Will extension of grain deal strengthen Russia-Türkiye partnership? Grain in exchange for fighter jets

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolded in February 2022 and caused unprecedented global energy and economic crisis that will have negative repercussions in the long-term perspective. However, the war's main consequence was the disruption of grain flow from Ukraine to countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where hunger is a growing threat and high food prices are pushing more people into poverty.

According to the UN, prices of staple foods rose across these regions by an average of 30%. The rising international condemnation and pressure enabled the European Union (EU) to strike a deal with Ukraine and Russia to ensure further grain flow to alleviate the food crisis.

As such, on July 22 2022, an agreement was brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye to open a safe maritime humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea (the Black Sea Grain Initiative). Since then, over 1080 ships full of grain and other foodstuffs have left three Ukrainian ports: Chornomorsk, Odesa and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi.

While unblocking the sea export route has helped to address the global food security crisis and lower grain prices, the situation remains challenging. Nevertheless, it did not prevent Ukraine and Russia from periodically issuing mutual accusations regarding the violation of the grain deal.

Ukraine's government usually accuses Russia of delaying cargo ships heading to ports to pick up produce; as per the deal, Russia has the right to inspect ships to ensure they aren't bringing cargo such as weapons into Ukraine.

In fact, the grain deal cannot solve problems of food transport and access in regions of starvation risk, such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia and Syria. But it could reduce grain prices — and provide Ukraine with vital revenues — if shipments could be accelerated to export some 20 million metric tons of grain the country has been unable to export because of Russia’s invasion.

However, Russia was quick to weaponize the grain deal to put additional pressure on Ukraine and partner countries in order to secure its interests, though it agreed to extend the deal several times. Russia claims Western countries have not implemented their side of the agreement, namely a pledge to ensure Russian food exports are unaffected by Western sanctions.

Consequently, the main reason for extending the grain deal is the continuous communication and negotiations between Vladimir Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The most recent grain deal is about to expire on July 17, and the EU proposed to allow a Russian bank under sanctions to carve out a subsidiary that would reconnect to the global financial network as a sop to Moscow aimed at safeguarding the threatened Black Sea grain deal that allows Ukraine to export food to global markets.

While the Moscow-Ankara axis strengthened further in light of the Ukraine war, this partnership remained the only hope for Kyiv and the EU for the extension of the grain deal. Nevertheless, the contradictory partnership between Putin and Erdogan is based on the personal interests of both rather than the necessity of a strategic partnership.

In line with it, Russian ultranationalist politicians usually express their dissatisfaction with Putin’s engagement with Türkiye, as “Russia gets nothing for its gestures.”

Moscow-Ankara axis seemed very pragmatic, but it's mostly an ad-hoc and fragile alliance based on short and medium-term interests. Despite rapprochement with Russia, Türkiye is a crucial country for the Atlantic Community and historically tied with the Western community, while Russia maintains the prominent antagonist role in the global system.

For example, when Russia agreed to hand over the fighters of the well-known Azov regiment to Türkiye as prisoners of war, Ankara guaranteed that all servicemen would remain in the country until the war's end. However, shortly after the deal, President Erdogan allowed all servicemen to leave the country for Ukraine during President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent visit to Ankara.

Undoubtedly, such a move provoked anger and questions in Russia, as they were completely unaware of the upcoming decision of Ankara. Therefore, the Kremlin stated that the Turkish and Kyiv sides violated the conditions of return. The return of fighters coincided with President Erdogan's attendance at NATO's summit in Vilnius on July 10, where he met Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

The face-to-face meeting resulted in Türkiye’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership bid and the facilitation of the EU membership for Türkiye. However, the primary outcome of the meeting was the formal approval of F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye.

Therefore, it is fair to note that Ankara, despite its alignment with Russia on several issues, such as the grain deal and its interlocutor role in the Ukraine crisis, still prioritizes the Western approach in its foreign policy agenda.

In this regard, Russia will be more upset with Ankara’s steady turn to the West, as it will decrease Moscow’s leverage and complicate the relations more amid tactical losses in Ukraine and growing instability at home.