How Beijing is redefining global aid through triangular cooperation

In a recent feature, The Diplomat explores China’s increasingly sophisticated pivot in global development strategy—an embrace of triangular cooperation, a model that brings together China, a traditional donor or multilateral organisation, and a third-country beneficiary. This shift marks a significant evolution in China’s aid architecture, reflecting both strategic ambition and diplomatic adaptation in the face of intensifying competition with the United States.

Traditionally known for its bilateral development assistance anchored in principles of non-interference and South-South solidarity, China long resisted engagement with Western-led aid frameworks. However, as the article notes, this posture has gradually softened, especially since the establishment of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018. With CIDCA centralising foreign aid coordination, China found the institutional muscle to explore new modalities like triangular development—a concept originally outlined in the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action.

The shift serves two primary geopolitical purposes. First, it deepens bilateral relationships with regional powers and traditional donors. Through joint training programs, co-financing initiatives, and cross-sector dialogues, China embeds itself in elite policy and industrial circles of strategic partner states. The article highlights China’s 2025 Third Country Training Program with Singapore and its trilateral summit with Pakistan and Bangladesh as concrete examples of how Beijing is leveraging developmental initiatives to build trust and influence.

Second, triangular cooperation provides Beijing with an avenue to challenge and reshape global multilateral norms. In speeches at the Boao Forum and the United Nations, Chinese leaders have lambasted what they call “pseudo-multilateralism,” a not-so-veiled critique of U.S.-led alliances. Instead, they promote “true multilateralism” as an inclusive, Global South-oriented framework—one in which China assumes leadership not by confronting the West directly, but by collaborating with multilateral institutions such as the UNDP and regional blocs like ASEAN.

The Diplomat makes clear that this is not a superficial change in branding but part of a larger strategic recalibration. The launch of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the expansion of South-South cooperation funds, and the founding of support institutions like the Global Development Promotion Center all underscore China’s desire to institutionalise its development model. By involving private actors, as suggested in China’s 2019 Third-Party Market Cooperation Guidelines, Beijing is also moving beyond state-centric approaches, blending foreign policy with commercial diplomacy.

The article’s key insight is that China’s triangular cooperation model reduces the pressure on developing countries to pick sides. For smaller states navigating the U.S.-China rivalry, triangular projects—often technical, apolitical, and recipient-driven—offer a safe harbour. This makes them more likely to engage with China on development even if they are hesitant to align strategically.

In conclusion, The Diplomat argues that triangular cooperation is not just a new tool in Beijing’s development toolkit—it is a strategic signal. China is positioning itself not merely as an alternative to the West but as a re-designer of the global development order. As triangular cooperation grows beyond aid into trade, infrastructure, and climate policy, China’s quiet evolution may soon become a defining feature of international development in the multipolar era.

By Vugar Khalilov