Armenian premier dodges constitutional changes Declaration of immaturity

Armenian Constitution, specifically about its inclusion of territorial claims against neighboring countries. “The Constit Court of Armenia, in its Decision dated Sept 26, 2024, noted that the reference to the Declaration of Independence in the preamble part of the Constit pertains exclusively to those provisions of the declaration that have been enshrined in the articles of the Constit,” he wrote on his social media account on platform “X.”

In other words, Pashinyan reiterated that there are no issues with Armenia’s Constitution, which simultaneously implies that there has been no progress on this point in the peace process. And it is unlikely that any progress will be made, considering that Pashinyan and his team are entirely preoccupied with the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026. To maintain his party's parliamentary majority and keep his position as prime minister, Pashinyan will avoid any bold decisions that could be perceived by Armenian society as "concessions" to Azerbaijan. It is no coincidence that his team has announced that the issue of constitutional reform will be put to a referendum in 2027, that is, after the elections. 

Moreover, Pashinyan himself was quick to state at the time that the issue of removing the reference to the Declaration of Independence would not be considered in the referendum. At the same time, there remains a possibility that the new constitutional draft might "in one stroke" eliminate all problematic elements, including territorial claims against neighbors.

But do the parties have the luxury of waiting until 2027? Azerbaijan certainly does — the country waited nearly thirty years for victory and can afford to wait another year or two. What matters more to Azerbaijan is not a signed document but concrete actions by Armenia proving that it harbors no aggressive intentions toward Azerbaijan. And this is where the real problem lies. Armenia is actively rearming itself with Western support while maintaining contentious points in its Constitution. A cycle without end.

Now, let us ask: does Armenia have the luxury of waiting for peace until 2027? At first glance, the answer might appear to be yes. Armenia has managed to position itself economically through the re-export of sanctioned goods to Russia. But how long can this situation last? On one hand, the war in Ukraine might come to an end soon. On the other hand, if it does not end and tensions escalate further, Western patrons could eventually stop turning a blind eye to Yerevan’s services to Moscow and strongly urge it to join the sanctions regime. This uncertainty cannot help but trouble Yerevan. The country needs the opening of communication lines to participate in regional trade and transport projects. The quickest and most cost-effective way to achieve this is through Azerbaijan.

Thus, Pashinyan faces two key tasks: signing a peace agreement that includes the opening of communication routes and presenting this peace to his electorate as a kind of "victory" over Azerbaijan, meaning without the obligation to amend the Constitution.

Could this be why Washington has been urgently trying to persuade Baku to sign a peace agreement in a truncated form, omitting the requirement for Armenia to amend its Constitution and effectively accepting Armenia's duplicitous terms? The most recent attempt was made by Secretary of State Antony Blinken last week in Malta during the 31st OSCE Ministerial Council meeting. Baku politely but firmly declined.

Thus, the idea of a truncated peace has failed. However, the task of winning the elections remains. This explains Pashinyan’s repeated insistence that there is nothing wrong with the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Armenian prime minister continues his quiet attempts to "prove" to Baku, as he imagines, that the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court supposedly meets Azerbaijan’s requirements.

We will not delve into the intricacies of Armenian jurisprudence. Let us assume that in countries with established judicial systems, such a decision might indeed come with a guarantee of unconditional implementation. But even in such cases, a caveat is necessary. The inclusion in a country’s Constitution of a reference to a document that challenges the territorial integrity of another state carries such a strong symbolic significance that it inevitably becomes a political matter, regardless of the Constitutional Court’s perspective. 

Therefore, the removal of this clause from Armenia’s Constitution is not merely a legal issue—it is also a matter of goodwill. Azerbaijan does not wish to leave the question of territorial claims at the discretion of Armenian justice; it wants to see a clear document stating that Armenia has no claims against Azerbaijan whatsoever.

This is a very simple concept. Pashinyan pretends not to understand it. The question is: how much time does he have left before he finally stops playing this game?