How likely is conflict between India, Pakistan to escalate?

The recent militant attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed 26 tourists, marks the first major terrorist incident in the region since the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing. That earlier attack, which targeted an Indian police convoy, was blamed on the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed. On May 7, India launched a missile barrage into Pakistani-administered Kashmir and parts of the Punjab province, in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack.

Pakistan responded with artillery fire along the Line of Control (LoC), the disputed and heavily militarized border that divides Kashmir between the two nations. The Foreign Policy publication examines the aftermath of this string of deadly attacks and lays out the potential scenarios for how the situation could unfold in the coming weeks, highlighting the risks of further escalation —including nuclear confrontation—and the uncertain role of international diplomacy.

Given the magnitude of the Indian missile strike, Pakistan’s retaliation appears inevitable. Historically, the Pakistani military has exerted dominant influence over the country's politics, and it cannot afford to appear weak in the face of Indian aggression. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, though nominally in charge, remains subordinate to the powerful army chief, General Asim Munir, who is known for his hardline stance against India. Just a week before the attack in Kashmir, Munir reaffirmed Pakistan’s ideological commitment to the two-nation theory, underscoring deep-rooted divisions.

The escalation has reignited fears of a potential nuclear conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Although both Indian and Pakistani officials have generally dismissed the likelihood of such an outcome, the risk remains concerning. Pakistan does not adhere to a no-first-use nuclear policy, meaning it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if it perceives an existential threat. It also possesses tactical nuclear weapons, likely meant for deployment in response to a major Indian military offensive.

India, on the other hand, has traditionally maintained a no-first-use doctrine. However, in recent years, Indian strategic discourse has become more ambiguous. Some analysts suggest India may be shifting toward developing a first-strike capability, although the extent and clarity of such a shift remain uncertain.

In past crises between India and Pakistan, the United States has played a key role in mediating tensions and preventing further escalation, particularly after both countries became nuclear powers in 1998. This time, however, US diplomatic engagement is noticeably absent. The Biden administration has been consumed with other priorities, and key diplomatic posts, such as the US ambassador to India and the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, remain unfilled. The burden of mediation has largely fallen on Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also currently serving as interim national security advisor. It remains uncertain whether his efforts will be effective.

In a surprising move, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan this week in a bid to ease tensions. While Iran has historically maintained ties with both India and Pakistan, the author points out that it lacks the necessary influence and diplomatic leverage to mediate meaningfully in this high-stakes conflict.

If Pakistan's anticipated response is reckless or inflicts significant casualties or damage on India—military or civilian—it may provoke further Indian retaliation, driven by public outrage and political pressure. Such tit-for-tat actions increase the risk of inadvertent escalation, which the article believes is a dangerous dynamic where limited responses unintentionally lead to broader, more destructive conflict. This form of escalation is particularly perilous in nuclear-armed environments, as seen during the Cold War in Europe, and now threatens South Asia. The current standoff is a stark reminder of the fragility of peace in the region and the urgent need for robust diplomatic engagement to avoid catastrophe.

By Nazrin Sadigova