Will Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Turkmenistan manage to push through the Trans-Caspian project? Expert opinions on Caliber.Az
As previously reported, Russian senator Alexander Bashkin said Russia "will not allow the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan".
According to Bashkin, Western experts believe Turkmen gas could be delivered from Baku to Türkiye and then to Europe, which could help reduce Europe's dependence on Russian fuel.
"Russia cannot agree to the construction of the pipeline due to possible threat to the environmental security of the Caspian Sea," the Russian senator said pompously.
Indeed, the document on the status of the sea lake was signed by all the Caspian states. And, of course, it is interesting whether Russia and Iran can try to jointly resist the implementation of the Trans-Caspian project, given that Türkiye, represented by Erdogan, is also behind Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in this case. After all, he attended the recent meeting in Turkmenbashi, during which an agreement between Ashgabat and Baku was negotiated. It is clear that Turkmen gas must go on to Türkiye. Can Tehran and Moscow try to pressure Turkmenistan's leadership to abandon this plan?
Renowned regional experts shared their views on the matter with Caliber.Az.
Turkmen analyst Ruslan Myatiyev, editor of the Turkmen.news portal, believes that this is a very complex geopolitical game, in which the economic interests and political risks of all the following countries are intertwined: Azerbaijan, Iran, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, and Russia.
"Turkmenistan is more dependent, and, in principle, it decides nothing in this game. Observers in Ashgabat believe that there will be no Trans-Caspian under the current political regime in Russia. Meanwhile, there is information that Turkmenistan is already selling its energy resources by swap deliveries via Iran to Türkiye. This, in particular, explains some improvements in Turkmenistan's economic situation. However, the gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea is still a long way off, and even an important player in this game - Türkiye and Erdogan personally - is unlikely to resolve the issue in Turkmenistan's favour", Myatiyev said.
Kazakhstan political observer Gaziz Abishev believes that here we are dealing with a typical clash of national geopolitical interests.
"Azerbaijan and Türkiye benefit from the pipe, Turkmenistan benefits from diversification, and Iran and Russia do not benefit from the weakening of their logistics monopoly. Therefore, they will certainly oppose the construction of this pipe. If the price tag is billions of dollars over many years, Moscow and Tehran will balk and aggressively oppose the construction of the pipeline," he said.
If necessary, they have many tools to put pressure on Ashgabat, which has little room for manoeuvre, Abishev noted.
"Russia generally has economic gravitas in the Central Asian region through its relations with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. And it also acts as Turkmenistan's trade partner. Of course, independence in decision-making is crucial for Ashgabat. Here again, there is a question of price - if it can make a lot of money, it may go to a confrontation. But still, the combined efforts of Tehran and Moscow - trade barriers, and investments for a closed Turkmenistan that is not integrated into the world economy can be a problem. So there is a balance of risks here," Abishev said.
In his turn, the deputy director of the Ukrainian Centre for Middle East Studies, Sergey Danilov, noted that Russia has a very long tradition of opposing the implementation of oil and gas projects in the Caspian Sea.
"More than 20 years ago at various international conferences, I heard numerous speeches by Russian experts about the ecological disaster resulting from the development of new fields in this sea, about the special ecology of the Caspian Sea, and the need to comply with some standards. These speeches came at a time when Russian and Western engineering companies were starting to make wells in the interests of Russian business in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea. The aim of this campaign was to disrupt the independent extraction of energy resources by other littoral states - primarily Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan," he said.
The Russian state machine was particularly stubborn in its opposition to Azerbaijani oil and gas projects, Danilov stressed.
"The presence of powerful reserves in fields such as Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli was complemented by ambitious plans to build the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which made Azerbaijan an independent player from Russia and minimized Moscow's political influence in the foreseeable future. In a dense mixture of economic and political motivations, Moscow resorted to a very different set of arguments, citing environmental and seismic hazards, discrediting data on prospective reserves, and maintaining instability in the South Caucasus. It is to the credit of the Azerbaijani government that it was able to pass that period without upheaval and to complete its ambitious plans," the expert noted.
Now we are witnessing a new stage of the struggle for the Caspian Sea, Danilov said.
"The idea to combine Turkmen offshore gas deposits with the transit infrastructure of Azerbaijan was expressed 20 years ago. However, due to the specifics of the relations between the two countries at the time, these talks did not go beyond behind-the-scenes discussions by narrow specialists. Turkmenistan, using Chinese credit, was developing exports to China; during the first Taliban rule, it considered building a gas pipeline across Afghanistan to Pakistan.
Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine changed everything. Access to the premium European gas market is strategically important for Turkmenistan. The additional resource to pump gas through Azerbaijan and Türkiye increases the profitability of the pipeline and gives political arguments in relations with EU countries interested in the stability of the transit countries," the expert said.
Russia will traditionally oppose such projects, but Moscow has fewer and fewer effective arguments, he said.
"Surely realising the weakness of its position, Russia instructed not a very significant politician to voice dissatisfaction with the plan for the construction. Moscow simply does not have enough time to react to all the dangers multiplying exponentially after February 24. Of course, we will still see other statements and media campaigns against this plan, directed primarily against Turkmenistan, which seems to be the weakest link in the new gas alliance. However, with unity and coordination, Ankara, Baku, and Ashgabat will be able to implement their plans, as they did 30 years ago," Danilov is confident.