Corridor through Zangazur - road to peaceful future Khazar Akhundov's review

The result of the war in Karabakh was the signing of a trilateral ceasefire statement by the heads of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia on 10 November 2020, which became a fundamental document, on which the entire post-war peace agenda is based. This includes the very difficult negotiations in the Working Group format on the unblocking of transport communications between the countries, which Azerbaijan and Armenia have been conducting for the past two years. In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta the other day, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk spoke about the activities of this Working Group, outlining the legal regime of the future transport corridor, which through Armenia should connect the main territory of Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR).

The trilateral Working Group, co-chaired by the Deputy Prime Ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, is now the main forum for agreeing on conditions for the unblocking of transport communications between Azerbaijan and Armenia. And the process could have proceeded much faster if it had not been hampered by Yerevan, whose political circles are under pressure from far-fetched irrational fears. Thus, while some time ago, opponents to the opening of the corridor were putting forward theses about the alleged commercial futility of this route for Armenia, today in Yerevan the topic of the loss of sovereignty and threats to the security of the country's borders is being stressed.

Russian deputy prime minister Alexei Overchuk recently spoke about the validity of such assumptions in an interview with a leading Russian newspaper. According to the Russian deputy prime minister, the South Caucasus has throughout its history been a crossroads of civilizations and trade routes, in fact, a geo-economic hub of Eurasia, and the early opening of communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan will enable the development of trade and humanitarian relations, allow neighbours to communicate with each other, which is seen as the best cure for the perennial problems and conflicts in the region.

When asked about the progress of the negotiation process, Alexei Overchuk stressed that a lot of hard work had been done over two years and as a result, the negotiators had a vision of the routes, the implementation of which could lead to the unblocking of the region. The deputy head of the Russian government noted that sovereignty over the road will be exercised by the country through whose territory it passes, meaning that there is no "extraterritorial corridor" that would in any way infringe on the sovereignty of any party.

However, it is important to note that according to point 9 of the above-mentioned Statement, Armenia undertook to guarantee the security of transport communication between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the NAR, by ensuring the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and cargoes in both directions. And just as importantly, the same paragraph of the Statement specifically stipulates that the control of transport communication along the corridor is the responsibility of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia. To what extent this circumstance restricts and infringes on the sovereignty of Armenia is a question that should be addressed to the government of this country. Moreover, a precedent already exists: in accordance with the agreement of September 30, 1992, between Moscow and Yerevan, the border guards of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia exercise protection of Armenia's state borders. Russian border guards also carry out passport control and other border procedures.

But if over the past 30 years this circumstance has not caused any complaints, then in the last year and a half it has become the subject of constant speculation. One way or another, such controls will have to be introduced in order to ensure the safety of transportation, as Armenia's international commitments, resulting from paragraph 9 of the Trilateral Statement of November 10, 2020, require it.

Equally untenable is the argument about the threat for Yerevan to lose control over the railways in case the corridor is opened. First, there has been no full control for a long time now, as the railway infrastructure operator in Armenia has been the South Caucasus Railway, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, for many years. Second, if an agreement on a transit corridor is reached, the bulk of the funds for the reconstruction of the Armenian railway tracks and the completion of the missing section are likely to be financed by Russia, which is extremely interested in opening a through transit with access to Middle Eastern markets.

A credible source told Caliber.Az that the stumbling block in the negotiation process is that Armenia has not presented the optimal route for the road. Only the shortest, climate-neutral, out-of-season route for the corridor - a 43-kilometer stretch through Meghri - can be optimal. Other proposals are unacceptable due to the complexity of the mountainous terrain, the lack of infrastructure, and the unsuitability of such roads for uninterrupted traffic throughout the year.

"Armenia should have provided a corridor to connect the Nakhichevan AR with the main part of Azerbaijan. Until today, not only has the corridor not been provided, but we have not even been told the route of the corridor, and no practical work has been done. Yerevan is again dragging its feet," Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said at the end of September.

While Armenia is yet to decide on the route, Azerbaijan takes concrete steps to build road and rail infrastructure in the East-Zangazur economic region. Thus, the construction of the 124 km long Goradiz-Aghbend highway on the state border with Armenia is 59% complete, and its commissioning is scheduled for late 2023, and the railway Goradiz-Aghbend (110 km) is 40% complete, and tentatively this section will be completed in 2024.

The two sides are reportedly discussing two legal regimes for crossing the border. For example, a simplified version will be used for direct communication with NAR - it should be safe for passengers and carriers, and the border crossing should be realized in a contact-free regime (all cross-border procedures are planned to be done virtually, using IT technologies). At the same time, a regular legal regime is envisaged for transit traffic along the corridor.

Despite political contradictions and periodically escalating border conflicts, Armenia as a whole is well aware that sustainable economic growth can only be achieved by overcoming the transport blockade, and this can only be achieved by normalising relations with Azerbaijan and, in the long term, with Türkiye. It is to be hoped that this understanding will turn into real action by the Armenian government and contribute to the early launch of the Zangazur corridor.