Baku-Yerevan dynamics revisited: On the virtues of constructively coercive pressure VIDEO

The year 2022 was a year of cautious optimism and reasonably realistic hopes on the Azerbaijani-Armenian front. Now, as we start 2023, the preceding time stretch is retrospectively regarded as a period of wasted opportunities, for the main objective, that is, the signing of a peace treaty, has not yet been accomplished. This is the view, I suppose, shared by many across Azerbaijan and beyond, including my humble self.

But still… Let us be less categorical amidst our gloom and doom. The situation is not as simple as it may appear. First of all, there have been some positive developments, the implications of which will continue to be part and parcel of the next phase of the negotiations. Secondly, we have learned, or at least had a glimpse of, the circumstances that could lubricate this seemingly endemic process.

Peace design

Amidst recurrent bust-ups, mutual accusations, claims and counterclaims, there was, and still is, a discernible framework that constitutes fertile ground for a peace treaty to be signed. However elusive that long-awaited historic accord may appear to be, its general contours are more or less clear. Baku’s five points and Yerevan’s acquiescence, albeit with reservations; the signs pointing towards the nascent emergence of a bilateral format after the second EU-mediated trilateral meeting in April; and Pashinyan’s declaration that “the status is not an aim, but the means of achieving the security and rights of the Armenian population of Karabakh” were collectively all very encouraging.

In October, following the Prague summit, it was tentatively argued by many that a peace agreement on the basis of mutual recognition of each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity could be signed, and such a document, despite not being comprehensive, would be sufficiently substantial to enable the sides to move forward on working out other remaining issues related to border delimitation and demarcation and the consequential opening of communication routes.

Causes of the derailment

Nothing sufficiently tangible eventuated from all of these developments. Why? Well, in the first instance, whether we like it or not, one needs to disparage the Armenian position, which has been woefully lacking in consistency. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has charted a trajectory and, to a measured extent, evolved, yet without actually coming to terms with accepting the recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh as a principal step in the thorny path towards moving on. As normal, he vacillated a great deal, pontificated inexorably, saying one plausible thing here, then retracting it somewhere else, being akin to a verbal chameleon. His major failure lies in his inability to recalibrate between the need to placate the revenge-driven segments of Armenian society and his internal opposition with the acknowledged exigencies related to the criticality of progressing the peace negotiations with Baku.

Are we asking too much of this beleaguered fellow for whom the epithet of ‘stuck between a rock and hard place’ was surely devised? I would beg to differ. What is required has no promise of being an easy ride, but it is essential to his and Armenia’s future. Procrastination, delaying and dithering only seem safe in the very short term. There is a time-honoured aphorism that if you don’t deal with problems in a reasonable way, they come back to you in a very unreasonable way. This certainly came to pass during the war of 2020. Pashinyan’s failure to be reasonable prior to 27 September 2020 led him to a disaster that cost Armenia and him very dearly. So, hard lessons must be learned and emblazoned on the conscience of the Armenian people in branded words of fire.

The EU efforts led by Council President Charles Michel were applauded throughout the year until biased French President Emmanuel Macron became more proactive. The attempt to transform a Brussels-mediated trilateral format into a quadrilateral format, involving Paris, was another significant cause of the derailment, curbing the EU’s influence.

And Russia, of course, is the elephant in the room. Whenever there was a glimmer of hope pointing towards the possibility of a peace treaty, Moscow interfered, demanding its influence and central role in the process to be recognised. The 31 October Sochi meeting served to achieve nothing of value, other than slightly placating Vladimir Putin’s receding sense of primacy. The Kremlin believes in conflict management, through being disagreeable and agreeable to both sides in a measured way, the net effect of which has resulted in a sharp decline in Russia’s reputation in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Illustrative example and its extrapolation

More importantly, we have now learned that whenever there has been a single development within the peace negotiations, this was achieved through an application of pressure by Azerbaijan; on the other hand, Armenia, since the signing of the 10 November 2020 declaration, has been on the path of shilly-shallying.  Just recall the situation enveloping the construction of the New Lachin Road. Pursuant to Article 6, Baku completed this before the three-year deadline, communicating everything to Yerevan, and by the time the route was becoming imminently operational in late August 2022, the government of Nikol Pashinyan claimed they had been taken aback. This exemplifies how discernible progress could be achieved in the Baku-Yerevan dynamics. The latter’s coercive assertiveness and the former’s reluctant acquiescence are going to be key to the future.

The point about constructive pressure leads us to the present state of affairs over the Lachin Road. For the past four weeks, Azerbaijani eco-activists, protesting against the illegal exploitation of Karabakh’s natural resources, have been standing their ground, surviving under harsh weather conditions. I have been there myself, so, I know what I am talking about. This is, of course, a form of pressure - a constructive one.

The resolve of the Azerbaijani demonstrators has already partially paid off - Base Metal, the company engaged in the illicit extraction of Azerbaijani gold, copper and molybdenum resources has halted its illegal operations. Under the watchfully beady eyes of the eco-activists, instances of the misuse of the Lachin Road have been virtually negated. But much more is to be achieved. Ecological monitoring and permanent control over the Lachin Road must be maintained by Baku.

Armenia, on the other hand, has resorted to the old and clapped-out ‘humanitarian disaster’ theory, claiming that the lives of 120,000 Armenian residents are at risk. As normal, this figure is vastly inflated. The actual number of Armenians residing in Khankandi and its outskirts is no more than a quarter of this erroneous figure. There is a visual control and the available facts. And the facts never lie if you treat them in good faith, unlike the Armenians who enjoy fiddling with them, following a century-long tradition.

The road is functional in accordance with its regime. The vehicles of the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ and the International Committee of the Red Cross have kept moving - in both directions - freely and in an unimpeded manner. Over the past month, the Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin residing in Karabakh have received sufficient food supplies via the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent. Any claim about the shortage of essentials is a carefully constructed lie. Perhaps it is not even a carefully constructed lie, but a simple, outright, blatant humdinger of a lie that would make Pinocchio’s proboscis grow to a record extent.

“Humanitarian disaster” is the standard Armenian way of perpetuating the argument that, under the Azerbaijani administration, life will be unbearable. It is also connected with the “remedial secession” line of the separatists and revanchists. When Azerbaijani forces resumed control over the Farrukh height in Karabakh in March of last year, and then assumed the commanding heights surrounding the zone of under temporary Russian control in August, the Armenian side reacted in the self-same fashion.

It does not amount to a humanitarian disaster if the separatists are unable to move freely, or use the Lachin route incorrigibly for illicit purposes. Armenia’s dwindling band of supporters may feel bewildered, desperate and flabbergasted. France, Armenia’s main espouser, failed to push through an anti-Azerbaijani UN Security Council statement during the dying days of the preceding year. One element must be understood and taken into account by Pashinyan and the separatists: the future of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process will be decided upon, not through a wide range of partisan and biased resolutions adopted in the legislative bodies of France or any other country, but on the ground and via the negotiations.

The year 2022 demonstrated that our neighbours have not yet improved in the department of fact-based reasoning. Their deadline for the benefit of the doubt seems to have expired, and its spoiled fruits consigned to the refuse heap of history. Legitimate, justified and constructively coercive pressure is the only viable path to which they are capable of responding. Alas. One would wish this would have been different. The truth is that time waits for no man. It does not wait for us either.

Caliber.Az presents the video version of the article: