Why China targets Philippines but spares Vietnam in South China Sea

The article from "War on the Rocks" provides a detailed analysis of the recent escalation in tensions between China and the Philippines around the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the eastern Spratly Islands.

The Chinese Coast Guard has been actively trying to block the delivery of supplies to the Philippine detachment on the BRP Sierra Madre, a ship grounded on the shoal since 1999. This coercive behaviour has led to injuries among Philippine sailors and raised serious concerns about the potential for escalation. The United States has reaffirmed its defence obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty, which covers armed attacks on Philippine armed forces in the South China Sea.

Interestingly, while China has been aggressive towards the Philippines, it has shown remarkable restraint towards Vietnam's larger and more militarized expansions in the Spratly Islands. This discrepancy is puzzling, especially since the Philippines is a U.S. treaty ally, whereas Vietnam is not. The article suggests that China's behaviour might be influenced by different capacities of the Philippines and Vietnam to impose strategic costs on Beijing. Vietnam's ability to impose such costs is greater, and paradoxically, the Philippines' alliance with the United States limits its capacity to impose strategic costs on China.

The War on the Rocks article explores several potential explanations for China's varied approach. One theory is the "divide and rule" strategy, where China aims to prevent collective action against it by using a combination of incentives and threats to drive wedges between its rivals. Another explanation focuses on China's interest in remaining in the "grey zone" to avoid direct conflict, which might explain the different responses to the Philippines and Vietnam based on their respective propensities for escalation. The close political relationship between China and Vietnam, characterized by shared communist ideologies and mutual interests, might also contribute to China's restraint towards Vietnam. Furthermore, China's perception of the U.S.–Palestinian alliance as a significant threat might make Manila's actions more concerning than Vietnam's.

However, the article argues that these explanations are insufficient on their own. It posits an alternative rooted in the concepts of weiquan (defending claims) and weiwen (maintaining stability). The capacity of a rival to impose strategic costs varies, and Beijing's actions are influenced by these differences. Vietnam's nonaligned status and the potential to form alliances with hostile powers like the United States give it a greater capacity to impose strategic costs, thereby necessitating greater Chinese restraint.

In conclusion, the article suggests that to bolster deterrence, the Philippines and the United States need to undermine China's confidence in staying within the grey zone. Imposing costs credibly rather than actually might be more effective. Additionally, the tension between weiwen and weiquan has broader implications for understanding China's foreign policy and territorial dispute strategies. This nuanced analysis challenges conventional wisdom on alliances and deterrence, highlighting the complexities of grey zone competition.