From Macron to Surkov: Is dialogue between Russia, West about to revive? Review by Serhey Bohdan

On the surface, relations between Russia and the West look like ashes left of hopes and plans. But there are embers smoldering underneath. Yes, speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 17, French President Macron said that now was "not the time for dialogue with Russia" because it was intensifying hostilities against Ukraine and destroying that country's civilian infrastructure. He made the remark at the conference, the organisers of which, for the first time in its history, refused to invite the Russian government.

But that was not all, as Macron hastened to add: "Our dilemma is that there will never be a reliable and complete peace on our continent until we learn to deal with the 'Russian issue', but with all sanity... We need strength and courage to start a dialogue again (with Moscow) in order to find a sustainable solution".

These words came in a curious context. On February 16, former Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov said that relations between Russia and the West "will normalise already in the foreseeable future". Surkov is long considered Putin's crony and a "power broker" in Russian politics, hence his statement reflected the mood in the Kremlin. Perhaps overly optimistic.

Friend Vladimir...

The history of relations between the Russian Federation and the West is not so bleak, however, and even the Kremlin's opponents admit this. Earlier this weekend, the American PBS TV channel published an interview with John Bolton, who has served in Republican White House administrations since the 1980s and held important foreign policy and security posts under presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump. Despite his retirement, Bolton clearly reflects widespread opinion in the American establishment - his political weight is indicated by his announced plans to challenge Trump in the next presidential election campaign and attempt to run as the Republican Party's own nominee.

Bolton begins his story by recalling what everyone knew but many had forgotten: the United States welcomed Putin to power. True, the interview highlights only one feature of Putin's biography (his service in the KGB). But the White House was well aware of another trait in the biography of the new Russian president - his work in the team of a radically pro-Western Russian politician, Anatoly Sobchak. And it was exactly this line - pro-western faction in Yeltsin's circle - that got him into the Kremlin. And not along the lines of some anti-Western radicals or communists - it is more likely to be linked to Yevgeny Primakov, who could have succeeded Yeltsin in a fair election. There is reason to believe that it was to prevent Primakov from coming to power that pro-Western elements in Yeltsin's administration nominated Putin - in an early election whose integrity the West did not doubt. Bolton assesses Putin himself as a smart, professional, educated, and strong-willed politician and, referring to the Russian leader's initial tenure in the Kremlin, stresses: "I don't think any of us were looking at this situation through rose-tinted glasses, we were assessing the situation on a strategic level. It was a real opportunity to start working together".

Back then, Moscow and Washington were focused on fighting a 'common enemy', Islamic terrorism, and their positions on international politics differed rather than clashed. For example, Washington wanted to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow, which the Kremlin did not agree to, but in fact, initially did not oppose.

Even then, relations between Russia and the US were far from rosy, and according to Bolton, that was more the fault of the Russian leadership. Well, what else could an American politician of such rank say? Moscow, according to him, took any steps of Washington too personally. The idea that some steps of Washington, even if not consciously directed against Moscow, objectively struck its interests, did not pop into Bolton's head.

The second nuance seems more objective - the Russian leadership's propensity for a kind of "historical re-enactment" in realpolitik. Bolton says that, while encountering Lavrov just before the USSR collapsed, he read an American reference to him which stressed: "He's not a communist, he's a czarist. I think this is a true characterisation of Lavrov in the 1990s and it is true of him now. I think it is a true characteristic of Putin too."

Indeed, the Western media is fond of quoting Putin's statement that the collapse of the USSR was a "tragedy". However, he called it not just a tragedy, but specifically a "geopolitical tragedy". In other words, Moscow lost territories, not the socialist system or the federation of republics. This leads Russian leaders to the appropriate foreign policy logic and as Bolton says: "I heard it from Sergei Shoigu, Sergei Lavrov, Nikolai Patrushev, I heard it from Putin. They think Ukraine is illegitimate and a mistake. Their desire to recreate mother Russia has nothing to do with the United States. ... I think from the Russian point of view it is a question of irredentism to a much greater extent than anything else. And this means that the basis for restoring cooperation between Russia and the West remains."

...and friend George.

Bolton also admits that the West erred in not actually integrating Russia into NATO despite the explicit desire of the Kremlin under President Putin to join the bloc. We will add that this desire has been backed by deeds exemplified by Russia's close cooperation with NATO in the US-NATO multi-year operation in Afghanistan (NATO logistically used Russian territory in particular), Russia's actual assistance to NATO countries in their operation to oust the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 (something neither the West nor Russia like to recall today), years of Western-Russian cooperation in putting pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, and a host of other examples.

So when Bolton suggests that the origins of the current confrontation with Putin should be sought in Putin's reaction to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, after which Putin "decided that there were consequences for him, even though we did not think there were any consequences except positive ones," it is hard to agree. Why, then, did the Kremlin again collaborate with the West on a variety of fronts? It is also hard to agree with Bolton's view that the tipping point in US-Russian relations came in 2007-2008 when the Kremlin decided that an agreement with the United States would not work and that the West itself was weak. A fracture, maybe, but not a fatal one.

In fact, several consecutive US presidents, according to a former US official, showed weakness vis-à-vis Moscow - especially Obama in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Then there was Trump, who, according to Bolton, might actually have withdrawn from NATO. Well, when Joseph Biden - increasingly reminiscent of the late Brezhnev to former Soviet citizens - came to power in Washington after Trump supporters stormed the Capitol, Putin decided to invade a neighbouring country.

Some saw Bolton's reasoning as just a call for the US leadership to take a tougher line. But, first, in his statements, he repeatedly cites examples of how things have recently been different - and that is an admission that things can change. Second, Bolton sees the conflict with Russia as part of a more global US-China standoff in which Russia is China's junior partner. And within that strategic logic, it makes sense for the West to bring Russia back on its side.

And it should not be assumed that the alleged immorality of the Kremlin's actions in Ukraine will prevent the West from again finding ways of rapprochement with Putin. The stakes in the confrontation between the West and China are too high for that to be the case. And there are precedents for such a rapprochement - the US, for example, quickly established relations with China in the early 1970s even though the Vietnam War was still raging, during which almost 60,000 American soldiers were killed with Beijing's help.

There are no small nations

Why did numerous attempts to establish relations between the West and Russia fail, since both sides were interested? But the fact is that there were not two sides, and to reduce global politics to superpowers is a dangerous simplification of the situation. Alas, global players in recent decades have often neglected the existence of smaller nations and countries "in-between" them. Already a century ago this was dangerous - for it was the actions of the Balkan states and nationalist forces that contributed to the long-standing but not necessarily fatal disputes of the then-global powers that escalated into the First World War. It was not inevitable and involved a series of unnatural alliances and confrontations - the whole history of Russian participation in that war on the side of the Entente and against Germany and Türkiye being the best example.

In recent decades, smaller players have begun to play an even greater role in world politics. This does not mean that the hierarchy of powers in the international arena has disappeared - not at all, it has even strengthened in favour of the West due to structural control of technology, finance, and media. But no one is allowed to divide regions and peoples in the style of Putin's beloved Emperor Alexander III.

Bolton, by the way, referring to the Russian sphere of influence under the guise of "near abroad", does not resent the very wishful thinking. He points to something else - "One has to take into account what the 'near abroad' thinks about all this. I mean, we have a sphere of influence in Canada, but we don't tell them what to do. I mean they tell us what to do, more than we tell them in a sense. And these countries, certain former members of the Warsaw Pact, wanted protection from Russia. They were the ones who joined NATO. We did not extend the border of NATO towards Russia. They have been knocking on our door since the minute the Warsaw Pact started to fall apart."

Of course, this is not entirely true; it was more the politicians in power in these countries who knocked, probably for different reasons. The people of the countries that joined NATO were not asked anything, and the discussion itself was conducted under unequal conditions for the opponents of the enlargement of the bloc. But the fact remains that the West was able to rely on influential groups in the former Eastern bloc countries.

In the meantime, the Russian establishment and the media and experts serving it continued to argue about "limitrophe states" and "fake" peoples, wondering how simultaneously Russia's friends were becoming fewer. But how can anyone be convinced to be friends with Moscow if they are constantly being told that they "do not exist", that their language is fake or imposed by enemies, and that their state is fake? In the meantime, this is exactly what many Russian experts associated with the Russian government have been doing.

Once in the Western structures, countries that have encountered such a thing naturally immediately adopted a radically anti-Russian stance. It would have been strange if they had done otherwise. Especially since the disputes were not only about intangible values but also about very concrete flows of huge money which the Kremlin decided not to give any more even to its allies - remember the oil and gas disputes between Russia and Belarus. In general, already since the early 2000s the Polish establishment began to talk about an impending collusion between Moscow and Berlin and it was not paranoia. The Russian oil and gas industry came to the forefront in defining Russian foreign policy and began to unceremoniously shift the gas transport infrastructure from Eastern Europe to the Baltics - taking money out of the respective countries. In the mental map of Eastern Europe, which Russia drew for itself, there was then only one serious partner - Germany, the rest being the Limitrophs and "post-Soviet pseudo-states"...

Once in the Western structures, countries that have encountered such a thing naturally immediately adopted a radically anti-Russian stance. It would have been strange if they had done otherwise. Especially since the disputes were not only about intangible values but also about very concrete flows of huge money which the Kremlin decided not to give any more even to its allies - remember the oil and gas disputes between Russia and Belarus. In general, already since the early 2000s the Polish establishment began to talk about an impending collusion between Moscow and Berlin and it was not paranoia. The Russian oil and gas industry came to the forefront in defining Russian foreign policy and began to unceremoniously shift the gas transport infrastructure from Eastern Europe to the Baltics - taking money out of the respective countries. In the mental map of Eastern Europe, which Russia drew for itself, there was then only one serious partner - Germany, the rest being the limitrophes and "post-Soviet pseudo-states"...

The result is clear, it is not surprising and the foreign foes are not guilty. Therefore, until Moscow changes its approach to the Eastern European countries, there will be no dialogue with the West, because these Eastern European countries have already joined Western structures.

Arrogance, though, does not do anyone any good and not only Russia has problems with it, but the US does too. American journalist and historian Peter Beinart once wrote an enlightening book on how great power arrogance, an inability to behave modestly, to critically assess their actions and role, to understand that "you are not alone" led the US to disasters time after time. He called it "Icarus syndrome" - as we know, Icarus in Greek myth escaped from captivity, together with his father, by fashioning wings and attaching them to his back in wax. Icarus' father, Daedalus, was aware of his limitations and was cautious not to fly upwards lest the sun melt the wax. Icarus decided that with wings he could soar to unseen heights - it ended in a natural disaster, the sun melted the wax, the wings fell off and Icarus crashed. Something similar happens to the great powers; political scientists describe it in less colourful terms such as "unfounded ambition in foreign policy over-reach".

For many respectable American politicians, the entire world is built around the uniqueness of the US and its confrontation with China, while other nations become mere extras, minor allies, or enablers. The whole "irreplaceable nation" discourse is about that, as are the claims about the incomparable qualities of the American state and nation. Recall the scandals that occurred when Donald Trump pointed out a couple of times that the US government also takes questionable actions, and therefore does not need to declare its opponents uniquely universal evil through a selective reading of modern history. For example, in 2017, Trump commented that "Yes there are plenty of murderers in the world. And we have plenty of murderers. Do you seriously think our country is not guilty of anything?" The entire American political establishment then lashed out at the president for daring to "compare" the US to anyone, especially the Russian Federation.

The myth of Russian-Western enmity

To recap, it is hardly possible to speak of an immanent, inborn incompatibility between Russia and the West, or, indeed, between any countries, peoples, cultures, or civilizations. Russia in its various guises has been involved in various coalitions with Western countries as a full-fledged player in major European politics at least since the time of Peter the Great. The very act of opening a "window to Europe", against the will of the Swedes, was made possible with the help of Denmark and one of Germany's largest states, Saxony! Same Germany had been closely linked with Russia for centuries, and it is enough to recall the names of Russian conquerors of the Caucasus or Asia. Two of the greatest classics of Western military thought, Karl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henry Jomini, went from the armies of the Western countries to the Russian Imperial Army and fought for Russia. How, then, can one speak of a certain unchanging hostile attitude at all?

In other words, Russia was part of that "old West". The modern "collective West" is a new phenomenon in world politics, a construct built by American efforts since 1945, the Russian Federation de facto came closer to it until the early 2010s!

In other words, the current enmity between Russia and the West is far from being as deep and age-old as propagandists on both sides try to present it to us. It is too early to talk about a new dialogue between Russia and the West, just as it is too early to talk about Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. But unless the Russian-Ukrainian war escalates into a larger conflict, it will be some time before the sides start talking. That time will not come soon - for now all sides (except the Ukrainian side) can afford to fight in the current format for another couple of years. Nevertheless, from a strategic perspective, both Russia and the US and the rest of the countries will have to come to an agreement - Russia and Europe will have to do it as neighbours, well as the US needs to at least pull Russia away from its alliance with China. But the international order that will emerge from these negotiations will only be more peaceful if the agreements take into account the views not only of the world's superpowers and blocs but also of smaller players.