Hapless and abandoned Armenia vs emboldened Azerbaijan The narrative unpacked: Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

The Western narrative implying that there is an urgent need to militarily support "a weakened Armenia, abandoned by Russia, against an emboldened Azerbaijan, with a newly-found appetite for territorial expansion at the expense of its neighbour" is in progress and needs to be unpacked. Orkhan Amashov's latest 'Contemplations' looks into this very subject in a wider context. 

Armenia claims that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Azerbaijan, after having restored its control over the remainder of Karabakh, is now intent on the seizure of the former's southernmost territory, either for purely land grabbing reasons, or merely for the purpose of forcing Yerevan's hand into agreeing to an extraterritorial corridor. 

Major Western players, including the EU; France specifically; and the US, despite not explicitly confirming this, nevertheless, by means of renewed emphasis on the vital criticality of the protection of Armenia's territorial integrity, appear to be ostensibly sympathetic to Yerevan's fears. 

Azerbaijan argues otherwise. Baku maintains that it has no territorial ambitions at the expense of Armenia and does not want a new war: as of September 2023, the main task - the restoration of full sovereignty over Karabakh - is complete, and now it is time to turn a new page and conclude a peace deal. 

Azerbaijan also says that the Zangazur Corridor, a land passage connecting its mainland territory with its Nakchivan exclave via Armenia, is no longer a top priority, with the alternative Iranian route being viewed as more realistic and viable. 

On the point of the extraterritoriality of the route, since February 2022, Baku has not been insisting on such a regime, viewing the entire issue as a matter to be decided between Moscow and Yerevan.

But still… The narrative is there, despite no shred of hard evidence being provided. There was, of course, one article, published by Politico on 13 October, which reported that US State Secretary Antony Blinken had informed a group of lawmakers that: “his department was tracking the possibility that Azerbaijan could soon invade Armenia”. Despite being later refuted by the State Department, this has, nevertheless, had its impact, pandering to the fears in Yerevan and amongst those who treat Baku’s intentions with a great deal of scepticism.

So, the narrative seems to suggest that an emboldened Azerbaijan, after sorting out the Karabakh issue, is now eyeing a territorial gain at the expense of Armenia, with Russian silence and Turkish support. And a weakened and abandoned Armenia, which is reaching out for Western support, should be helped. This is the crux of the matter.

Of course, there is a need to justify the delivery of French arms to Armenia, which is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), dominated by Russia. The French-Armenian defence partnership, with the first batch of military equipment, including multi-purpose armoured vehicles being sent to Armenia via Georgia does, at this juncture, not present a serious factor bearing upon the military balance between Yerevan and Baku.

One may argue that this is just the beginning of a masterplan to extricate hapless Armenia from the clutches of the Muscovite monster, helping Yerevan to defend itself against Azerbaijan, and that much more is to come. 

Here one has to differ, for the sake of healthy scepticism. Firstly, there is a limit to the extent of the military assistance that Armenia could attract from France or any Western country, due to it being a member of a different military bloc, hostile to the West itself. Secondly, there is no guarantee that any military hardware delivered to Armenia will not eventually end up in the hands of Russia, the sworn enemy of the West.

The visible and verifiable impact seems to be helping Pashinyan maintain his power, by increasing his popularity and corresponding legitimacy. France enjoys a high degree of public approval in Armenia, arguably seeking to have its military footprint in this country at some point in the distant future, when circumstances may prove auspicious. This level of French espousal for Armenia allows Pashinyan to be positively viewed as a leader, taking tough but ultimately courageous decisions.

Although it is possible that the Armenian Prime Minister may channel this externally-assisted increase in legitimacy into taking bold decisions regarding the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, such a probability seems unlikely, at present.

I have a sneaking suspicion that Pashinyan may enjoy the present “no war, no peace” situation. The lack of a framework peace treaty with Azerbaijan adds plausibility to the suggestion, in the case of the slightest escalation on the conditional state border, that Baku could take decisive measures which could conclude with the occupation of Armenian territory. This would enable Pashinyan to ask for more help from France, in particular, and the EU, in general.

The absence of a peace deal with Baku will also justify his reticence in taking genuinely bold steps vis-à-vis Russia. A speech delivered at the European Parliament or any other European institution may garner him nice press coverage, but, in real terms, when it comes to being truly independent, more needs to be done. And Pashinyan does not seem remotely ready for that.  

Rather curiously, under Pashinyan, Armenia has become even more economically dependent on Russia, with the country's economic growth being largely attributable to trade with Russia. It is also worth mentioning that the majority of Armenia’s current exports to Russia are, in fact, re-exports of Western products that Moscow is no longer able to get otherwise.

On a different note, since this narrative presents Azerbaijan as a potential aggressor and Armenia as a victim, it appears to serve the purpose of burying Yerevan’s record in egregious occupation and territorial claims. 

This will not go unnoticed in Baku, which is getting increasingly disillusioned with the Brussels peace process, in view of some of the untoward statements coming from this very institution. The process led by EU Council President Charles is presently stalled. With Aliyev’s calls on direct talks to be held in Tbilisi visibly falling on deaf ears, Baku seems to be presented with three options. 

The first mode of action would be to continue indirect coercive diplomacy to induce some reciprocity from Armenia, with the hope that Western mediation could be invigorated. For instance, when Baku declared that the Zangazur Corridor had lost its attractiveness, with the focus being shifted to the Iranian route, Yerevan felt the need to appear more eager on the railway segment of the land passage, evidently fearing to be sidelined. This is one way of influencing Yerevan. 

Secondly, with the Brussels process losing momentum, Baku may turn to the mothballed Moscow platform to address some of the technical issues, such as those related to the delimitation of the state border, even if such a course of action would not be its preferred option.

Thirdly, it may deliberately resort to a “wait and see” policy, placing emphasis on building its regional ties, exacerbating Armenia’s isolation and making the latter feel the perils of the “no peace, no war” situation more profoundly.