What to expect from Türkiye-Egypt normalization process? Inching towards a rapprochement

On September 10, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met his Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the recent G20 summit in India, thus highlighting the new era in the current Ankara-Cairo reconciliation. This was the two leaders’ first meeting, since their informal meeting in 2022 in Qatar.

During the meeting, Erdogan said relations entered a “new era” with the mutual appointment of ambassadors, voicing his belief that ties would soon further rise to "the level they deserve", according to the statement.

The Turkish president particularly highlighted that Ankara “attaches importance to revive cooperation” in LNG, nuclear energy, culture and education.

The re-election of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the critical elections in May 2023 marked a new milestone for Türkiye’s renewed diplomacy of rapprochement with the immediate neighbourhood, namely in the Gulf and MENA region. Since his re-election, President Erdogan initiated political reconciliation with Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, Iraq, and Egypt. Until now, the diplomatic thaw with Israel and the Gulf states proceeded smoothly, including Egypt.

Egypt has been at odds with Türkiye as a crucial regional actor since 2013. Following the military coup in this country that deposed the Muslim Brotherhood government, these two Mediterranean countries had been extremely hos­tile towards each other. The current rapprochement, which might lead in a best-case scenario to a resumption of diplomatic relations, thus comes as a surprise. After years of tense ties and regional turbulence, Ankara repeatedly switched to the strategy of pragmatic partnership.

Erdoğan’s top priority after the election is to improve the country's economy, which is in dire straits, with inflation in April officially at 44 per cent, and a rapprochement with Egypt would appease Saudi Arabia and increase trade. One point of tension between the two countries was the East Mediterranean gas forum, a group of countries, including Egypt, that were cooperating to bring gas from the Middle East through the Mediterranean Sea to European markets.

The two Mediterranean nations announced on 8 July 2023 the restoration of ambassador-level relations, with Cairo appointing Amr Al-Hamami as its ambassador to Ankara and Turkey appointing Salih Mutlu Sen as its new ambassador to Egypt.

Indeed, the rekindling of relations came with mutual concessions from both sides. For example, Ankara agreed to push the local televisions to tone down the criticism of Abdul Fattah el-Sisi’s government, while the latter agreed to stop harsh criticism of Türkiye at the official level.

Despite the long-term strained relations, Egypt and Türkiye have retained strong trade ties despite the diplomatic rift: Egypt was among the top 20 markets for Turkish exports last year, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute.

The successful diplomatic normalization with Cairo will enable Ankara to start demarcating the maritime borders, an issue that witnessed a long-term stalemate. On the other hand, the positive bilateral statements paved the way for Turkish private companies to launch investment plans in Egypt.

In this vein, on 4 August, representatives from Koç Holding, the largest Turkish investment group, revealed its plans to expand its activities in Egypt, focusing on vehicles, medical products, and new energy sectors. Koç Holding is already heavily invested in the Egyptian market, including establishing a factory for electrical appliances with a $110 million (EGP 3.4 billion) investment. The factory is scheduled to begin production next year, with plans to export 60 per cent of its output to foreign markets.

From Ankara’s point of view, the normalization process gained traction again for two primary reasons: Egypt’s massive economic problems and the devastating earthquake that hit Turkey in February.

Notably, Cairo’s economic meltdown and the friction with its former financial supporters—such as Saudi Arabia—means that Egypt needs to increase its economic, financial, and business interactions with other countries as much as possible in order to alleviate the stress of the economic situation, prevent a social explosion, and prepare for the presidential elections in 2024.

However, Cairo is pursuing the rapprochement less ambitiously than Ankara. Egyptian government officials insist that, in order for relations to be normalized, Türkiye first has to make more concessions, such as stop supporting the Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations. Moreover, another pre-condition set by Cairo for normalizing relations is non-interference by Turkey in Libya’s internal affairs.

Cairo insists on withdrawing Ankara-backed Syrian militias in Libya, which Egypt sees as a threat. While it is highly unlikely that Ankara will acquiesce to this demand—Türkiye has turned a deaf ear to earlier calls by French President Emmanuel Macron to remove all foreign troops from Libya, including those financed by Ankara. However, this rhetoric should not hide the fact that the political leadership under President al-Sisi is also interested in improving its bilateral relations with Türkiye.

At a time when Cairo and Ankara exchanged harsh statements, the US chose to stand by Egypt as a part of its tense relations with Türkiye, particularly during the Trump administration.

However, the Biden administration mainly pursued a balanced approach toward Egypt, which was likely a reason behind al-Sisi’s motivation to restore diplomacy with Ankara. President al-Sisi is not confident that the Biden administration will demonstrate unilateral support to Cairo in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia.

Türkiye believes that the normalization with Egypt will be another diplomatic milestone in the country’s foreign policy agenda, which has been partly reset after the May elections. With pivoting to the West, Ankara eyes permanent stability and interregional cooperation in the long perspective to tackle domestic problems and security challenges.