US-China face-off: Who and how blocs are shaped Shereshevsky's alignment

A third world war between China and the US is highly likely; the formation of imperialist blocs today is a fait accompli. Media outlets often voice such conclusions by political experts. But is it true?

The two opposing superpowers, the United States and China are now in a state of cold war. Washington is creating a whole system of military alliances to resist Beijing in its advance to the West. This is primarily the "Four", which, in addition to the United States itself, includes India, Japan, and Australia, as well as AUKUS - a defense alliance formed by Australia, Britain, and the United States (according to observers, the pact is aimed at countering China's influence in the South China Sea.).

And what about the PRC, is the country really forming appropriate alliances with Russia and Iran? In this case, should the SCO and the recent entry of Iran into it be considered in this capacity?

Researchers of the problem, however, while generally correctly assessing global trends, often miss several details that generally make it difficult to see the prospect of events, the most realistic options for the development of relations between the two superpowers.

Meanwhile, China today is not so strong, because it does not have the latest technologies necessary for a full-fledged confrontation with America. Chinese economists themselves admit that the country is lagging behind in critical areas such as rocket turbines, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, high-speed bearings, and so on.

The Chinese leadership intends to invest trillions of dollars in the modernization of industrial production to achieve parity with the West in these areas, but so far, the gap remains behind. And it is not known whether the PRC, as the Soviet slogan said, will be able to "catch up and overtake".

Moreover, China's lag may even increase because the United States is consistently breaking production chains through which high technologies can get to China. In particular, America, together with the Netherlands and Japan, created a "semiconductor OPEC" - an alliance whose goal is to prevent the creation of modern semiconductors in China.

China is in a difficult situation today also because the development of its economy has somewhat slowed down, which is largely due to the critical envy of exports to the US and EU countries. Its total trade with these countries is about 1.5 trillion dollars: 10 times more than trade with Russia and 100 times more than with Iran - potential allies in the anti-American bloc. In the case of a powerful strengthening of sanctions (the example of Russia and Iran shows that this is possible), this led to an even greater slowdown in the Chinese economy.

At the same time, the PRC is a country where large strikes and protests of the working class often take place. It is economic growth that gives legitimacy to China's autocracy, or "system of political capitalism," as some experts say, such as Branko Milanovic, an economist and former World Bank chief.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, which has a monopoly on power, has long existed in an environment where over 70 per cent of the country's population works in the private sector, which generates 60-70 per cent of GDP. Inequality in China reaches the same scale as in the US, provoking social conflicts.

At the same time, society does not choose the leadership of the country, that is, it is deprived of a mechanism for letting off steam. Therefore, the government needs to constantly maintain high rates of economic growth, so that the situation of most workers improves slightly from year to year, or at least does not undergo a sharp deterioration, he notes.

One of the leading Russian and international experts on China, Alexander Gabuev, is sure that in the event of a halt in economic growth, uprisings or strikes are possible in the province of Guangdong with a population of over 100 million people, consisting almost entirely of workers and specialists serving Chinese exports.

“China, like Egypt, is characterized by a high concentration of population in several regions, including the working class, and in the event of protests, gigantic waves of people can quickly disperse throughout the country. In this dense human anthill, any social protests are very dangerous for the country's leadership,” the political expert and sinologist considers.

In 1989, the signal for the government to disperse the protests on Tiananmen Square was not student protests, but the formation of the NCWP (Independent Workers Union of Beijing) - a movement that dreamed of transferring factories and plants into the hands of self-governing collectives of workers, to remove the Communist Party. It began to spread rapidly, spreading to Shanghai.

For these reasons, Beijing needs to maintain economic growth - this is the regime's way of survival. That is why China is very sensitive to sanctions. He is wary of ties with Russia and Iran because his assistance to those states could trigger Western sanctions against him at any moment.

Chinese trade with Iran, Gabuev notes, after the imposition of sanctions against this country by former US President Donald Trump has decreased by a third. Trade with Russia, by contrast, is growing rapidly and could reach $200 billion this year, but China refuses to supply weapons and ammunition to Moscow and is cautious about investing in Russia. After February 24, the leadership of the CPC recommended that some giant companies refrain from investing in Russia.

At the same time, Beijing has adopted several restrictions on the terms of payment for its goods: from now on, transactions are made exclusively in yuan and only with companies located in China. Now the authorities in Moscow and the management of Russian companies will have to figure out what to do with the "piles of yuan", for which they are far from always able to purchase the necessary goods.

“Besides, China, unlike Turkey or the UAE, is not and cannot become a safe harbor for the capital of Russian private or state companies. In this country, foreigners cannot purchase real estate. In addition, the boundaries between private and state property are blurred, and it costs nothing for the government to freeze any assets,” the analyst believes.

At the same time, the Russian expert also points to the reasons why the PRC is not currently interested in providing military assistance to Moscow. Beijing would like to avoid direct participation in the Ukrainian conflict, as this would cause it to become linked to this conflict and prematurely aggravate confrontation with the West.

In addition, in this case, the PRC would find itself in a situation of dependence on the actions and decisions of Moscow. Finally, the Chinese do not trust Russian politicians, believing that they are "too arrogant and if they achieve major successes, they will begin to treat the PRC with disdain".

Even less clear is the situation with such Chinese allies as Iran and Pakistan, which are now part of the SCO along with anti-Chinese India (New Delhi is Beijing's main opponent in the Indo-Pacific region.

In Pakistan, the military, which plays a colossal role in politics, prefers to balance between China and the United States. In the case of the Middle East, China is betting on developing economic ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Iran's rivals close to the US. China's trade with the Emirates alone is about $50 billion, 3.5 times more than with Iran. Beijing is also closely connected with Israel, a US ally and Iran's main rival, as it depends on Israeli high technology.

Russian orientalist Andrey Lankov highlights another important problem of the PRC. Beijing has almost no notorious "soft power". Modern Chinese culture, as experience has shown, is practically not successful abroad. In this regard, it is very much inferior even to the culture of South Korea - a country whose economy is about 10 times smaller than China's, and in terms of population, it is generally about 30 times smaller. The Chinese model of social structure and Chinese ideology is not subject to export.

“If you try to describe the real, and not proclaimed in words, Chinese ideology, then this is “Chinese state nationalism” with the addition of Han ethnic nationalism. It is practically impossible to export it - all countries in which something similar is sold (for example, the Middle East) are already quite capable of producing this ideological good themselves, in commercial quantities. In addition, nationalism, in general, is a poorly exported ideology,” Lankov is convinced.

Based on all the above considerations, then, as the orientalist notes, the serious problems of Beijing are associated with the lack of any system of military-political alliances. “It simply does not have such alliances, but the United States has dozens of allies, some of which are conditionally comparable to China both in terms of military and economic potential.

Weak candidates for the role of Chinese allies are only a few countries, among which only Russia, relatively speaking, is a "country of the second row". All other potential allies of China are generally countries of the third and even fourth row. Iran, Pakistan, North Korea - this, perhaps, is the entire list of very conditional quasi- and almost allies.

The United States is already superior to China in most significant parameters, and the presence of allies (connected with America, including ideologically!) finally shifts the balance in favor of the United States,” Lankov believes.

All these factors have a serious impact on China's position. And it is currently focused on the careful formation of political alliances with countries such as Russia or Iran. However, Beijing is still very far from a full-fledged system of military-political and trade-economic blocs. So, in China, they are fully aware that they are not yet ready for a full-scale confrontation with America and its allies.