What are risks of renewed conflict in Garabagh? Looking for peace on the phone

On September 12, a Russian Red Cross truck carrying humanitarian aid entered Garabagh from the Azerbaijani city of Aghdam amid the rising tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the risks of renewed escalation. It was the first delivery of supplies to the territory in nearly three months since Azerbaijan introduced limited passage of all traffic on the Lachin road connecting the region to the Republic of Armenia. Also, the food delivery marked the first use of this route connecting Aghdam to Khankendi after three decades.

Since July 2023, Baku has taken a firm stance regarding using the Lachin road and proposed using the Aghdam-Khankendi road as an alternative route for food supplies. Earlier, Azerbaijan accused the de-facto Armenian regime in Garabagh of illegal arms smuggling under the protection of the Russian peacekeeping mission.

This thesis immensely forced Baku to tighten its grip over the Lachin checkpoint, which dragged international reaction. However, Azerbaijan seemed very confident in light of the condemnation campaign referring to the international law and dignity of territorial integrity.

The Second Karabakh War, whose third anniversary will be marked on September 27, was a major game-changer in this context. Having surpassed Armenia in military and economic might, Azerbaijan liberated the occupied territories while leaving the Armenian-populated part of the region under the temporary control of Russia's peacekeeping contingent.

Azerbaijan does not hide its intentions to ensure control over the entire Garabagh as soon as possible, while the peace talks with Armenia stalled. The main narrative of Baku is that the peace negotiations cannot be further delayed, and this year is the last chance to conclude the long-term complex region with the final peace treaty.

However, as of September 2023, both sides accuse each other of a military build-up along their shared border in preparation for an offensive. These accusations are accompanied by almost daily flare-ups along different sections of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border as well as around the Garabagh region.

In one of the most violent confrontations in the Kalbajar direction, on September 1, four Armenian servicemen were killed, and a mobile ground station for combat drones was destroyed.

Amid uncertainty and risks, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke on the phone with the leaders of France, Iran, Georgia and Germany, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to warn about the “possible military offensive of Azerbaijan.”

Of Armenia’s greater concern, the balance of power steadily shifts in favour of Azerbaijan, while Yerevan attempts to reach out to the West, namely France, to create a counterbalance. However, such attempts come at the cost of deteriorating relations with Moscow. As a result, the Russian government openly criticized the Armenian government for its anti-Russian sentiments and recent joint military exercises with the US troops.

In this vein, the accusation of Azerbaijan by PM Pashinyan in torpedoing the peace process appeared to be irrelevant, as his recent congratulatory statement on the 32nd anniversary of the “independence of Nagorno-Karabakh” on September 2 completely contradicts the Armenian government's earlier statements that they acknowledge Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

Moreover, despite Yerevan’s arguments that Azerbaijan deliberately keeps the Lachin road closed to initiate an “ethnic cleansing”, Baku proposed to use the Lachin and Aghdam routes simultaneously for humanitarian purposes. Nevertheless, Armenia refuses to use the alternative route for humanitarian aid, claiming that the Lachin route shall not be under the control of Azerbaijan.

As for Azerbaijan, the strict control of the Lachin road is a viable method to control the passage of Russian vehicles and prevent arms supply to the separatist regime in Karabakh that can undermine the complete resolution of the Garabagh issue.

It is clear that the present developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the Garabagh region shape the future of regional geopolitics. With the current balance of power and full control on the ground, Azerbaijan will unlikely make any concessions amid the peace process but instead will exert more force to bring Armenia to the negotiation table.

Moreover, Baku's eyes set a favourable precedent for using the Aghdam route for further humanitarian deliveries despite objections from the separatist regime. After the route becomes fully operational, Baku may re-open the Lachin road for free movement of the Armenian population of Garabagh.