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ANALYTICS
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Abkhazia's return to Georgia: Preconditions and possibilities Strategic Imperative

15 November 2024 15:55

Recent developments in the occupied region of Abkhazia indicate that Russia has no choice but to return this territory to Georgia, and this outcome aligns with Russia's own interests. It is also crucial for the survival of the Abkhaz people, who are on the verge of extinction and assimilation, and whose survival can only be ensured as part of Georgia.

Currently, there is no unified vision within the Russian leadership regarding what to do with the occupied Georgian territories. However, two potential strategies are beginning to take shape.

The first strategy is to facilitate a peaceful and gradual reintegration of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region into Georgia. To allow the Kremlin to "save face," a plan is being developed for the return of Abkhazia to Georgia in the form of a so-called "confederation," while maintaining certain Russian interests in the region and under the condition of restoring friendly relations between Russia and Georgia.

The second strategy is the course towards the complete annexation of the occupied territories. This approach is almost obsessively advocated by much of the Armenian lobby in Russia. For them, such an outcome would make Abkhazia, along with the neighbouring Sochi region, a prime area for the settlement of ethnic Armenians, offering far better climatic conditions than those in the Republic of Armenia.

Abkhazia is also of interest to this lobby as a potential hub for Armenian business development, much more promising than the now-defunct separatist "Artsakh." Investments in the "black hole" of "Artsakh" were, by definition, incomparable to the potential returns from investments in the thriving resort business along the Black Sea coast.

It appears that Moscow has not yet completely abandoned the idea of annexing Abkhazia. While relations between Russia’s leadership and Georgia have not yet improved to the point that would critically undermine the Armenian lobby’s plans, supporters of annexation have begun accelerating the process. Before Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, could recover from the elections, on October 30, 2024, the Russian government and the leaders of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Abkhazia" signed an agreement allowing Russian companies to implement investment projects in Abkhazia. The agreement also protects the rights and interests of Russian investors in the separatist region, granting them extensive privileges and rights.

The idea behind this "annexation through investments" is to quickly turn Abkhazia into an extension of Russia’s Sochi resort area. However, the agreement's implementation requires ratification by the separatist "parliament." As a result, the agreement has sparked strong opposition within Abkhazia, where critics see it as a document that hands the region over to large business interests. According to opposition leaders, the "investors" will bring in large numbers of settlers, ultimately dissolving the Abkhaz people into a foreign population.

The concerns are not entirely unfounded. It’s important to remember that Russia’s 145-million-strong population is increasingly migrating southward. Each year, the processes of "desertification" in the northern regions and "overpopulation" in the warmer Krasnodar region are worsening. Even the once quiet and provincial city of Krasnodar has now become a million-strong metropolis, with neighbourhoods full of high-rise buildings and traffic jams that rival those of Moscow. The Armenian community and Armenian businesses are maintaining and strengthening their presence in the Krasnodar region. The Abkhazian "opposition" fully understands the implications of "protecting Russian investments" in Abkhazia for their ethnic group’s future.

After the separatist "parliament" passed a law on November 11, 2024, regulating the construction of multi-functional complexes outlined in the "investment agreement," the situation in Abkhazia escalated. The opposition began organizing protests and launching attacks on "parliamentarians," demanding that they refuse to vote for the ratification of the agreement with Russia. On November 12, 2024, opposition actions led to the blocking of roads, including the Gumista Bridge, paralyzing traffic in Abkhazia.

During the protests at the Gumista Bridge, Abkhaz protesters surrounded "member" of the separatist "parliament" and "Hero of Abkhazia," one of the commanders of the Bagramyan Battalion, Galust Trapizonyan, demanding that he not vote for the ratification of the "investment" agreement with Russia—an agreement that was being pushed by Trapizonyan's fellow countrymen. Judging by video footage, the "Hero" appeared visibly intimidated. Russian State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin, known for his ties to the Armenian lobby, publicly supported the "investment agreement."

Nonetheless, by the evening of November 12, 2024, the separatist "authorities" were forced to retreat. In exchange for the lifting of the bridge blockades, all detained opposition members were released. However, the situation is far from resolved, as the main flashpoint in Abkhazia is expected on November 15, the day the "parliament" is set to consider the ratification of the Russia-Abkhazia "investment agreement."

The opposition is emboldened by their "first victory," as the "authorities" succumbed to their pressure and released the detainees, which is widely seen as a sign of weakness in the regime. But even if the ratification is pushed through, it does not mean the situation will calm down. The swift organization of the bridge blockades and their mass support from the Abkhaz population demonstrated that the Abkhaz were genuinely beginning to resist the absorption of their land by Russia. As one of the Abkhaz Telegram channels, "Abkhazia-Center," wrote, "We need to send these 90s-era thugs away and start negotiating with the Georgians. Especially since we are talking about a confederation."

As for Russian businesses eyeing the resort sector in Abkhazia, there are no guarantees for the protection of Russian investments in the temporarily occupied territory. No matter what "agreements" are signed by the self-appointed puppet separatist "authorities" or what the separatist "parliament" ratifies, these are, from the standpoint of international law, meaningless documents. Those who doubt this can ask members of the Armenian diaspora who invested their money in the separatist "Artsakh" while bypassing Azerbaijani law. They have lost their investments forever and irreversibly.

Meanwhile, Russian investments in Abkhazia could be protected if the territory is reintegrated into Georgia. It’s worth noting that Russia is currently one of the largest investors in the economy of the rest of Georgia. The Russian capital has long established a strong presence in strategically important sectors such as energy, telecommunications, mining, mineral water production (including the famous "Borjomi" brand), transportation, and logistics.

In the energy sector, Russian investors own companies such as "Telasi," "Khrami HPP-1," "Khrami HPP-2," "Mtkvary Energy" TPP, "Larsi HPP," "Shilda HPP," and "SakRusEnergo." "Telasi" holds the exclusive right to supply and distribute electricity in Tbilisi, with 75.5% of the company owned by the Russian firm "Inter RAO." Russian company "Beeline" holds strong positions in the Georgian telecommunications market, while Yandex dominates the online services sector. Russian investors also control the strategically important Poti grain terminal, crucial for Georgia's food security.

All rights of Russian investors are protected, and their businesses are thriving, even despite the lack of diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia. Therefore, Russian businesses would receive a new impetus for development if diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries.

If desired, Russian investors can easily and profitably sell their stakes in businesses and enterprises in Georgia, transferring ownership to investors from other jurisdictions. This is practically impossible in the occupied territories, regardless of the "agreements" signed or "laws" passed by the internationally unrecognized separatist "authorities." Therefore, Russian investors interested in developing the resort and tourism business in Abkhazia must understand that they can only make successful investments in this sector if Abkhazia is reintegrated under Georgia’s jurisdiction.

There is another important factor to consider. The state of infrastructure in occupied Abkhazia is incompatible with serious investment projects. Electricity is supplied intermittently and according to a schedule, and this is only possible because Georgia fully covers the operation of the Inguri Hydroelectric Power Station, supplying electricity to the separatist territory. Frequent power grid failures, water supply interruptions, and damaged roads are all issues that are unlikely to be resolved under the corrupt separatist regime.

Abkhazia needs much more than investment in resort and hospitality industries; it urgently requires the restoration and development of its infrastructure, something that can only happen within the framework of a unified Georgian state.

Vladimir Tskhvediani, Georgia, for Caliber.Az

Caliber.Az
The views and opinions expressed by guest columnists in their op-eds may differ from and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial staff.
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