Palestine’s drama completing Middle East transformation Belarus expert on Caliber.Az

Doctor of Political Sciences from Belarus Serhey Bohdan’s exclusive analysis for Caliber.Az.

The Israeli army entered the first city in the Gaza Strip on November 3, launching a ground operation against Palestinian Hamas radical organisation. This can be the end of the Palestinian issue amid the normalisation of Israel's relations with main Arab countries.

Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, made it clear in his public speech that he does not plan to help Hamas fight against Israel yet.

Despite the bloodiness of the recent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, its outcome is quite predictable, and the conflict is unlikely to escalate.

Military situation

If one abstracts from moral and ethical nuances and consider the military, political and economic aspects of current events, then they are almost normal.

On the contrary, everything looks quite natural. The sides began to fight as soon as a classic military situation arose. In such a situation, amid worsening hostility on existential issues, the sides of the conflict have the means and opportunities to take revenge.

Let's start from the last point as theology and metaphysical hatred are too often mixed into analysis, although it is necessary to consider fighters, military equipment and money.

Where did they come from? The Palestinian-Israeli war is closely connected with the processes that gave rise to the Arab Spring, in particular, the civil wars in Syria and Iraq.

Both Hamas and Hezbollah actively took part in this confrontation, usually on opposite sides of the front. How has this involvement in the Syrian and Iraqi civil war affected the ability of these groups to confront Israel?

First, this is an increase in technical equipment and tactical training of Arab groups.

This is testified by the attacks on Israeli armoured vehicles. Hezbollah last week published a video footage showing the destruction of an Israeli Merkava tank on the border of Lebanon and Israel, while Hamas destroyed more than a dozen Israeli tanks.

During the Syrian war, Hezbollah and Hamas obtained many advanced weapons, their fighters mastered new tactics. Western countries and Israel were forced to turn a blind eye to this.

Hamas was useful to stand against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah - against ISIS. Moreover, both supporters and opponents of Assad not only studied, but also actively applied the knowledge they acquired. They skillfully use the “ultra-modern” Western-style technology.

Moreover, the Syrian conflict in the 2010s created a “fog of war” that will not clear for many years, allowing any players to transfer weapons and ammunition to Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. (which can be passed off as captured from ISIS, Syrian regime, etc.).

Second, this is money.

No matter how much people talk about Iran’s financing of Hamas, there is little information about it and Tehran could hardly transfer huge money. This was hampered by political tension between Iran and Hamas and technical difficulties.

However, it is well known that many hundreds of millions of US dollars were transferred to Hamas by Qatar.

After all, Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The global Ikhwan network was supported by the Qataris thanks to the Arab Spring (namely, two contradictory factors - first the desire of the West and its allies in the region to use the Ikhwan brothers to destabilise unwanted regimes, and then a military coup against a democratically elected one and the Ikhwan Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi).

Third, this is political cover.

The general political situation over the past ten years has forced the West and its allies not only to tolerate Ikhwan activity more than usual (Sunni radicals in Syria and throughout the Middle East were considered a promising tool against Assad, Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, not to mention Nasrallah), but also to allow Qatar to finance the Ikhwans and their branches, including Hamas.

Due to the above-mentioned situation, the US and its allies at least tolerated the activity of Hamas not only in the region in general but also in the Gaza Strip.

There were Israeli operations in Gaza but limited, despite numerous civilian casualties.

Israel's attempts to carry out search operations were harshly opposed by significant regional players, whose opinion is important for the US. As a result, Hamas faced difficulty in Gaza, but Israel was unable to eradicate it.

In general, it was difficult not to notice how Hamas’s forces have been growing over the past ten years or more. Why are current events presented as a surprise? The reason is that for many months before the beginning of the current war, liberal circles in Israel and the liberal establishment worldwide that condoned them were confronting the current Israeli government. They were interested only in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his reforms. This also applied to numerous representatives of liberals in the Israeli security forces.

The Palestinian issue

However, a new exacerbation was expected in any case. Israel is trying to complete the geopolitical transformation in the region, which de facto means to put an end to the Palestinian issue. This is clear and unacceptable for Palestinian organisations - regardless of their political ideologies.

It is worth considering the situation from the point of view of the internal logic of Tel Aviv’s actions. Israel's current military operation was a reaction to the attack by Palestinian Hamas, but in general it corresponds to the logic of Tel Aviv's previous actions.

This is another big step - or rather a big leap in the Israeli policy towards the Arab population of Palestine.

Gaza is one of two formally self-governing Palestinian territories. There is a Palestinian administration with limited powers on the second one - in the fertile West Bank (Jordan River). Jewish settlements, which are gradually being legalised, are appearing there.

The West Bank is gradually being included in Israel, as some 600,000 Jewish settlers are living there. This is a huge number considering the small area. The Israeli government will not agree to expel these people. Further expansion of these settlements is only a matter of time.

As for the Gaza Strip, the situation is different. This area without water, fertile soil, minerals and generally everything is slightly connected with the Israeli economy. A strict blockade regime has been imposed on it since 2007. The Arab population is increasing there. The radical organisations opposing Israel operate.

There are no Jewish settlements there. The area remains not just alien, but also hostile to Israel. Not only missiles are launched from Gaza. This depressed and radicalised area creates obstacles to the normalisation of Israel’s relations with Arab countries and preventing from criticising in the West.

Israel has recently made significant progress in international legitimisation of its actions. Tel Aviv not only has successfully prevented recognition of the Palestinian Authority and political organisations. Its actions were accepted at the international level covertly.

Israel achieved recognition of its sovereignty over the new territories by Western countries.

For example, US President Donald Trump recognised entire Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2018 (putting an end to the plans for its division), while he recognised the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019.

Even Jewish settlements in the West Bank which were condemned many times cause no sharp reaction in the West. When in spring the government allowed the construction of 5,000 houses for Jewish settlers in the area, the US made just formal comments.

The Israeli government complemented this success in the West with important steps in relations with major Arab countries. Official relations have been established with them, while close business relations with a number of countries. Lebanon (despite Hezbollah) can be cited as an example.

Moreover, the Arab countries tried to normalise relations realising that the Palestinian issue was being resolved. The UAE’s ambassador in Washington said that in exchange for normalising relations, they agreed with Israel that it would not officially extend its sovereignty to further parts of the West Bank until 2024.

In other words, the Palestinian issue has been ordinary in recent years except for the situation with the Gaza Strip.

Hamas attack provided the Israeli government with carte blanche from the West for a final solution to the Palestinian issue in the area. It was interpreted as an Israeli 9/11, after which Tel Aviv stopped asking questions.

Therefore, now the Israeli army has the opportunity to quickly destroy armed Palestinian groups in Gaza.

Proceeding from history, having such a carte blanche to conduct search operations, it is quite possible to destroy even very big armed movements such as the Liberation Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Aceh separatists in Indonesia, the rebel movements in Oman's Dhofar, Iraqi Kurdistan, etc.

Along with or after liquidating of Palestinian groups in Gaza, a huge part of the population could be relocated to Egypt and then to other countries. These plans have been announced this week.

It is possible that part or entire Gaza, along with its population, will be transferred to Egypt. It was under its administration before the 1967 war. The whole world is preparing to change borders. There is no reason to think that they will remain unshakable in the Middle East.

Egypt supports blockade of Palestinians

Despite this, there is still no reason to think that the Palestinian-Israeli war can more escalate. It is simply absurd to discuss the possibility of neighbouring Arab countries’ joining it.

Not only the Israeli authorities, but also the Egyptian government were involved in blockade of the Gaza Strip. Gaza shares a border with Egypt. Except for a brief episode during Morsi's presidency, Egyptian security forces have been the Israelis' best military partner for a long time.

Of course, many experts have been discussing for several weeks the possibility of opening a second full-fledged front by Hezbollah against Israel in the north to help Hamas in the south.

However Lebanese Islamists are unlikely to act. Hezbollah will not do more than shootouts and symbolic steps.

War is a serious action, and if you enter into a war on someone’s side, you must not just share certain values and principles. A clear coordination of actions with a high level of mutual trust is required. This is not observed between Hamas and Hezbollah (and Iran, which stands behind it).

The history of Iran's relationship with Hamas is extremely controversial. Iran initially relied on another organisation in Palestine - “Islamic Jihad”, rather than on Hamas (which appeared from the Palestinian “Muslim Brotherhood”).

Moreover, Tehran does not want to stand for an organisation that has more than once gone against it and has often sought friends among Tehran’s opponents, for example, among the Gulf monarchies.

The actions of Hamas during the civil war in Syria when it withdrew its groups from Damascus, an ally of the Iranians, abroad - through Türkiye to Qatar, can be cited as an example. Hamas members in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and Syria took up arms against the Iranian-backed Syrian regime.

As Iran does not intend to help an organisation that has recently acted against its closest ally, then Hezbollah will not intend to save its Palestinian partners. Moreover, it is important to consider the different natures of Hezbollah and Hamas.

Hezbollah, by the way, also did not want to support the Syrian government of Assad in the 2010s, but was forced to act - otherwise its supplies from Iran, for which Syria is important, would have been cut off. Hezbollah would have problems without this supply.

However, Hamas never depended on the Iranians. It did not have sufficient opportunity to stably supply groups in Gaza.

The tunnels on the border with Egypt were used by Hamas to obtain something from Egypt, rather than Iran. One can be sure that neither the Egyptian government nor the Salafis acting in that area on the Egyptian side would tolerate any groups from Iran.

We again see that, despite many opponents in the West and Israel, they are unable to coordinate their actions. Maybe that’s why the current escalation, despite its unprecedented nature, will not turn into the long-awaited nuclear war.

Limits of Iran's Capabilities

Why do we hear endless talk about Iran and Hezbollah, which are about to join Hamas? The fact is that these conversations are beneficial to both sides. As a result, the Iranians and Hezbollah seem to be globally important.

In particular, they can improve their image in Arab Sunni countries after many years of supporting the Syrian government of Assad against the Sunni opposition, which was accompanied by growing antagonism between Shiites and Sunnis.

These rumours allow supporters of Israel to mobilise Western countries, tired of supporting Ukraine, to render assistance to the Israelis. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear programme can be highlighted. This is an important moment for Israel in a situation where the West is coming to terms with Iran's de facto nuclear status.

Of course, such speculation looks risky. In fact, the risk of Iran being even more directly drawn into the current showdown is minimal. Iran has little ability to massively project military power towards Israel.

Geographically, it is far. Iranian must commit any actions through Syria (even if the Lebanese Hezbollah is deployed against Israel, it will be impossible without Damascus). The Iranian-allied Syrian government is extremely weak and does not even control much of its territory.

Moreover, it is necessary to get to Syria onshore through Iraq - which the US and their Kurdish friends can easily block.

There are no other options. Tehran’s technical means for the transfer of forces and supplies are limited. The aircraft fleet has not been renewed since the 1990s. The ships are even worse.

Moreover, Iran, and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is interested in such operations, can not begin them, if only because the arsenals of the supplies and military equipment necessary for such actions have been depleted. The weapons were sold to the Russian Federation in the hope that it would supply the military equipment required by Iran but in vain.

In general, the topic of Iranian operations against Israel is interesting because the basic prerequisites (or rather, their lack) have long outlined Tehran’s further actions.

The Iranian relevant circles know that when, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, IRGC fighters went through Syria to open a front against Israel, the then leader of the revolution, Khomeini, immediately demanded the IRGC to return and pointed out the inability to fight there without supply.

As a result, only IRGC instructors for local Shiites remained in Lebanon, while the main contingent was withdrawn.

The large-scale participation of Iran and its allies in the current conflict over Gaza is unimaginable.

Of course, this does not apply to Lebanon and Syria, where clashes, missile and bomb attacks will be continued, but this is a completely different platform. Israel and its allies after 1973 successfully separated various “hot spots” along Israel’s borders.

They do not flare up at the same time. For example, if Hamas intensifies activity, Hezbollah is silent, and vice versa. Nothing shows to any changes in this model.

World wars do not start in Middle East

In response to the Hamas operation, the US government sent an armada of warships with aircraft, to the shores of Israel.

The essence of these actions is symbolic. Netanyahu can resist Hamas on his own, and, as we mentioned before, it is impossible to expect the intervention of additional players.

In other words, no country will actually intervene in the conflict. In fact, none of them supports Hamas. Hamas is first and foremost a creation and product of the Gaza Strip itself.

This is its strength and weakness. For several decades it has been operating in a limited territory, completely transparent and shot through by the Israelis - relying on the Palestinian population of Gaza.

On the other hand, the military power remains limited. They are truly destroyed without support from the outside and without diplomatic cover.

Apparently, something like this will happen in the coming weeks. Many world politicians, equating Hamas with ISIS, hinted at such plans.

As is known, the West (together with the Russian Federation and, sometimes, Iran) fought against the latter, destroying entire areas in which ISIS militants were present. Then the military entered these areas with carte blanche to conduct search operations.

There is no inevitability in history, but the end of the Palestinian drama seems possible. As opposed to the confrontation between the West and Russia in Eastern Europe and primarily within the Russian-Ukrainian war, the possibilities for escalation in the Palestinian-Israeli war are limited.

Despite all the rhetoric of the sides, fuel supplies for the current conflict in the Middle East are limited. There have been many conflicts in the Middle East, but world wars have not yet broken out there.

Both world wars began in eastern Europe - one in Bosnia, the second one in Poland. The danger of world war is also much more connected with the east of Europe, rather than with the Middle East.