Mines for peace? Baltic states signal shift from arms control to armed deterrence

In a dramatic and controversial signal to Moscow, the Baltic states and Poland may be about to rewrite their approach to national defence. On March 18, the defence ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland recommended withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention, the landmark international treaty banning anti-personnel mines. Latvia has already taken concrete steps in that direction, with its parliament approving the move. This pivot is more than symbolic: it suggests a shift toward a deterrence strategy designed not to start wars, but to prevent them.

In a detailed commentary published by War on the Rocks, the authors argue that this potential turn is neither reckless nor inconsistent with humanitarian values. While anti-personnel mines have long been reviled by the international community, particularly humanitarian organisations, the authors make a compelling case: “pulling back from the Ottawa Convention and opening the possibility for stockpiling (and potentially deploying) anti-personnel mines are actions driven by a legitimate need to provide security and reduce the risk of war.”

At the heart of this argument is geography and geopolitics. Facing a resurgent and aggressive Russia, the Baltic states and Poland are acutely aware of their strategic vulnerabilities—chief among them, a lack of manpower. The use of anti-personnel mines, especially in marked and controlled areas of their own territories or via self-deactivating systems during active combat, could serve as force multipliers. The mines would be “laid in clearly marked minefields in areas controlled by these states,” ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law.

The piece anticipates and directly addresses widespread concern over the humanitarian implications. However, the authors stress that all four countries remain “committed to international humanitarian law, including the protections of civilians during an armed conflict.” Notably, they are all signatories to the Geneva Conventions and the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which permits the use of mines under strict conditions.

The types of mines these countries might adopt—such as the U.S.-made Area Denial Artillery Munition—are highlighted as examples of compliance-focused systems. These munitions deploy mines that self-destruct within 4 to 48 hours, thereby minimizing long-term civilian risks. The article argues that “any civilians present would already be at extremely grave risk due to their proximity to the enemy,” should such mines be used in a live conflict scenario.

Ultimately, the commentary frames this move as a pragmatic step toward effective deterrence. “Anti-personnel mines allow these states to bolster their defensive capacity and offset one of their most significant military shortfalls: manpower.” More than that, this strategic shift may reduce pressure for a broader arms race, instead signaling to Russia that any incursion would be costly.

By Sabina Mammadli