Hamas assault overshadows Israeli intelligence’s historical achievements

FP features that the reputation of Israeli intelligence, once held in high regard for its daring operations and effectiveness, has been deeply shaken in the wake of the devastating Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.

Before October 7, 2023, Israeli intelligence held an unparalleled reputation, with its bold operations often becoming legendary and even depicted in Hollywood films. The agency garnered admiration from allies and instilled fear in adversaries due to its audacious missions and extensive capabilities. However, this reputation was significantly tarnished last year, and Israeli intelligence leaders are now working to restore it.

Despite the allure of high-profile intelligence operations, it remains uncertain whether these efforts are effectively supporting diplomatic or strategic initiatives. Leading up to the Hamas attack, Israeli intelligence had established a culture of accountability regarding inevitable failures, and it seemed to be operating at peak performance. In September 2023, during the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Herzl Halevi, the Israeli military's chief of staff, reflected on the nation's largest intelligence failure—failing to detect the Egyptian invasion that triggered the war—and discussed the lessons learned from that experience.

In 1973, the prevailing belief known as "the concept"—the incorrect assumption that Arab states would only engage in war against Israel under very specific circumstances—led the Israeli government to overlook crucial signs of an impending invasion. Israeli intelligence thought it had learned from past mistakes, which had resulted in numerous resignations and firings following the war. However, that hard-earned reputation, much like Israel's sense of security, was on the verge of collapse.

The intelligence community's failure on October 7 to foresee and prevent Hamas's brutal attack was so profound that it eclipsed the failures of 1973. The disorganization, missed signals, and ignored warnings overshadowed the US intelligence shortcomings on 9/11, where there had been prior alerts about an imminent al Qaeda threat. Similar to the American intelligence community's "failure of imagination" regarding the novel approach of the 9/11 attacks, Israeli intelligence also overlooked the explicit threats articulated by Hamas leaders. Caught off guard, the Israeli military took agonizing hours to respond. 

The parallels between the intelligence failures of 2023 and 1973 are striking: in both instances, political and military leaders were trapped by misconceptions about their enemy, misjudging intentions and underestimating capabilities. Israeli leadership believed that, despite its violent rhetoric, Hamas was satisfied with its control over Gaza.

Meanwhile, lower-ranking intelligence officials attempted to alert their dismissive superiors. On October 7, when Shin Bet (Israel's internal security service) considered the possibility of an attack or kidnapping, it dispatched a single elite intelligence unit known as "Tequila," consisting of just seven operatives, to assess the situation at the Gaza border. 

This team was among the first defenders, facing overwhelming odds, and several members lost their lives during the initial hours of the assault. Military intelligence (Aman) remained skeptical of any imminent threat, despite multiple warnings from observers, including a women-only military unit stationed along the southern borders and a civilian who was monitoring Hamas communications. His warnings were disregarded, and his equipment was confiscated by the Ministry of Communications, as senior security officials grew tired of his alerts, according to journalist Efrat Fenigson. 

The warnings from the "Devil’s Advocate" team, created by the Israeli military after the 1973 conflict, were similarly dismissed. It seems the lessons from the Agranat Commission, which examined the circumstances leading up to that war, have been overlooked, resulting in a strategic culture that often ignores dissent, fosters groupthink, and devalues outside expertise. Despite these flaws, Israel's intelligence operatives had long managed to achieve remarkable successes, but this track record may have fostered overconfidence, which contributed to the failures on October 7. 

Following the Hamas attack, Israel's intelligence community found itself in a precarious position, highlighted by the resignations of Aman’s director-general and the head of the Israeli military’s signals intelligence agency, Unit 8200.

By Naila Huseynova