"Soft Karabakh scenario" for Georgia Moscow and Tbilisi start the game

The separatists in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali seem to be losing hope: the prospect of their reintegration into Georgia is becoming increasingly tangible. This shift was evident after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made a statement expressing positive sentiments about Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze's initiative for reconciliation with the Abkhazians and Ossetians.

Following this, a pessimistic post began circulating on Ossetian separatist websites, stating: "Does anyone still doubt that we are moving along the Karabakh scenario? Even if it's a lighter version, in terms of Russia’s recognition of our country, the situation is becoming more and more obvious."

Lavrov had been explicit: "They said they want historical reconciliation. As for what form this reconciliation will take, that is for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia to decide."

This isn't just talk—it's a clear signal that the game is on. As for Gagloev (the leader of the Tskhinvali separatists), the situation is obvious. He’s a pawn in this political game and will undoubtedly comply with whatever decisions are made in Moscow. When the pressure builds, as always, he’ll give in and accept any terms. Gagloev's weakness and cowardice make him the ideal tool for manipulation.

The Georgian side understands that now is the perfect time to secure the best possible deal from Moscow regarding South Ossetia. This is a moment to act decisively and take advantage of Gagloev’s vulnerability.

The pace of events is expected to pick up after the parliamentary elections in Georgia. If the Georgian Dream party wins, South Ossetia should brace itself for some tough changes. We're standing on the threshold of significant political shifts, and it's foolish to remain in denial.

The more astute separatists are beginning to grasp this reality. The puppet separatist authorities are weak and hold no real power. Under the right conditions, Russia may well hand over these territories to Georgian control. In essence, this would be a softer version of what separatists are calling the 'Karabakh scenario.' In the end, Karabakh came under the full control of Azerbaijan, with no "special status" for separatists and no foreign military presence on Azerbaijani soil.

Undoubtedly, the reintegration of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region into Georgia could take the form of a "confederation" to allow the Kremlin to save face regarding its previous "recognitions of independence" for these occupied regions. Russian troops might remain in these territories for some time, much like their recent presence in Karabakh as peacekeepers. However, it's important to understand that given the current geopolitical dynamics, all of this is temporary. Sooner or later, Russian forces will leave Georgian territory, and the Abkhazians and Ossetians will have to negotiate directly with the Georgians on the terms of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence within a single state.

Even if this state is formally a "confederation," it is clear to everyone that economically and politically, Georgia will dominate, not Abkhazia, and certainly not the so-called "South Ossetia," which is depopulated, empty, and entirely reliant on subsidies.

However, this situation does not imply the assimilation or dissolution of small ethnic groups. The Constitution of Georgia guarantees autonomy for Abkhazia and provides official status for the Abkhaz language. These are quite favourable conditions for a small ethnic group like the Abkhaz, who, in their so-called "independent" state, have long become a minority, forgetting their language and facing extinction and assimilation.

Moreover, unlike the Armenians, the Abkhaz have no other state except for the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic within Georgia—therefore, no one will forcibly remove them from their homeland, as the Russian Empire did in the 19th century.

The conditions for reviving the Ossetian ethnic identity can also be discussed. The Ossetians remember well that during the time of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast within Georgia, they received an education in their native language, while in the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR, there were no Ossetian schools at all.

It is clear that Russia, which is already negotiating with the ruling Georgian Dream party regarding the terms for the return of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, wants to maintain its military bases in the currently occupied territories, as well as its military and political control. However, it is uncertain whether this issue will remain relevant for Russia in 3 to 4 years. Moreover, Russia's military presence in Abkhazia is not contributing to its efforts in the war in Ukraine; rather, it has become more of a burden. Even the establishment of a Russian naval base in Ochamchire does not address the vulnerability of the Black Sea Fleet’s ships to attacks from Ukrainian missiles and drones.

Initially, Russia may have planned to maintain its military presence in Azerbaijani Karabakh beyond 2025. However, the geopolitical landscape in which Russia found itself in November 2020 is fundamentally different from that of September 2023. Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, diverting resources to sustain a military presence in Karabakh has become exceedingly costly for Russia, not to mention the challenge of providing military support for the separatists. Azerbaijan's neutrality and its strategic partnership with Russia, particularly in joint transit projects like the North-South corridor, represent the maximum outcome the Kremlin could have hoped for, and it achieved this.

As a result, Azerbaijan's jurisdiction has been fully restored over all of Karabakh. The fact that the Armenian population failed to address their reintegration into Azerbaijan and the restoration of their Azerbaijani citizenship during three years of Russian peacekeeper presence is not Baku's fault. All grievances from the Karabakh Armenians should be directed at their separatist leaders and adventurers like Ruben Vardanyan, who convinced them that Karabakh would never be part of Azerbaijan.

What the separatists have done to the Karabakh Armenians serves as a valuable lesson for the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. It is essential to engage with central authorities when they offer not just dialogue and reconciliation but also maximum concessions. This creates an opportunity to discuss issues such as local governance, amnesty for participants in military actions, and the conditions for the cohabitation of returning displaced persons with the population that remained during the occupation. Many countries that have experienced civil wars and separatist conflicts have gone through similar processes.

Conflict resolution experiences show that compromises can always be found. Before the 44-day war, the Armenian side was in an advantageous position to advocate for its interests in any compromise, requiring only that they begin the de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories. However, both Yerevan and the separatists missed their chance to resolve the Karabakh issue peacefully. They subsequently squandered the opportunity to negotiate the aftermath of the 44-day war, even if the terms were no longer as favourable. Even then, there was a chance for the Karabakh Armenians to gradually and painlessly integrate into Azerbaijan with the mediation of Russia and under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers. Baku consistently offered dialogue, but the separatists flatly refused to consider the future of the Armenians of Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Ultimately, they brought the situation to a point where Armenians voluntarily left Azerbaijani territory.

The Kremlin, which has already shown the separatists the "stick" in the form of reduced funding, still finds it unwise to overtly demonstrate its strong rejection. On September 30, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin showcased the "carrot" by congratulating the separatist region of Abkhazia on its "victory day over Georgia" and its "independence." However, simultaneously, the Kremlin is starting to question the "heroic" narrative of the separatist war of 1992-1993. In this way, Moscow is gradually "nudging" the separatists toward Georgia and even preparing Russian public opinion for the idea that it may be better to part ways with the "ungrateful" separatists.

To change the perception of separatists in Russia, Moscow doesn't need to come up with anything particularly new—it's enough to focus on certain "heroes" of the separatist movement. Ahead of the 31st anniversary of the separatists' capture of Sukhumi, Russia "remembered" Shamil Basayev, a "hero of Abkhazia" and "deputy defence minister" of the separatists during the 1992-1993 war. An exhibition dedicated to this "hero" exists in a museum in Sukhumi that was restored with Russian funding. Although the separatists have always known about this "hero"—his photograph has adorned the museum for many years—attention was only drawn to him now, with demands to revoke Basayev's title of "Hero of Abkhazia." As a result, many Russians have dramatically changed their views on the "heroism" of the Abkhaz separatist movement; numerous angry questions have emerged on Russian social media asking, "Why are we feeding those who consider terrorists 'heroes'?" and "Isn't it time to return them to Georgia?"

The conclusion that negotiations regarding the return of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali are already underway can be drawn from the words of Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the Georgian Dream party, who stated that "the question of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity could arise at any moment, necessitating corresponding changes to the Constitution of Georgia." He emphasized the need to "reconsider the system of governance and territorial organization" in the country.

Some analysts and experts have speculated that this refers to a confederative model, whereby Georgia would first need to recognize the "independence" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, it is important to understand that the Kremlin is not primarily concerned with the status of these autonomous regions within Georgia. The experience of Russia imposing a "special status" on Ukraine's separatist Donbas through the so-called "Minsk agreements" has clearly demonstrated that the project of having a "Trojan horse" within a largely uncontrollable state to influence its policies is difficult to implement.

Moscow is primarily interested not in the internal territorial arrangement of its strategically located neighbour in the South Caucasus, but rather in ensuring that the "entrance" to the Georgian segment of the Middle Corridor is not controlled by clear geopolitical adversaries of Russia. Meanwhile, Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia officially states the country's aspiration for NATO membership. So far, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has declared that the Georgian Dream party does not intend to amend this article.

However, the dynamics of Georgia's relationships with the US and the collective West could potentially lead to either a revision of this article or to a more independent Georgian foreign policy within the Western camp, similar to Hungary. This appears to be Russia's main strategic interest concerning Georgia, and indirectly, that of China as well.

With Georgia's full integration into NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance effectively closes the last "neutral window" into Asia at the beginning of the Middle Corridor. If Russia agrees to restore Georgia's territorial integrity, its main concern will likely not be the constitutional establishment of a confederative structure in Georgia, but rather the country’s renouncement of its mandatory aspiration for NATO membership or its actual autonomy within NATO, akin to Turkey or Hungary.

Naturally, in geopolitical negotiations, Moscow may initially "raise the stakes," demanding not only a break with NATO but also Georgia's participation in a Union State alongside Belarus and the separatists. However, in reality, such a scenario is unlikely.

It is also important to remember that NATO does not allow countries with unresolved territorial conflicts to seek full membership. One of the primary objectives of occupying Georgia’s Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region is to hinder Georgia’s accession to NATO—a fact that Moscow does not even try to conceal. Therefore, if Russia were to "hand over" to Georgia the tool that prevents its NATO membership, it would want some guarantees that, the day after regaining control of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, Georgia would not become one of Russia's overt geopolitical adversaries.

Ideally, Russia would prefer to have Georgia not as a "second Belarus"—a scenario that the Georgian opposition is using to scare voters ahead of the elections on October 26, 2024—but rather as a "replacement for Finland," which maintained neutrality for a long time despite being an EU member, actively cooperated with Russia, and only recently joined NATO. Russia has no objections to Georgia's membership in the EU.

The membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO has effectively "closed" the Baltic "window to Europe," which was opened by Peter the Great. Now, there are looming prospects of Russia potentially losing its "window to Asia" through Georgia. To keep this strategic "window" open, the Kremlin may be willing to sacrifice Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

The question of Georgia's neutral status could become a point of political bargaining between Moscow and Tbilisi following a likely victory for the "Georgian Dream" party. Such a status would also be acceptable to Türkiye and Azerbaijan. A "soft Karabakh scenario" for restoring territorial integrity could very well be proposed by Moscow to Georgia as compensation for renouncing NATO membership. It is possible that the Kremlin will cite Azerbaijan's positive example of neutrality and the rapid restoration of its territorial integrity—something Moscow did not oppose in September 2023.

A parallel can also be drawn between the "constitutional issue" related to restoring Georgia's territorial integrity and the need to definitively close the notorious "Karabakh question" regarding Armenia's claims against Azerbaijan. In the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, the so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh" is mentioned not just anywhere, but in the very preamble. This could render any peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan a mere "futile document." With a change of power in Yerevan, any agreements with Azerbaijan could be declared invalid as "not corresponding to the preamble of the Constitution of Armenia."

This is why Azerbaijan considers the exclusion of any mentions or implications of territorial claims from the Armenian Constitution and its preamble as a fundamental condition for a peace treaty. It is also possible that Russia will present its own "wishes" regarding Georgia's constitution—this time to minimize objections to the return of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region to its fold.

Vladimir Tskhvediani, Georgia, for Caliber.Az