lines, but reproducing those that existed in 1991. Armenia understands the emphasis of the Almaty declaration as the metamorphosis of the former Soviet administrative borders into a formal interstate demarcation.

On the other hand, Baku, whilst accepting the self-same document as a general political foundation for delimitation, maintains the view that the parties should adopt a more flexible posture and creative approach, adhering to a stage-by-stage methodology, dealing with one section followed by another. The Azerbaijani stance could be described along the lines of “let us fix what is fixable now and move on incrementally”. 

From Baku’s guise, so far as one can tell, the 15 May protocol strictly refers to the Gazakh-Tavush section of the border and, with the rest of the border, maps emanating from earlier dates could potentially be used. Plus, there are certain sections of the border in relation to which there may be no legal cartographic documentation, and the parties may be compelled to draw new lines on the basis of the facts on the ground, geographical specifics of a given area and so forth.  

Armenia is hellbent on emphasising that what is presently taking place is the reproduction of the 1991 border line and no concessions have been made by Yerevan. It is true that Yerevan has, so far, made no concession on border delimitation. However, there are limitations on the idea of recreating the 1991 border. First of all, back then, there was no legally-defined border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Secondly, in the case of reproducing these 1991 borders, there is a great scope for divergent interpretations of maps dating from different years, the legal standing of which being a possible cause of disagreement. Thirdly, the facts on the ground will most certainly need to be taken into account, leaving any hypothetical map out of the equation regarding certain border sections.

What is very encouraging is that both Azerbaijan and Armenia are now making substantial efforts to sustain the positive momentum gained. This is incredibly important. Plus, on a positive note, anti-Pashinyan protests against the delimitation process with Azerbaijan, held in Yerevan, are unlikely to gain a critical mass endangering the political fortunes of the Armenian Premier The probability of him being booted out or popping his clogs is minuscule. The locomotive has a fine head of steam, and the wheels are in motion, spinning laboriously and in the right direction. We are getting there.