Military lessons to learn from historic failure of British Ottoman assault Analysis by War on the Rocks

On June 23, the United States carried out precision airstrikes under Operation Midnight Hammer, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. Following the strikes, US President Donald Trump claimed the operation had “totally obliterated” the sites. In response, Iran’s parliament voted to authorize the government to close the Strait of Hormuz — a move that, if executed, could immediately disrupt nearly 20% of global oil shipments and trigger significant, cascading economic consequences worldwide.

A former advisor to the US Central Command and National Defence researcher Jonathan Schroden shared his comparative analysis of a potential Strait of Hormuz closure with Britain’s historic 1915 failure to reopen the Dardanelles Strait (contemporary named as Strait of Çanakkale) through an assault on its Ottoman defences in an article published by the War on the Rocks.

While the two scenarios have substantial geopolitical and technological differences, the author argues that both episodes center on maritime chokepoint warfare, layered and asymmetric threats, and the importance of political-military alignment and strategic communications when economic and kinetic warfare combine.

In early 1915, British leaders, including Winston Churchill, planned to seize the Dardanelles Strait to break the Western Front stalemate, threaten Constantinople, push the Ottomans out of the war, and aid Russia.

The Ottomans had layered defenses: mines blocked passage, mobile howitzers protected them, and large coastal guns shielded the howitzers. The campaign began with Allied naval bombardments and mine-clearing efforts, but Ottoman mines sank three battleships in one day, forcing the Allies to abandon the naval-only approach and was followed by an attempted land invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula.

The attack was met with a Turkish counterattack led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his 19th Division attached to the Fifth Army which was stationed on Gallipoli, who would become the revolutionary founder of the Republic of Türkiye. After nine months of heavy losses, poor logistics, and no progress, the Allies withdrew in early 1916, having suffered over 250,000 casualties. 

The Strait of Hormuz is a vital global maritime chokepoint due to its oil traffic and surrounding geopolitical tensions. To strengthen its threat to the strait, Iran has developed a range of military capabilities, including conventional assets like navy ships, submarines, torpedoes, and anti-ship drones and missiles, alongside asymmetric tools such as explosive-laden fast boats, sea mines, and underwater drones. Like the Ottomans in the Dardanelles, Iran would likely rely on mines as the core of a layered defense strategy, supported by its other systems. Whether Iran would attempt to close the strait—and how effective such an effort would be—remains debated, especially after the unprecedented US strikes on June 23.

Britain’s failure at the Dardanelles was especially striking because it went beyond mere tactical mistakes, exposing deeper operational and strategic flaws. As a result, the article outlines four key lessons that could be applied to a potential Strait of Hormuz scenario.

Mine warfare

A major reason behind the failure of the British naval assault at the Dardanelles was the surprising effectiveness of Ottoman minefields. In a future Strait of Hormuz crisis, the US would likely face a comparable threat: a combination of naval mines and other asymmetric sea denial capabilities. Iran possesses a significant stockpile of mines, some of which can be deployed via submarines or covertly disguised commercial vessels. Although the US Navy has four mine countermeasures ships based in Bahrain and is capable of clearing mines, it has historically underfunded and neglected this mission area. The Navy's long-standing reluctance toward mine warfare could result in unpreparedness — if Iran were to close the strait, the US might find its mine-clearing capacity both inadequate and delayed.

Strategic overreach

In 1915, British and French leaders believed that naval power alone could force open the Dardanelles, collapse the Ottoman Empire, and possibly force a surrender. The US should heed this lesson when contemplating a response to a Strait of Hormuz closure. While reopening a maritime chokepoint may seem like a clear operational objective, the surrounding political aims could quickly become overwhelming. Would the US seek to degrade Iran’s military capabilities beyond reopening the strait? If a US vessel were attacked during mine-clearing efforts, how far would Washington be willing to escalate? Without clearly defined political goals, military operations could unintentionally spiral into a regional conflict — the same lack of clarity that doomed the British effort a century ago.

Dominating the narrative

Another critical failure of the Dardanelles campaign was poor strategic communication. Iran, by contrast, has consistently shown skill in controlling narratives, often framing itself as the victim of Western aggression and amplifying anti-American sentiment through regional media. The US, on the other hand, often treats information campaigns as secondary to military actions. In a Strait of Hormuz crisis, the battle for global perception would be just as crucial as the military response. Anticipating and countering Iran’s media strategy should be a core component of any US operation.

Tempo of decision

The final and perhaps most institutional lesson from the Dardanelles is the danger of indecision and sluggish operational tempo. That campaign suffered from unclear command structures and slow, fragmented planning. In the Strait of Hormuz, events could escalate within hours in a highly charged political environment.

 Effective US response would require predefined operational plans, rapid coordination between field commanders and national leadership, and clear rules of engagement. Equally important is early and close coordination with regional partners, whose willingness to cooperate may vary.

The Dardanelles campaign stands as a stark warning, with the author concluding his cautionary analysis with the following words:

"These are not novel observations; if they ring close to home, it is because the US military exhibited the same pathologies in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not a stretch to worry about their recurrence in a future crisis. The Strait of Hormuz may look very different from the Dardanelles on a map, but from a strategic and operational standpoint, they rhyme in ways that demand attention." 

By Nazrin Sadigova