"Tehran's new political moves - attempt to survive" Israeli pundit on Caliber.Az

Azerbaijan's geopolitics in the Middle East is to a large extent connected with two countries: Israel and Iran. But if Israel is a friendly and close country to us, then Iran, on the contrary, has become quite aggressive towards Baku, unwilling to accept the new alignment of forces in the South Caucasus that emerged after the 44-day war, and the increased political authority of Azerbaijan in the world. In contrast to the cooperation between Baku and Tel Aviv, which is extremely disturbing to Tehran, Iran is trying to increase its influence in the region.

In an interview with Caliber.Az, Vladimir Mesamed, the Israeli political scientist, expert in Iranian studies, and researcher at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, shared his opinion about Iran's current policy. 

- Recently, Iran has been demonstrating new tactics in its foreign policy relations, such as restoring contacts and diplomatic rapprochement with other countries. At the same time, it is not abandoning its traditional methods - using terrorist entities under its control in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Palestine to its advantage. What do you think this is about, what is the mullahs' regime trying to achieve?

- Recently, Iran has indeed been trying to restore relations with the countries of the Middle East, and this process is quite visible. If you remember the situation before March 10, 2023, when the agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed, there were only two countries in the region that maintained normal relations with Iran: Syria, which maintained relations with Tehran even during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraq, because Shiites rule there. And, perhaps, we can add Oman, which now acts as an intermediary between Iran and other countries to build diplomatic bridges.

As for Saudi Arabia, Tehran has actually demonstrated that it intends to reach a new level of interstate relations. But just recently, he refused to cooperate with Riyadh, arguing that the Saudis are allies of the United States. Today, Iran wants to turn this page, which indicates a new approach to foreign policy. And almost in unison, there is an improvement in Iran's relations with two other countries in the region - the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Despite the fact that they are considered pro-Western and were previously on the "black list" of the Iranian authorities.

However, establishing relations with Iran is not easy at all. The same Bahrain not so long ago accused Tehran of causing unrest on its islands, trying to influence the Shiite majority of the country, where the Sunni dynasty actually rules. However, little by little, some ties are being strengthened. About the same with Egypt, which, in principle, never had normal relations with the mullah regime, since at one time Cairo supported the fugitive Iranian Shah. And now some contacts with Tehran are being planned.

The need to improve relations with its neighbours in the region is compelled by objective factors - the country's political and economic isolation. It is trying to somehow alleviate the burden of problems that are increasingly piling up in the country. Most of all, this concerns an economy that is undergoing a serious crisis. For Iran, this new political move towards rapprochement with other countries is essentially an attempt to survive.

However, Tehran is by no means ceasing its support for terrorist groups. This was demonstrated by the recent "small war" between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip when the Iranians supported the Islamic Jihad organization involved in this military conflict with arms and finances. So the tactic of re-engaging with the Arab world does not at all remove the essence of Iran's policy, which consists of assisting terrorist and separatist groups in the Middle East to provide support to Tehran, if necessary.

- Recent events have shown that Iran has become more restrained in its aggressive rhetoric towards Azerbaijan. In any case, Tehran has stopped accusing Baku of so-called "ties with the Zionist regime", military cooperation with Israel, etc. Hossein Abdollahian, the Iranian Foreign Minister, even visited Baku and met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and his counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov. And the statements resulting from these meetings sounded quite optimistic. But it is hard to forget that over the last two or three years alone Tehran has changed its attitude towards us several times - from talking about cooperation to shifting back to the language of threats. So how should we view the emerging warming between the countries - should we be happy or, on the contrary, cautious?

- As for the assumption that Iran is reducing its aggressive policy towards Azerbaijan, this is indeed observed. Perhaps there is even a pattern - there have been ups and downs in the two countries' contacts over the years. Obviously, now it is again important for Iran to demonstrate that its relations with Azerbaijan are on the rise, which is why the bravura rhetoric on the results of the visit of the Iranian foreign minister to Azerbaijan. I think it is now extremely important for Tehran to establish positive interaction with Baku and demonstrate this to the world - saying that relations with the neighbours are being restored. And who is Iran's closest neighbour? Isn’t it Azerbaijan?

In this context, it is worth noting that Azerbaijan and Iran have a lot in common, both historically and mentally. But there is also much that separates them, surprisingly enough, in the same historical and mental sense. The two countries are inhabited by the same ethnos - Azerbaijanis. In Azerbaijan, they are the ethnic majority, while in Iran they are the largest (several tens of millions) ethnic minority. It would seem that fate has ordained that there should be normal relations.

Moreover, there is another important uniting moment: despite all the disagreements, Iran has many plans for cooperation with Azerbaijan. However, it condescendingly refers to its neighbour as a "younger brother". It is clear that Azerbaijan does not agree with this statement. Baku rightly believes that relations can only be equal. And perhaps this equality will be restored for some time, although Iran constantly seeks to remind that it is the "big brother" and that it should lead.

In addition, Tehran is a fierce antagonist of the West, and Israel has generally declared its number one enemy. Baku, on the other hand, pursues a multi-vector foreign policy and has significantly strengthened its ties with Tel Aviv in recent years.

Hossein Abdollahian's meeting with Ilham Aliyev inspires cautious optimism, to say the least. But I do not think that the emerging "relations of positive takeoff" will be sincere on the Iranian side; it is simply that for Tehran now it is extremely important to multiply the number of friends, rather than enemies - that is what stimulates its actions.

- Meanwhile, disagreements between Israel and the US over Iran's nuclear programme are deepening. The US is in favour of dialogue with the Iranians without harsh pressure, while Israel insists on drastic measures, believing that the mullahs' regime poses a serious threat to the region. How exactly does Israel intend to curb Iran's nuclear aspirations, does it have plans A, B and maybe even C in this regard?

- There is a lot of ambiguity here. Last October, the US repeatedly made it clear that the deal on the Iranian nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was practically dead and could not be signed. The same position was held by Iran. Although Israel initially opposed the signing of the treaty, believing that it did not address security issues, it did not resolve tensions over Iran's nuclear programme.

The proposed draft document does not really guarantee Israel that the new JCPOA will not leave Iran an opportunity to join the club of nuclear powers and that the country will not build an atomic bomb. And if such a treaty were to be signed, it would cause serious friction between Israel and the United States, its closest partners and allies.  

We remember Biden saying that the US would not allow a nuclear Iran with an atomic bomb. Yet both the 2015 document and the current one create no leverage to stop a nuclear Iran. That is why Israeli leaders keep saying that they do not believe Iran's assurances about its supposedly peaceful nuclear programme. There is certainly a military component there. That is why Israel says that in addition to peaceful plan A, it always has a plan B - a plan to defeat the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, a forceful solution to the issue.

Although there are voices in Israel claiming that even the destruction of nuclear facilities will not solve the problem and that Iran will be able to restore its nuclear capabilities in a few years. So, the only way out is to dismantle the aggressive regime in the country. However, so far this is an almost unattainable goal.

It is already clear that the months-long Iran-US talks in Oman are essentially separate and are likely to lead to no result. The fact that Biden is trying to replace the negotiating team and has suspended the chief negotiator on the issue, Robert Belli and he is being replaced by another. The near future will show whether the situation in the negotiation process will really change or whether what is called in Persian "waht kushi" - killing time, wasting time, while Iran will build up its nuclear capability, which will lead it to possess nuclear weapons.

- What tactics does Israel intend to follow in its cooperation with Ukraine against the Iranian military threat and in countering the Russian war in Ukraine?

- As for Israel's position on Ukraine, we may not be very open, but we have always supported Ukraine in its opposition to Russian aggression, which has been going on for a year and a half. We understand the Ukrainian people and are always ready to help.

Another thing is that in the matter of assistance, Israel cannot do it as openly as other countries. We have a rather sensitive situation - we are in the Middle East region; it is very difficult with security here. Therefore, we must pursue a cautious policy with both Iran and Russia, since we believe that Moscow is helping to avoid a confrontation with Tehran to some extent. But we see that Iran is infiltrating further and further in the Syrian direction and creating pockets of danger. This is what prevents Israel from openly helping one country or another.

Meanwhile, Israel is providing Ukraine with humanitarian aid, and recently even supplied military equipment that helps track strikes against Ukraine. But in any case, one cannot blame Israel for stepping aside from helping Ukraine.

Moreover, Tel Aviv and Kyiv are cooperating at the level of special services, and this work is directed against Iran, a country that openly helps Russia and even creates a plant for the production of drones on its territory. And this is the state that declares that Israel should not exist on the political and geographical map. Therefore, the criticism of the Ukrainian ambassador, who complains about insufficient Israeli assistance to Ukraine, is absolutely unfounded - Israel is doing what it can, moreover, I think that over time, Israeli assistance to Ukraine will only increase.