Beneath grim skies: How Russian media misrepresents AZAL crash On “Baza’s” latest publication

The Telegram channel Baza, which is closely affiliated with Russian security agencies, has published what appears to be the full transcript of the black box recordings from the cockpit of the Embraer aircraft that crashed on 25 December 2024, belonging to Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL). This transcript is of significant interest in itself, and, as we did previously, we will assume that it is authentic.

At the same time, in the context of how this catastrophe is being covered in Russian media, we found the channel’s own commentary preceding the publication just as intriguing. To get straight to the point—it is so hypocritical that one wouldn't even need to read the transcript to refute its claims. The falsehoods are that obvious.

The very first line is blatantly sensationalist: "According to the transcripts, there was panic in the cockpit before landing in Grozny." However, after reviewing the transcript, one comes to the conclusion that there was nothing even remotely close to panic in the cockpit before the crew attempted to land in Grozny. Yes, there was surprise, emotion, and concern—an inevitable reaction when electronic warfare (EW) disables critical aircraft systems—but not panic.

It is only after the external interference with the aircraft that the crew’s distress visibly intensifies—and understandably so. Try maintaining absolute composure when your aircraft, carrying 67 people, becomes almost completely uncontrollable.

And yet, it's interesting to consider what led the authors of the publication to conclude that there was panic in the cockpit "before landing" in Grozny. Perhaps it was the pilots' use of profanity? Seriously? Yes, the captain and the second pilot do indeed use vulgar language, according to the transcript. We won’t dwell on this, but we would suggest the authors ask any pilot they know how often they swear, especially in abnormal situations.

Let's continue reading: "The aircraft's crew, apparently, was not prepared to operate under conditions where the GPS signal was jammed." What a verdict! That sounds rather cynical. Before passing such "profound" judgments, the authors should first ask themselves why the GPS signal was jammed on a civilian aircraft in the first place, and only then draw their conclusions.

Meanwhile, Baza continues to develop its argument: "The second pilot directly admits this on the black box recordings and also mentions that he had never previously conducted an NDB approach, i.e., an approach using radio beacons." What’s so surprising about this? The NDB (non-directional beacon) approach has not been practised anywhere in the world for a long time, except in Russia. However, this doesn’t mean Azerbaijani pilots are unfamiliar with this method. No, they are sent twice a year to simulators in France and the UK, where they practice, among other things, the NDB approach. This doesn't even take into account the simulators within the country.

But theory is one thing, and practice is quite another. The commanders of Azerbaijani civil aviation aircraft are proficient in all types of landing approaches. For instance, the captain of the Embraer, Igor Kshnyakin, has been a pilot since Soviet times, and he undoubtedly knew how to fly using radio beacons. According to the second pilot’s words (again, assuming the transcript's authenticity), this was indeed his first real-life encounter with such a situation, which is perfectly normal—second pilots gain experience, including handling the aircraft in emergency situations, under the guidance of seasoned captains. There was nothing extraordinary in the composition of the Embraer crew, and therefore, Baza's criticism is misplaced.

The dirtiest aspect of this campaign is that it seeks to tarnish the professionalism of the pilots, effectively insulting their noble and heroic memory.

But let’s entertain, purely hypothetically for a moment, the idea that the plane could have been saved, even after hitting the ground, although the extent of the damage and loss of control of the aircraft made such a possibility virtually impossible. Here’s the question: how does this absolve those responsible for jamming the GPS, failing to inform the crew about the "Carpet" signal, and especially those who opened fire on the aircraft?

The claims by Russian media about the supposedly unprofessional behaviour of the crew, even if they were true, do not negate the guilt of those who operated the air defence systems over Grozny. On the contrary, the deliberate silence on these aspects—specifically, the GPS failure due to EW jamming, the strike on the aircraft, and the failure to provide the crew with the "Carpet" signal—indicates that the Russian side has no answers to these points. And this is the crux of the matter.

Interestingly, the channel no longer mentions birds or exploding oxygen cylinders as possible causes of the crash. One can hope that this trend of narrowing down the theories will eventually lead Russian media to the simple conclusion: it was Russia's Pantsir-S air defence system that targeted the Azerbaijani Airlines plane.

Meanwhile, Baza continues to "convince": "From the conversations between the captain and the second pilot, it is clear that both attempts to land at the airport in Grozny were unsuccessful, despite the assistance from air traffic controllers. After this, the captain decides to fly first to Baku, and then to Mineralnye Vody. Earlier, Baza published the full transcript of the AZAL plane’s crew's communications with air traffic controllers. It was evident from the transcript that all decisions were made by the Azerbaijani Airlines crew independently. Russian controllers had suggested landing first in Grozny, then in Makhachkala, and provided the crew with information about other Russian airports, but the crew decided not to land there.”

The channel discusses the "help from air traffic controllers" as if it were some kind of panacea. While we’re not aviation experts, we won’t delve into the transcript regarding the attempts to land the plane. However, even without this, there’s an obvious logical fallacy. The fact that the crew made decisions independently doesn’t exclude the possibility that those decisions were the right ones, does it? And, logically, it makes sense that the crew would make decisions on their own, since they had the most accurate information about the flight conditions. On the other hand, Baza's awkward attempt to present arguments shows its complete unwillingness to analyze the crash with any sense of reason.

The key question is not why the plane didn’t land in Grozny or Makhachkala (though we don’t rule out that this question may come up during further investigations), but rather the fact that it was first "blinded" and then driven into an emergency state.

Meanwhile, Russian security-affiliated channels are busy shifting the focus from the specific causes to abstract consequences. With each new attempt, these efforts appear increasingly absurd.