Iranian-Armenian geopolitical bluff on the borders of Azerbaijan Serhey Bohdan's think piece

In early December, an Azerbaijani-Turkish exercise started on the border with Iran. It was Baku's tit-for-tat to the Iranian support of Armenian revisionism and a mirror-like response to the October maneuvers of the Iranian army, in particular, the forcing of the Araz on the border with Azerbaijan. By pulling forces in the Caucasian direction, Tehran is negotiating with the Armenian leadership on the inadmissibility of changing the "geopolitics" of the region. But Iranian-Armenian ties, despite their long history, are largely based on a bluff.

Strategic ambiguity

Closer scrutiny of statements by Iranian officials on Karabakh and Azerbaijani-Armenian relations reveals a striking ambiguity. Take, for example, a tweet by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ali Khamenei, which notes: "We are happy for the return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Of course, in case of a deliberate policy to block the Iranian-Armenian border, the Islamic Republic would be against it, because that border is a link of thousands of years".

The nuances of meaning in the statements change, tilting one way or the other. For example, during a meeting on September 24 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Iranian Foreign Minister Hussein Amir-Abdollahian stressed that Iran considered unacceptable not only any border changes but also the "geopolitical situation" in the region. In this context, it can be interpreted as an attempt by Azerbaijan and Türkiye to unblock the region. Just a few weeks later, the head of the Iranian government said differently: during a meeting with President Aliyev on 13 October Raisi stated that "any changes in the historical borders, regional geopolitics and transit routes between Iran and Armenia are inadmissible". But at the same time, he stated about the unacceptability of "any European military presence under any pretext"! The inadmissibility of any foreign military presence in Armenia (and Azerbaijan, but in fact, only the Armenian government would like to bring foreign troops into their country) was also mentioned a week later by the Iranian Foreign Minister during his visit to Yerevan. At the same time, he urged to use of the mechanism of negotiations in a "3+3" format (South Caucasus countries, Russia, Türkiye, and Iran) - an option of little interest for Pashinyan.

In other words, Tehran's support for Armenia is far from unconditional; it is full of cracks. Rather, this support serves as a tool to find ways for Iran to play a serious role in the region. And to do so, it chooses a course of strategic ambiguity in which nothing is certain. Even with the accusations against Azerbaijan, to which Iranian officials attribute some vicious ties with Israel. But if you look closely, Tehran attributes these ties, if necessary, to everyone it can get its hands on. For example, the conservative newspaper "Kayhan", probably close to Supreme Leader Khamenei, writes that "Tehran will not tolerate changes on its northern borders aimed at undermining the interests of Iran and Russia". In the opinion of "Kayhan", there is "an invisible alliance of the US, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Zionist regime" in the region which aims to "geopolitical changes fraught with detrimental strategic consequences for both Iran and Russia". That is, even when negotiating with Pashinyan, the Tehran establishment accuses him of a whole list of items!

At the same time, the Iranian politicians do not dare to state clearly their decisive intentions in the South Caucasus, in contrast to their policy towards the Persian Gulf region. This is understandable since Iran does have some opportunities in the latter. As for the former, everything is much more modest, and Tehran can only relocate troops. Why is this so? Iran has no ideological influence and allies in the post-Soviet space, as well as no money to conduct even intelligence activities - if recently published statements on payments to Iranian agents are correct, then the situation, to put it mildly, looks deplorable for Iranian ambitions. Therefore, it is not surprising that on November 20, when tensions escalated once again, the Supreme Leader's international affairs advisor Velayati said that Tehran had no intention to invade or seize power in Azerbaijan.

Tehran's reservations on Karabakh

This does not cancel the risky steps taken by the Iranian side. On December 7, Azerbaijani media reported that in late October Iran transferred 600 anti-tank missile systems to Armenia. Such information about defence cooperation had appeared before and Iran usually officially denied it, at the same time saying that Armenia was interested in Iranian equipment. In October Major General Safavi, the military adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader said that Armenia was among the 22 countries which had officially applied for the purchase of Iranian-made drones.

Iran's military exercises in October were clearly aimed at the South Caucasus and, among other things, practiced the forcing of the Araz. At the same time, the Iranian Foreign Minister paid a visit to Armenia, where he explained: "Iran will not allow its communication routes with Armenia to be blocked, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has also launched military maneuvers in this region to achieve this goal". During his trip, he opened the Armenian consulate in Gafan (43 thousand residents!) in the south of that country - clearly a purely political move. Alain Simonyan, the speaker of the Armenian parliament, also noted that: "The establishment of the Iranian consulate general in the region carries an important message, and we are waiting for the establishment of the Armenian consulate general in Tabriz".

By the way, the latest Iranian maneuvers were in a certain sense the repetition of last year. For the first time, the Iranian side held such demonstration exercises in September-October 2021, organizing two series of unprecedented maneuvers. Iranian troops were concentrated near the borders of Azerbaijan as part of the largest operation of the Iranian armed forces since the Iran-Iraq war. Even then the commander of the Iranian Army's ground forces, Kiumars Heidari, made a political statement that Iran would not tolerate any changes of borders in the region, and the IRGC's Twitter account declared even more: "The Islamic Republic will not tolerate any geopolitical changes on its borders."

This course is not new. On the one hand, Iran has never recognized the Armenian territorial expansion, but on the other hand, the whole Iranian officialdom since the 1990s underlined that there were two general lines in the northern direction - relations with Russia and connections with Armenia! When Azerbaijan began to restore its territorial integrity, the same Velayati clearly called on Armenia to withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani lands, and representatives of Supreme Leader Khamenei in the Iranian provinces with Azerbaijani population supported Azerbaijan in October 2020. But at the same time the Azerbaijani side found evidence of cooperation between Iran and Armenia in the military field and the famous "Khudaferin incident" happened! However, again we should note that in all these cases the Iranian side did not admit its involvement, and quickly withdrew from Khudaferin - strategic uncertainty par excellence.

Geopolitical games

However, behind some incidents, it is worth recognizing a "general strategy" - emerging as a relatively stable consensus in the heads of politicians. The role of the irrational in Iranian politics is extremely exaggerated. No matter how much they talk about "mullahcracy", it takes a long time to find obscurantism and bigotry in Iranian foreign policy. In recent years, the security forces, with their specific strategic thinking and predisposition to cynical calculation, have moved to the forefront of Iranian politics. Revolutionary activists and Khojatolleslams with their thoughts on "political fiqh" and "liberation movement congresses" have long been replaced by pragmatic generals (retired and acting) with geopolitical calculations that fill even the ideologically oriented Iranian media. These approaches can be seen in the steps of the new Tehran government, which has gained a foothold in Tehran with the election of President Raisi in 2021.

In this regard, there is the issue of transit and entry into the global arena for both Iran and Armenia. Armenia is sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Türkiye and has no access to the sea, depending on Iran and Georgia. Iran has access to the sea, but it is access through the Persian Gulf, which is convenient for access to Asia and Africa, but not to Europe. That is why, although Armenia and Iran share only 44 kilometers of border, they set ambitious goals. Armenia needs Iran to communicate with Arab and Asian countries. Iran expects to reach Georgia, Russia and the Black Sea, and European countries through Armenia.

Moreover, Armenia and Iran are not only interested in their own transit, but they also hope to draw large international traffic flows to their communications. When the first representative of the new Iranian administration, Iranian Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade Reza Fatemi-Amin arrived in Yerevan in March, he declared the "South-North" international transport corridor the top priority in bilateral relations. The latter is an initiative to develop routes between Central and South Asia and Europe via the Caucasus and Russia.

It is no accident that the new Iranian administration began a dialogue with Yerevan at that time and with this very topic. After all, the idea of increasing international transit through Armenia-Iran gained additional importance after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war on February 24. It instantly changed the picture of transport flows related to Russia.

However, Tehran and Yerevan have to start with the basics - Baku can easily paralyze their communications. Attempts to make Armenia a transit corridor were hampered by Azerbaijan's victory in the war, as the Armenian side lost control of the communications section between Gorus and Gafan as a result of the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani lands. At first, after the 2020 war, Iranian traders continued to supply Karabakh separatists with energy as if nothing had happened. But after Azerbaijani border guards set up checkpoints and then started detaining Iranian truck drivers on the road between Gorus and Gafan crossing the border with Azerbaijan last autumn, the Iranian Road and Transportation Agency finally banned truck traffic to the territory controlled by the Armenian separatists.

At the same time, Tehran promised to help Armenia build a new road in southern Armenia, through Tatev and Gafan, without crossing the border with Azerbaijan. During his March visit, Fatemi-Amin stated that Iran and Armenia had also tentatively agreed to launch infrastructure projects in Armenia and to have Iranian companies participate in tenders for the construction of power plants, dams, and roads in Armenia. More specifically, Iran has shown interest in cooperating in building a road between two cities in southern Armenia, Gajaran and Garakilse, which should develop communications between Iran, Armenia, and Georgia as part of the North-South corridor.

Iranian Deputy Transportation Minister Heirolla Khademi visited Armenia in May to confirm Tehran's financial and technical support for building roads that would allow cargo from Iran and other countries to bypass Azerbaijani territory en route to Armenia, Russia, and Europe. During Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan's visit to Tehran in May, the construction of new roads was one of the main issues. In October, during his three-day visit to Armenia, Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian again discussed with Pashinyan the need to develop the North-South corridor as a transit route between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea, passing through Armenia and Georgia.

It should also be recalled that the most important issue for Iran is to find ways to overcome Western sanctions. They paralyze relations with most countries of the world - international trade is tied to mechanisms controlled by the West. Therefore, the option of working "through Armenia" becomes important. This year, Iran and Armenia signed agreements on the joint production of pharmaceutical products and household appliances for export to third countries.

Easier to do through Azerbaijan

In its time, Iran helped Armenia survive the years of the blockade that followed the territorial expansion. But it did not create an economic base for serious relations: trade between Iran and Armenia was only $304 million in 2020-21, and then jumped to about $700 million, but such explosive growth is unlikely to keep trade at record levels. During Pashinyan's November visit to Tehran, a goal of as much as three billion dollars in trade was announced. Such turnover with a small impoverished country looks fantastic. Even though during the visit Armenia and Iran inked accords in the field of engineering and extended the "Gas for Electricity" agreement, according to which Armenia exports electricity to Iran in exchange for gas. At that the volume of gas supplies to Armenia will double, and so will the supplies of electricity to Iran. That is, cooperation between Tehran and Yerevan has objective boundaries.

But there is another aspect. Almost everything that Iran does in cooperation with Armenia, would be easier and more profitable to do when cooperating with Azerbaijan (even cooperation with Armenia would be more effective with the participation of Azerbaijan). And judging by the steps of the Tehran authorities, this is clear to them. So, no matter how much they keep talking about the invariability of the "geopolitics of the region" - which is a controversial point because its invariability means just stagnation - but Tehran itself changes it, and not in favor of Armenia. For example, in March Baku and Tehran agreed on the construction of communications between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan through the territory of Iran.

In August Iran commissioned an additional power line with Armenia and on November 21 Iranian Energy Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian said that in addition to synchronizing Iran's power grids with those of Armenia the same work is being done with Azerbaijan and Russia.

Speaking at the conference "Along the Middle Corridor: Geopolitics, Security and Economy" in Baku on November 25, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev noted that there are agreements on the opening of the Zangazur corridor with Russia too and the corridor itself meets the interests of all regional states including Iran and Tehran's protests cannot hinder the project. Incredibly, on the same day, Armenian and Iranian officials gathered in Yerevan to discuss railroad cooperation in the event of the unblocking of tracks in the region - something that Azerbaijan is calling for!

Storm in a teacup

The Iranian policy of strategic uncertainty in the Caucasus creates tension in relations with Azerbaijan, but it hardly has any prospects other than as an element of some kind of political bargaining. Firstly, Azerbaijan and Türkiye successfully neutralize the most serious aspects of this policy, and we gave examples of this above. Second, Iran objectively has only shaky grounds for a role in the Caucasus. And it will remain so as long as it actually flirts with the failed "Great Armenian" project. The bluff of both Yerevan and Tehran is evident here. Think about it: the most pro-Western, pro-American elements in Armenian politics (like Simonyan and Pashinyan) talk about the importance of ties with Iran and praise the current Iranian administration, which is known for its confrontation with the West. At the right moment, they will simply exchange these ties for the preferences of the West. Tehran is aware of the pro-Western sympathies of the Armenian elite, but it is also bluffing in order to increase its importance in regional politics and in post-Soviet structures by playing the role of "Armenia's protector". The culmination of this disingenuous game between Yerevan and Tehran was Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan's lobbying in May for a free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). A politician who made a career out of the idea of leaving that very union!

But a bluff will always remain a bluff, and from geopolitical fantasies, they have to return to the physical reality. And this means that Iran and Armenia will eventually have to cooperate in the South Caucasus with Azerbaijan and Türkiye anyway.