Armenia between promises and actions Analysts on the prospects for peace

The world viewed Armenia’s agreement to accept Azerbaijan's terms on the last two points of the peace treaty as an important signal for establishing peace and order in the South Caucasus—seen as the removal of the last obstacle on this path. Baku, however, remains highly rational in this regard.

Unfortunately, things are not as smooth as they may seem from a distance—Yerevan's peaceful statements do not neutralize Armenia's negative actions. Yerevan continues to launch diplomatic attacks against Baku, and the front of these attacks is quite extensive. The aggressive activities of the Armenian lobby in the EU are noteworthy, including bribing European politicians and promoting an anti-Azerbaijani agenda. The accelerated militarization of Armenia, rapidly increasing its military potential, also raises serious concerns.

According to Baku, Armenia must create a demilitarized zone along the border with Azerbaijan, amend its constitution, unblock transportation communications, open the Zangezur Corridor, prepare society for peace, and more.

How do Azerbaijani and foreign political analysts assess Armenia's actions and promises within the framework of the peace process? This was the question posed to them by the Caliber.Az correspondent.

Farhad Mammadov, head of the South Caucasus Research Center, believes that a peace treaty can only be signed after several key conditions are met.

"Baku's skepticism is quite understandable. First, the agreement on the text of the treaty already removes two topics from the agenda—third-party involvement at the border and mutual international lawsuits. However, these will only be applied once the parties sign the treaty.

Secondly, the Armenian side claims readiness to sign the treaty immediately and is discussing the place and time for the signing. At the same time, Baku considers this insufficient and puts forward two additional conditions: the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and amendments to the Armenian Constitution, which, in turn, requires a referendum on adopting the new version.

The dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group could theoretically take place by the end of the year at the OSCE foreign ministers' summit, but this would require active participation from Armenian diplomacy. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs must show willingness to work on this issue. The referendum is necessary to eliminate territorial claims against Azerbaijan in Armenia's legislation. Pashinyan has already announced its holding, but the details—the format, timing, and content of constitutional amendments—have not yet been revealed, leaving uncertainty in Armenia's positions.

Although the agreement on the text of the peace treaty is an important step, there are still procedural issues. At the moment, there is no escalation at the border, and negotiations continue on various fronts, including border delimitation and missing persons—this is a good foundation for further work. However, Baku does not intend to automatically fulfill the demands put forward by the Armenian side. From Azerbaijan's perspective, the treaty will only be signed after the referendum, as it will demonstrate the Armenian society's stance on the peace process. The results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia could also show voters' views on this issue, as political parties will express their positions on cooperation with Azerbaijan," emphasized Mammadov.

According to Ruslan Aisin, a Russian political analyst and the editor-in-chief of the Poistini portal, Azerbaijan's distrust is fully justified, as the Armenian leadership has repeatedly promised to fulfill its obligations but continues to delay the process. This concerns the signing of relevant documents, the unblocking of the Zangezur Corridor, and the initiation of constitutional amendments in Armenia aimed at removing territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

"In practice, we observe that Pashinyan and his government systematically evade fulfilling most of their promises, creating only the illusion of readiness to act. Instead of concrete steps, we see manipulations, political rhetoric, and a sort of 'smokescreen' behind which real commitments remain unfulfilled. Moreover, Armenia is trying to sit on several chairs, simultaneously courting both Western countries and Russia. This strategy is aimed at buying time and attempting to use external factors to apply pressure on Azerbaijan.

The use of fluctuations in the positions of major players regarding processes in the South Caucasus is one of Armenia's main tactics. In these games, Armenia resorts to various provocative maneuvers, which only complicate the negotiation process. Nevertheless, every patience has its limit. Official Baku has already presented justified demands, backed by clear arguments. Azerbaijan is demanding specific actions from Armenia, signed documents, guarantees for the fulfillment of commitments, and real steps toward their implementation.

It is also clear that Yerevan is eager to sign the peace treaty as soon as possible, making active appeals to Baku, and creating the image of a peacemaker—this is all necessary to strengthen Armenia's position on the international stage. A peace treaty with Baku would undoubtedly boost Pashinyan's political rating both abroad and domestically and could influence the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections.

If Armenia continues with populism and evades fulfilling agreements, delaying the process, Azerbaijan may resort to more decisive actions. Such a scenario is undesirable, but if the process is artificially delayed, Baku may have no other choice. In the current circumstances, Yerevan is trying to maneuver, avoiding clear commitments, but this cannot continue indefinitely," summarized Aisin.