Armenians risk losing their state in fear of mythic Turkic threat Yerevan's another provocation goes down in flames
On April 11, the Armenian armed forces carried out a provocation on the conditional border (Lachin-Gorus section). It happened following warnings of many experts. According to the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry, the Armenian side used mortars and large-caliber weapons. Three of our servicemen were killed. May Allah rest the souls of the martyrs. The Armenian side officially reported the death of four of its servicemen. However, there is reason to believe that the true death toll is much higher.
Inspired by EU and Iranian support (any sensible person would question the stability of this combination of allies, especially since the EU mission is controlled by the United States), Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has shown a complete lack of respect for the negotiation process in recent months. All initiatives of both Azerbaijan and the mediators have been blocked. Suffice it to recall the Armenian side's refusal to participate in the meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow last December, or Pashinyan's recent statement that the very existence of the "Karabakh self-defence forces" proves Azerbaijan's intention to "commit the Armenian genocide".
Recent statements by the head of the EU mission in Armenia, Markus Ritter, have only added fuel to the Armenian prime minister's permissiveness. Ritter also "warned" of an alleged Azerbaijani attack on Armenia, and if this does not happen, the mission can be considered a success. If we add to this the aggressive rhetoric of Iran, coupled with that country's unfriendly acts towards Azerbaijan, it seems that the Armenian leader came up with the idea that there is no better moment for a provocation.
Apparently, Nikol Pashinyan seeks to go down in history as the author of the concept of the lost war. There is a saying: "A chess player thinks how to win, a strategist thinks whether to win". For a strategist, a loss at the tactical or operational level can be a source of opportunity for achieving a strategic objective. Pashinyan's strategic goal is to stay in power longer and preserve his life.
Here, perhaps, he indeed thinks strategically, however, not for the interests of the state, but for personal gain. Each escalation inspired by the Armenians, on the one hand, shows that "he is not afraid of a direct confrontation with the Azerbaijanis," and on the other, that the enemy is still strong, and that it is not worth much to "make a move" against him. Such a scenario can temporarily pacify the most radical elements in Armenian society, let off revanchist steam, maintain a semblance of "resistance" and embed the idea of the inexpediency of mass protests in the face of an external threat.
Let's make a reservation right away – this does not mean that Armenia has or had the option to win. There are always two options for it – to start a war and lose or not to start at all. Pashinyan always chooses the first one. So, as already mentioned, it is more convenient for him.
However, the Armenian prime minister made a mistake - Azerbaijan is not a room for experiments. Pashinyan also fails to take into account the fact that every provocation by the Armenian side will result in Azerbaijan gaining positional, image, and political advantages. Consequently, in the long run, these provocations work against both Armenia and the Armenian prime minister himself.
As luck would have it, a mishap has occurred with Europeans so tenderly nurtured by the Armenian authorities because of recent events on the border. According to Armenian Telegram channels, "Yesterday, the Armenian Foreign Ministry spent half a day unsuccessfully persuading EU observer mission commander Markus Ritter to go to the Armenian positions near the village of Tegh (Dygh - Ed.), which came under fire from Azerbaijan. The EU mission refused even to visit the village itself, accompanied by the Armenian military."
Well, we can believe it very much. Is it not because the Europeans preferred to sit tight in their lodgings that they were aware of the Armenian provocation being prepared and did not want to take part in the coverage of Pashinyan's version? After all, by definition, they cannot say anything in favour of Azerbaijan either... An option is possible, but too noble for the European Commission. And maybe it doesn't belong to them to join the black deeds somehow? There is a risk to be wounded. It's better to mastermind, direct, provoke...
Such behaviour by European spies under diplomatic cover should be a sobering lesson for Armenians - using Europeans as a human shield against Azerbaijan will not work. They are well aware that Azerbaijan has the right to respond to the provocation with severity and are not going to fall at risk to be killed by Azerbaijani bullets. But it is already too late for Armenians to think it up. The deed is already done. Armenia has been and will continue to be flooded by all kinds of agents and paramilitary groups from third countries. Given Armenia's actual loss of its sovereignty, the only formally preserved criterion for its statehood is visa control over its conditional territory. It is not for nothing that Pashinyan speaks with such aspiration about 29,000 square kilometres of Armenian territory. So there is nothing else left but to trade this land, to flood it with all possible destructive elements. In fear of a fictitious Turkic threat, Armenians have almost already lost Armenia.
But that, as they say, is not our problem. The blood of the martyrs will not remain unredeemed. The situation at the escalation site is under the full control of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Once again, the situation is under Azerbaijan's full control.