Why Syria-Israel peace remains elusive

In a compelling analysis published by Foreign Policy, the complexities and deep-rooted challenges of restarting Israeli-Syrian peace talks under the new Syrian leadership are laid bare. The article situates the ongoing attempts within a historical and political framework, highlighting how the legacy of past leaders, the entrenched symbolism of contested territories, and the fractured state of Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa complicate prospects for meaningful peace.

The piece opens by recalling a poignant moment from March 2000, when then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad told U.S. President Bill Clinton, “I want to swim in Lake Tiberias.” This remark symbolised hope for a breakthrough in peace negotiations that ultimately failed. Fast forward to today, and while former militant leader Ahmed al-Sharaa replaces Assad at the negotiation table, the obstacles remain daunting. The article argues that although a comprehensive peace agreement is currently out of reach, limited, security-focused cooperation between Israel and Syria—particularly against mutual threats like Hezbollah and Iranian proxies—offers a more feasible pathway.

One of the article’s key insights is the enduring symbolism of the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967, which remains central to Syrian national identity and pride. The loss of this territory is portrayed not merely as a geopolitical issue but as a profound national wound, deeply embedded in Syria’s collective consciousness through education and political rhetoric. This psychological dimension helps explain why any concession over the Golan remains politically unthinkable for Syrians.

Moreover, the piece highlights the fragility of Syria’s new leadership under Sharaa, who has been in power for only six months and governs a country still grappling with the aftermath of civil war. Unlike Egypt’s Anwar Sadat or Jordan’s King Hussein, who had strong institutional control and the coercive capacity to suppress dissent in their peace efforts, Sharaa faces a fractured state with competing factions—including hardline Islamist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—that vehemently oppose normalisation with Israel. The internal political calculus for Sharaa is perilous; he risks alienating influential groups and destabilising his fragile coalition by pushing too hard on peace initiatives.

The article also examines regional dynamics and public sentiment. The 2023 Hamas-led massacre has hardened Israeli attitudes against territorial concessions, while in Syria, the Gaza conflict and Israel’s recent military operations have further soured public opinion and increased hostility toward Israel. The piece thus underscores the entrenched mistrust and domestic pressures facing both governments.

Despite these challenges, the article proposes a pragmatic “security-first” approach brokered by the United States. This includes practical steps such as expelling Palestinian factions operating in Syria, dismantling Iran-backed militias near the border, and cooperating on intelligence to curb Hezbollah’s arms trafficking. These measures would address immediate security concerns and lay the groundwork for gradually building trust, rather than forcing a comprehensive peace deal prematurely.

The analysis closes with a realistic assessment: a full normalisation akin to the Abraham Accords is unlikely in the short term. Instead, the United States should support a phased, incremental strategy, allowing Sharaa the political space to navigate internal opposition and demonstrate stability. For Israel, these steps represent progress toward an eventual peace, while for Syria, a gradual pace reduces the risk of destabilising the fragile post-Assad order.

By Vugar Khalilov