UNSC session: Azerbaijan gratified, Armenia disgruntled and discontent amongst Karabakh Armenians Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

In the latest episode of Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov, the author looks into the main takeaways emanating from the latest session of the UN Security Council, held on 16 August, and explains why the result should be viewed as perfectly satisfactory for Azerbaijan and a failure for Armenia. Furthermore, Amashov examines the situation in Karabakh, where social cohesion is breaking down, with the political-military system of the separatist junta approaching the point of implosion.

"On 16 August, Armenia failed during an open session of the UN Security Council. It failed miserably and spectacularly. The result for Azerbaijan could be described as “perfectly satisfactory”. I would even say “more than perfectly satisfactory”. Triumphant is the superlative, I believe, that should be reserved for better occasions.

Let me explain what I mean. Success or failure has a measure. Yerevan wanted a resolution or statement by the UN Security Council, condemning the measures being taken by Azerbaijan regarding the Lachin Road, exerting considerable pressure on Baku and stalling the peace process. The aim was to garner some credibility for the view that the Armenians of Karabakh cannot and will not live under Azerbaijani jurisdiction, whilst further entrenching the so-called humanitarian exclusivity of the Lachin Road, as opposed to other options suggested by Azerbaijan. Nothing eventuated from these efforts. The message to Armenia is clear: the international community is not governed to exercise the kind of pressure on Baku that Armenia expects. 

As to the question regarding the result for Azerbaijan, the outcome of the session was perfectly satisfactory and, apart from the fact that Armenia failed in its quest, there are two major takeaways.

Firstly, the consensus at the UN Security Council seems to indicate that humanitarian supplies to Karabakh should flow in an unimpeded manner, both via the Lachin Road and other routes, including the Aghdam-Khankandi Road, as stipulated by Azerbaijan. My hunch is that, once supplies begin to be delivered via Aghdam, there could be some intensification of movement along the Lachin Road. But not before. 

Secondly, and more importantly, territorial integrity was re-emphasised as the keystone of any future settlement, and it was stated that progress in the peace negotiations is a prerequisite before moving on from the current impasse.

In this sense, the message to Yerevan was very simple: “Stop playing remedial secession games”. For Karabakh Armenians, the self-same message signifies the following: “Be reasonable; go and sort out your problems with Baku”. 

The irony is that, at present, Azerbaijan seems to desire a peace deal more than Armenia, paradoxically despite the fact that Yerevan needs it far more than Baku, for if the parties do not reach an accord by the end of 2023, the agenda of the peace negotiations in 2024 will not be the same, with Baku having greater demands that will be ultimately to the detriment of Yerevan’s perceived objectives.

For Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, there is currently a chance to convince his compatriots and the political classes that, in the wake of the failure at the UN Security Council, it must be clear that Yerevan should show receptiveness towards Baku’s peace agenda. After the city council elections in Yerevan, scheduled for September, which some of his internal detractors are attempting to turn into a “referendum on Pashinyan’s credibility”, the Prime Minister may be in a better position to act responsibly, taking some inevitable calculated risks. The question is whether he will utilise the opportunity or spurn it, either deliberately or through ghastly oversight, as has been the case in the past.

For Azerbaijan and Armenia to be able to conclude the current phase of the process with a peace treaty or some document on peace and interstate normalisation, some changes on the ground in Karabakh must happen. Again, the Karabakh component is not integral to the text of a prospective peace deal, but the progress therein should be a critically contributory element, enabling the sides to sign something legally-binding to the benefit of all parties.

And what is happening in Karabakh now? It appears that the military junta’s recalcitrance to accept humanitarian trucks via Aghdam, and the subsequent realisation that neither Yerevan nor Moscow is going to be able to assist the secessionist endeavour, have caused distress and a great deal of malcontent amongst the separatists and locals of the region.  

As was the case during the eco-protest on the Lachin-Khankandi Road in late 2022 and early 2023, which resulted in Vardanyan’s dismissal from the so-called position of the “first minister”, the currently self-imposed impasse has exacerbated rifts and squabbles within the separatist entity - social cohesion therein is breaking down, with the political-military system on the verge of implosion into millions of shards.

Some Karabakh Armenians are living a life of plenty, ostentatiously showing off their nuptials on social media, whereas others have very little. This adds to the internal fury levied against the so-called elites existing within the social structure of the Karabakh Armenians.

Harutyunyan is under fire for his incompetence. Vardanyan, still physically present in Karabakh, is opposing him without offering any viable solution. On the whole, the situation in Karabakh is akin to insipid, self-delusional vacuity in the context of straight thinking. As one Yerevan-based Armenian analyst, whose name regrettably slipped my mind, recently expostulated: “Avoiding facing a certain reality does not save one from the clutches of that reality”. I concur.

Back to the changes on the ground in Karabakh. It is not just concerning humanitarian supplies going via Aghdam, which is important on its own, but insufficient alone. Amongst many other necessary developments, the illegal Armenian armed formations should be withdrawn forthwith from Karabakh. Although we cannot exclude any possibility, it does not seem likely they will do it on their own volition.

Their continuous presence in Karabakh is resulting In the stagnation for internal dialogue between Baku and the Karabakh Armenians and in the peace process between Baku and Yerevan. Azerbaijan does have an appetite for letting stagnation continue ad infinitum. It has its own scheduled agenda. Consequently, if necessary, Baku will act decisively on the ground. And the period succeeding 27 September 2020, has shown that, in Azerbaijan’s parlance, “if necessary” means something very consequential. As Neil Watson, British Journalist, whose reflections I cherish, put it “one should not never trifle with a nation whose ambition matches its resources, augmenting its moral stance”.