US's recurrent Middle East missteps From Eisenhower to Obama

In the article “The Foreign Policy Mistake the US Keeps Repeating in the Middle East,” published by The New Republic, the author examines the recurrent challenges faced by US foreign policy in the Middle East, drawing parallels between the contemporary situation and the dynamics of the Cold War era.

The narrative begins by recounting Barack Obama’s 2009 Cairo University speech, which aimed to reset US relations with the Muslim world but ultimately fell short of achieving its goals. The speech, which called for “mutual interest and mutual respect,” was lauded for its rhetoric but criticized for lacking substantive policy changes, as evidenced by the Obama administration’s inconsistent actions in Egypt following the 2013 military coup.

The article credits The New Republic for highlighting the continuity in American foreign policy missteps, particularly the tendency to prioritize short-term strategic gains over long-term stability and human rights. This pattern, as illustrated through the presidencies of both Dwight D. Eisenhower and Obama, has contributed to ongoing instability in the region. Eisenhower’s administration, for instance, orchestrated the 1953 coup in Iran to depose Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had sought to nationalize the country’s oil industry, thereby installing Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah. This intervention set a precedent for future US involvement in the Middle East, often characterized by support for authoritarian regimes at the expense of democratic aspirations.

The article further delves into the repercussions of US actions in the region, referencing Fawaz A. Gerges’s book, What Really Went Wrong. Gerges argues that America’s Cold War-era policies, particularly those under Eisenhower, laid the groundwork for contemporary anti-American sentiments and the rise of radical Islamist movements. By undermining nationalist leaders like Mosaddegh in Iran and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, the US inadvertently paved the way for more extreme and anti-Western ideologies to take root. Gerges contends that these leaders, despite their flaws, represented opportunities for fostering more stable and independent states in the Middle East.

Nasser’s tenure in Egypt is portrayed as another critical juncture where US policy faltered. Despite his initial popularity and his efforts to assert Egypt’s independence from colonial influence, Nasser’s alignment with Soviet interests and his aggressive stance towards Israel alienated US policymakers. The US response, characterized by fluctuating support and opposition, ultimately failed to recognize the broader regional implications of Nasser’s policies. Gerges suggests that a more consistent and principled American approach could have mitigated some of the negative outcomes.

The article concludes by reflecting on the enduring legacy of these policy decisions. It argues that the US must learn from past mistakes by avoiding alliances with repressive regimes and prioritizing human rights and democratic principles. The piece emphasizes that effective foreign policy should balance strategic interests with ethical considerations, acknowledging the complex and often unpredictable nature of international relations.

In summary, “The Foreign Policy Mistake the US Keeps Repeating in the Middle East” underscores the cyclical nature of American interventions in the region, highlighting the need for a more thoughtful and consistent approach to foreign policy. By drawing lessons from history, the US can better navigate the intricate dynamics of the Middle East and foster more sustainable and equitable outcomes.