Foreign Policy: How to beat the Wagner Group

Christopher Faulkner, an assistant professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College’s College of Distance Education, and Marcel Plichta, a former US Defense Department analyst, have written an article for The Foreign Policy magazine claiming that the US Treasury Department’s recent sanctions are only a first step in stopping the Russian mercenaries. Caliber.Az reprints the article.

On Jan. 26, the US Treasury Department introduced its latest round of Russia-related sanctions. Distinct from earlier efforts designed to combat Russian aggression, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the Wagner Group a transnational criminal organization as well as expanded sanctions against Russia’s military defense industry and more than a half-dozen of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cronies. This proscription—which authorizes US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to designate, seize assets, and levy sanctions on a “significant transnational criminal organization”—is further proof of the Biden administration’s growing concern over the Russian mercenary outfit’s role in Ukraine. It is also a formal acknowledgement of the criminal nature of the Wagner Group’s operations around the globe, which include serious human rights violations, such as sexual violence and mass killings. Although sanctioning the group is an important first step for Washington, incentivizing other countries to oppose Wagner to the best of their abilities is crucial.

The Wagner Group is best known for its mercenary army in Ukraine, but it is also active in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Mali. Although labeled a private military company, Wagner may be best categorized as a hybrid state force, used by Moscow as a low-cost foreign-policy tool that enhances Russia’s security relationships with illiberal regimes by offering military services in exchange for resource concessions, such as access to gold mines. The mercenary outfit’s ability to exploit clients, engage in serious human rights abuses, and prop up autocratic regimes demands international action, but there is no viable scenario in which the United States unilaterally defeats Wagner through sanctions or designations alone. Even if it means herding cats, the Biden administration will need to establish a joint effort across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

The unique challenge in sanctioning a transnational criminal group like Wagner is that those organizations that rise to the status of being considered for that designation often have established intricate networks that help them evade sanctions. For a private military company like Wagner, which retains deep connections to the Kremlin and its network of pariah states from North Korea to Sudan, the challenge becomes even more complex. Symbolically, however, the recent transnational criminal organization branding removes all doubts about the way the United States views the group—and this can have important practical consequences, especially for those states, business entities, or individuals who want to avoid entangling themselves with a US-labeled criminal network.

Recent reporting points to potential friction between the Wagner Group and the Kremlin, in part due to the group’s challenges in taking Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. There, Wagner has faced significant losses and has struggled to replenish its ranks. Any opportunity to degrade the group’s financing or resourcing could exacerbate these tensions, and the transnational criminal organization designation has the potential to do just that. However, in isolation, those designations or any other unilateral effort will be insufficient for addressing the broader threat posed by Wagner, especially outside of Ukraine.

The most straightforward way for Washington to hit Wagner’s finances is to pursue efforts with partner nations that cut the group off from its international deployments, which bring in significant revenue and bolster Russia’s shoestring foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. This can be done by working with other countries to impede the flights and shipping that make up Wagner’s logistics and smuggling network, pursuing international and municipal legal action against Wagner fighters, and formalizing a Wagner intelligence-sharing network with like-minded countries.

Enthusiasm to act against Wagner and Russia, though, varies internationally. To start with, Washington can rack up a few easy wins with countries that are already acting against Wagner. The United Kingdom is currently conducting an inquiry into the Wagner Group, and the European Union levied its own set of sanctions on the group following its deployment to Mali in December 2021. France is also vocally opposed to Wagner, especially their activities in the Sahel and Central African Republic, for parochial reasons. European countries have the financial tools to assist with sanctions, well-funded intelligence agencies that can assist in a joint intelligence effort to counter Wagner, and the capacity to help collect evidence against Wagner for war crimes trials. Even smaller European countries like Belgium can help by leveraging the diamond hub of Antwerp to cut revenue from Wagner’s blood diamonds. Key US allies outside of Europe—such as Australia, Canada, and Japan—have also levied sanctions against Wagner.

Getting other countries to sanction or otherwise impede Wagner will be more difficult. Wagner’s current and former host countries, such as Sudan and Syria, are unlikely to cooperate with Washington at all. The Central African Republic and Mali might try to maintain some semblance of relations with Washington—but only to evade further criticism for hiring Wagner as well as to keep aid flows open. Amid several new sanctions on Central African Republic citizens for working with the Wagner Group, American diplomats will have to juggle the pressure campaign and very acute risk of increasing insecurity by removing one of the main actors fighting rebel groups.

Key African countries are not eager to take sides and will need careful and persistent diplomatic engagement if they are going to risk making an enemy of a regional security actor. South Africa has already taken a hard line against US efforts aimed at degrading Wagner, campaigning hard against the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act, which the US Congress introduced in the 2021-2022 session to directly challenge the group. Egypt and Algeria, which could seriously harm Wagner’s logistics just by denying overflight rights to aircraft with Wagner personnel or materiel, probably won’t want to risk severing their relationships with Moscow over an issue they perceive as marginal.

Despite these concerns, Washington has the tools to rack up difficult wins too. The Biden administration has relied on Egypt in its efforts to counter Wagner on the African continent. CIA Director William Burns and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken have, on multiple occasions, met with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government in an attempt to use Egypt as an intermediary to pressure military leaders in both Sudan and Libya to end their relationships with Wagner. These efforts, however incremental, may have paid some dividends as Egyptian officials elected to raise concerns about Wagner in Sudan and the Central African Republic met with Sudanese leaders directly. For its part, Cameroon might be amenable to kicking the small number of Wagner associates out of its port in Douala, through which the Wagner Group ships goods to support its operations in the Central African Republic, if Washington ties it to issues far more important to Yaoundé, like aid and security force assistance.

Countries that act as a nerve center for the movement of money, gold, and diamonds would be ideal partners to go after Wagner’s revenue, but few of these countries will join Washington’s more hard-line sanctions without stronger incentives. As other experts have argued, the United States can counter Wagner’s (and Russia’s) malign influence by offering opportunities for enhanced diplomatic and economic engagement—along with the promise of enhanced security cooperation should these regimes commit to democratic principles. This will be challenging but necessary, as several countries that have partnered with Wagner are facing difficult and unresolved internal security threats. The United States must show these states that their interests are aligned despite strategic attention being diverted away from counterterrorism. They must do this while simultaneously conveying that Wagner is exploiting insecurity for profit, including by reinforcing the notion that any perceived security gains ushered in by Wagner’s presence are fleeting at best.

For countries that are even less inclined to stop the Wagner Group, like the United Arab Emirates, Washington’s strategy must be different. Dubai is not only a permissive environment for Wagner’s gold smuggling but it might also have helped fund Wagner in Libya, and UAE firms were sanctioned in November 2022 alongside Wagner for helping the group smuggle unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia for use against Ukrainian civilians. In the most recent round of sanctions, another UAE-based aviation firm was sanctioned for its role in the transport of personnel and equipment for Wagner operations in the Central African Republic, Libya, and Mali. Short of a pressure campaign that threatens a broader diplomatic rupture with Washington or offering significant carrots like resurrecting the F-35 deal, it’s unlikely that the Emiratis will make any serious effort to constrain Wagner, even as Dubai-based businesses and individuals are hit by US sanctions.

Even if the United States continues to mount pressure on those countries straddling the fence on opposing Wagner and designations successfully convince some Wagner associates to stop dealing with them, the group is still likely to retain the ability to operate in Russia and occupied Ukraine at the very least. The immediate line of effort should be harmonizing sanctions and legal efforts to the greatest extent possible. Many partner countries could be in line with US actions at minimal cost to themselves. The United Kingdom, for instance, only sanctions half as many Wagner associates as the United States, despite having legislation that fast-tracks sanctions for individuals targeted by the OFAC. The United States should also formalize intelligence-sharing on Wagner with partner countries like the U.K. and France, and whenever possible, it should declassify incriminating information on Wagner to pressure countries to join sanctions regimes and support other actions like war crimes investigations. Such visibility can serve as an important deterrent for would-be Wagner clients.

Despite consensus in Washington that the Wagner Group is an abhorrent problem both inside Ukraine and out, what so-called victory against the group looks like is less clear. Stopping Wagner’s activities writ large seems improbable, and US officials have not yet answered the strategic question of what constitutes success. Short of incapacitating the group, the United States and its allies might measure success in curtailing Wagner’s spread to new theaters and restricting its ability to fulfill ongoing contracts.

Although this is within reach and addressing Wagner’s crimes should be a short-term priority, Washington must remain mindful of the fact that private military companies are as much a symptom of instability as a cause. Even if Wagner itself becomes defunct, Russia will have no shortage of combat veterans looking for work and can promote alternative private military companies with their own illicit financial networks. So long as conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa continue to grow in scale and intensity, transactional security services like those provided by the Wagner Group will remain in high demand.