How Israel defies developed world’s falling fertility trend

Many countries have seen baby booms in the aftermath of war, but Israel stands out as potentially experiencing one during an ongoing conflict.

This occurs as much of the developed world faces significant population decline due to falling birth rates. In OECD countries, the total fertility rate (TFR)—the average number of children a woman is expected to have—sits at 1.5, far below the replacement rate of 2.1. South Korea exemplifies this trend, with a TFR of 0.75 in 2023 and a projected population decrease to a third of its current level by century’s end if the trend continues. Despite sharing many of the same socioeconomic conditions that have led to falling fertility rates elsewhere, Israel’s TFR has risen over the past three decades.

The UN projects that the global population will peak at 10.3 billion in the mid-2080s before declining by 7 percent by 2100, but as an article by the Foreign Policy journal highlights, Israel defies this trend. Alex Weinreb of the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel estimated that Israel's TFR in 2023 was 2.84 and potentially higher in 2024. This anomaly has prompted interest in whether Israel's experience holds lessons for other nations grappling with demographic decline. Some argue that population decline is not inherently negative, suggesting that it could alleviate environmental pressure. However, many countries face challenges from this trend. The UN estimates that nearly a quarter of the world’s nations will experience a 14 percent population decline over the next 30 years. This demographic shift threatens the sustainability of pension systems, drains societies of youthful innovation, and stirs political tensions, particularly in countries turning to immigration as a remedy. 

Attempts to boost fertility elsewhere Numerous governments have implemented costly and diverse pronatalist policies. South Korea has spent approximately $270 billion over 18 years on incentives and matchmaking events. France invests 3.5 to 4 percent of its GDP on family support measures, yet its TFR was only 1.6 in 2024. The U.S., particularly under the Trump administration, has floated ideas like classifying childbearing as a form of national service. China relaxed its one-child policy in 2016 and adopted policies to increase birth rates. Still, these efforts have yielded minimal and temporary improvements in fertility. Israel’s unique drivers: Religion, nationalism, and familism In contrast, Israel’s unique fertility dynamics have drawn attention. 

Demographers in Israel often break TFR down by religion—Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze—and by degree of religious observance within the Jewish majority. As the article highlights, religion plays a significant role in Israeli society and politics, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict has heightened its influence. One of the most critical contributors to Israel’s high fertility rate is the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Jewish population, which comprises about 12 percent of the total population. 

Between 2020 and 2022, the Haredi TFR was 6.48, comparable only to fertility rates in sub-Saharan Africa. The rise in Haredi fertility in the 1980s coincided with increased government child allowances. The community’s values emphasize large families, and many Haredis live in insular, religious communities. Despite this, the Haredi TFR has declined slightly from a peak of 7.3, likely due to the economic burden on women who are often expected to work while their husbands engage in extended religious study. Muslims and other religious minorities account for about 20 percent of the population. In 2022, Muslim women in Israel had a TFR of 2.87, but this represents a significant drop from 4.55 two decades earlier, aligning with broader trends across the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the TFR among Jewish Israelis increased from 2.65 in 2002 to 3.06 in 2022. 

Despite a slight decline since 2018, the rate remains 15 percent higher than two decades ago, while the Muslim TFR has decreased by 37 percent. The non-Haredi Jewish population in Israel also maintains relatively high fertility rates. In 2022, non-Haredi Jewish women had a TFR of 2.45. Even secular Jewish women, typically the group with the lowest birthrates in developed countries, had a TFR of 1.96 from 2020 to 2022—just below replacement level but still far above peers in other nations. Factors typically cited as suppressing fertility—such as high housing costs, limited public childcare funding, delayed childbearing, and women’s educational and labor force participation—apply in Israel as much as elsewhere. 

Yet, college-educated Israeli women do not have fewer children than less-educated peers. Labor participation among Israeli women is comparable to the U.S. and Europe, yet fertility has increased alongside workforce inclusion. This paradox may be explained by a combination of religion and nationalism. Canadian scholar Kevin McQuillan notes these are potent drivers of fertility, especially where ethnic or religious conflict exists. In Israel, an ideology of “familism,” which elevates the importance of family in society, further reinforces high fertility. 

Sociologist Barbara Okun of Hebrew University argues that for many Jewish Israelis, national identity is closely tied to being part of the Jewish majority, a sentiment blending nationalism and religious connection. War-time fertility spike Despite 15 months of war, Israel saw a 10 percent rise in births in late 2024, according to journalist Rachel Fink. Okun suggests that in Israel, the lines between religious belief and national identity blur, making familism resilient even amid modern economic and technological shifts. 

By Nazrin Sadigova