Hungary: Between the West and the Turkic World Expert opinion on Caliber.Az

In an insightful interview with Anton Bendarzsevszkij, a Hungarian analyst and expert on the post-Soviet space, as well as, director of the Oeconomus Research Foundation, Caliber.Az delves into Hungary’s unique position between the West and the Turkic world. As a long-standing member of the European Union, Hungary has navigated complex relationships with both Brussels and emerging Eastern powers. Bendarzsevszkij sheds light on Hungary’s strategic foreign policy, its growing ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian nations, and its ongoing critiques of EU leadership. He also explores how Hungary is positioning itself to play a pivotal role in European and global geopolitics, especially amid shifting dynamics in international relations.

– What is the current state of Hungary’s relations with the EU?

– First of all, I would like to note that Hungary has always been and continues to see itself as part of a Christian, conservative, and traditional Europe in the full sense of the word. Moreover, from a purely geographical standpoint, Hungary has no alternative, even partially—it is a landlocked country surrounded by European states. With a territory of 93,000 square kilometres and a population of 10 million, Hungary has always been and will continue to be interested in participating in European integration projects, free trade, and development within a unified Europe. Hungary views the period when it was part of the so-called Eastern Bloc as a time of Soviet occupation, which began immediately after the end of World War II.

In May of last year, Hungary marked 20 years as a member of the European Union—a significant period that allows for reflection and analysis. In fact, my research foundation, Oeconomus, published a book examining these processes. I can confidently say that Hungary’s EU membership has been a positive experience: over the past two decades, there has been an impressive improvement in all economic, social, and public indicators. Participation in European integration has undoubtedly served as a catalyst for the country’s economic development—poverty has been reduced by half, and real wages have also doubled during this time.

According to forecasts, by 2030, Hungary will be nearly on par (90%) with the developed EU countries in terms of living standards, economy, and social indicators. Therefore, I want to emphasize once again that Hungary’s EU membership and its involvement in the bloc’s activities are an irreversible process. The rhetoric suggesting that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is on the verge of pulling Hungary out of the EU or that Hungary is no longer interested in participating in the Union is, to put it mildly, a fabrication and pure populism. The proof of this lies in the fact that Hungary has one of the highest levels of public support for the European Union among all member states.

– But isn’t there another side to the story? I mean the criticism that Brussels regularly directs at Budapest.

– Yes, there is another side to the story—Hungary has also voiced significant criticism of the European leadership over the years. Budapest has been expressing its position quite openly since 2013–2014, but the heightened criticism and, consequently, the conflict with EU policies began after 2015, when the migration crisis in Europe erupted. Prior to that, Hungary’s criticism was relatively mild or more marginal in nature.

Since around 2015, mainstream European political parties—by which I mean the major party groups in the European Parliament—have increasingly criticized Hungary, and in response, Hungary has continued to criticize the European mainstream.

What is the core of this criticism? From Hungary’s perspective, Europe has strayed from its traditional values, which once served as the foundation of European unity—principles of freedom, democracy, and traditional Christian values. In our view, the EU’s migration policy is a mistake, a dead-end, and the peak of a kind of altruistic multiculturalism. It is entirely unclear why European countries should be obligated to accept migrants from non-European nations, particularly those in dire economic conditions. Is it simply because a wealthy and prosperous Europe is expected to take responsibility for all global crises? In my opinion, this is a mistake that leads to the erosion of the European identity as we know it.

Unfortunately, criticism of European policies is increasingly restricted and stigmatized, which does not help the European Union but rather makes these processes counterproductive. Hungary continues to argue that Europe has diverged from the path it followed in the 1980s and 1990s. When Hungary joined the EU, it did so with the understanding that it was a union of sovereign states, bound primarily by trade, economic interests, shared values, and coordination on common decisions linked to European identity. However, instead of pragmatism, we are now seeing national sovereignty being curtailed. The EU is shifting toward an ideological direction, with increasing public disputes between the European leadership and individual member states. Political and ideological pressure on certain EU countries has become almost a routine instrument in this process.

All these conflicts primarily harm the European Union itself, as they undermine the bloc’s competitiveness both internally and on the global stage. They divert attention and resources away from the real issues that need to be addressed. By analyzing the critical rhetoric voiced by the Hungarian authorities in recent years, we can assess where the EU has ended up by 2025 after a series of crises. And there have been many: the migration crisis, the pandemic, the energy crisis, and the war in Ukraine—all of which lacked a cohesive and effective response, significantly weakening the EU. This is because there was no proper development strategy, making the European Union much weaker today than it was 15–20 years ago.

What is Hungary’s current criticism? The debate Hungary has launched regarding the EU is that we should have realized these truths much earlier, rather than now, in what is essentially the "last call." The discussion should focus on renewing Europe, making it more flexible, and moving away from policies burdened by ideology and rigid dogma. Take green policies, for example: while Europe should indeed set an example for other countries and define the direction for the future, it cannot pursue this agenda in an excessively dogmatic way—dismissing all alternative approaches and accelerating the transition so aggressively that it destroys traditional economic sectors and severely undermines European competitiveness. Policies must be realistic, with step-by-step implementation rather than drastic, ideologically driven measures.

In response to Hungary’s criticism, the European Union, at an ideological level, accused the Hungarian leadership of allegedly undermining European unity. However, these claims sounded rather strange and not particularly democratic. According to Brussels’ logic, European unity seems to mean simply echoing the majority’s views and supporting the objectives promoted by certain influential countries. But that is not true European unity—it increasingly resembles a form of opinion dictatorship.

Hungary believes that such an approach should be abandoned in favour of a realistic and constructive strategy—one that enhances European competitiveness and fosters pragmatic relations with its neighbours, free from ideological dominance. This applies to relations with China, Russia, and other nations as well.

Unfortunately, Hungary has been alone in maintaining its independent position within the EU. However, with Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House, we hope for changes—specifically, that the United States will support Hungary, forcing the EU to reconsider its strategy, its approach to problem-solving, and alternative paths for development.

This political conflict with the EU has also materialised in financial measures. The European Union froze more than €10 billion in funds allocated to Hungary. In a way, it was striking to observe how the EU implemented this policy of financial freezes against both Hungary and Poland, while simultaneously presenting a set of demands to Budapest and Warsaw.

Hungary did comply with the first and second sets of these demands, but as new conditions continued to emerge, Budapest eventually concluded that the issue was not about the requirements themselves but rather a political matter. The European Union appeared dissatisfied with Hungary’s government, and the freezing of support funds seemed more like a punitive sanctioning mechanism than a step aimed at improving specific indicators.

This perspective was soon validated when Poland’s conservative party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński—Hungary’s ally—lost the elections. Ironically, almost immediately after the election results were finalised, the frozen EU funds were swiftly released. Poland received its money, even though the new government had not yet implemented any of the EU’s required reforms. This made it evident that the entire process was politically motivated.

Such a biased approach severely undermines European consensus and damages internal EU relations. Meanwhile, Hungary has been trying for several years to secure the release of its allocated funds, but so far, without success.

– Azerbaijan is currently in quite a complex relationship with the EU, despite being an important energy partner for the European Union. This has led to the suspension of the Azerbaijani delegation's work in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, along with repeated attacks on Baku from Europe. At the same time, Brussels and several EU countries openly support Armenia, take a pro-Armenian stance, and lobby for Armenian interests in the South Caucasus. For example, a military cooperation agreement has been signed between France and Armenia, and an EU intelligence mission is stationed in Armenia. What are Brussels and certain EU countries hoping to achieve with such an unbalanced, openly anti-Azerbaijani policy in the South Caucasus? Where does this position come from, and will it change with Trump's return to power?

– I believe this configuration of relations will change, and this isn't solely the effect of Donald Trump. It will be influenced by the fact that European leaders have realized the importance of diversifying energy supplies, and they are in great need of strong partnerships with countries with whom Europe previously maintained, as noted, somewhat unbalanced relationships. Why has Armenia been and continues to be in a more favourable position within the European Union? There are various reasons for this: ideological and strategic.

The ideological reasons stem from Armenia being a Christian country with a large diaspora that is active in both the United States and the European Union. Armenia has also been very successful in advancing its narrative as a historical victim, claiming that its neighbours allegedly "oppressed" it, leading to the "loss of some of its territories" and the perpetration of a "genocide" against the Armenian people. Unfortunately, this lobbying had an effect on recent policies and Europe's stance on the injustice when Armenia occupied Karabakh and other parts of Azerbaijan. In fact, as early as the 1990s, Europe turned a blind eye to Armenia’s actions.

The mistake of the ideological approach was that Europe did not make any real attempts to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the past 30 years.

The second point is Europe's strategic security policy, where it tends to view Armenia, as well as Belarus, as countries under strong geopolitical influence from Russia. Therefore, Europe has felt the need to provide political and financial support to free them from this influence, in an effort to "save" their sovereignty and independence. At the same time, despite the "Eastern Partnership" program that Europe promoted for several post-Soviet countries, the EU did not see any threat to the sovereignty of stable, self-sufficient Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia.

However, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war, and the realization that Europe needs energy cooperation have brought a new dynamic to this agenda. Therefore, I believe that whether some EU countries want it ideologically or not, they have no other choice but to get closer to Azerbaijan and build more constructive relations.

As for Hungary, it has a multi-vector policy: for instance, Budapest is very active in defending Christians in the Middle East and North Africa and has the "Hungry Helps" program, which supports Christian communities in Muslim countries. However, despite this, Hungary has, since 2011, taken a course to strengthen relations with Azerbaijan, including in trade, economy, and energy cooperation.

I believe that the policy Hungary has pursued since 2011 will now begin to be adopted by the European Union. It’s a matter of time — unfortunately, this approach has been lacking for the past few decades, but we will get there.

– By the way, Hungary is actively strengthening its relations with the Turkic world. What is Budapest’s interest in this?

– The turning point came with the renewal of Hungary's foreign policy, which was called "Opening to the East" around 15 years ago, and it had its own underlying reasons.

The ruling party of Hungary, Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union), came to power in 2010, during the peak of the international economic crisis of 2008, which had severely impacted European countries by 2009-2010, essentially halting European development. When Fidesz came to power in 2010, Hungary was already in a difficult economic situation. The goal of the "Opening to the East" policy was to improve relations with the countries of Eurasia to the east, while maintaining all of Hungary's ties with the West. The West also wasn’t stagnant, and relations with this group of countries were also developing. However, they had reached a certain limit, and the 2008 economic crisis highlighted that limit.

Hungary saw an opportunity in the rapidly developing countries of the East, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and later Uzbekistan, China, and South Korea. Over the past 10 years, Budapest has significantly increased its level of relations with Asian countries. For instance, South Korea has become Hungary's main investment partner. This has been, and continues to be, a very conscious foreign policy — to build bridges to the East based purely on pragmatic considerations, without following ideological dogmas. As a result, Hungary was able to build a much more honest and open dialogue and relationship with Azerbaijan compared to most Western European countries. When Western Europe was reluctant to accept Azerbaijani gas for political reasons, Hungary had no such issues. For example, in the energy sector, there have been agreements between our countries for several years: since 2023, Hungary has started receiving gas from Azerbaijan. This open dialogue policy is also being pursued by Budapest with Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan, for instance, recently opened its embassy in Hungary. Of course, some shared historical and cultural ties have helped build these relationships, providing additional momentum and dynamism.

The fact that Hungary has had observer status in the Organization of Turkic States since 2018 shows that historical and cultural relations between Hungary and the Turkic world play an important role. Trade and economic relations are crucial, but it’s beneficial when there is a shared historical and cultural foundation.

To sum up, I would like to note that Hungary views its relations within the EU and NATO as a foundation it wants to preserve, while also striving to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. In this way, Hungary is becoming a stronger player on the international political stage and in global trade — and these same qualities, of course, help Hungary strengthen its position within the European Union. This is a multifaceted approach that Hungary is ready to continue pursuing. Additionally, Budapest and the Hungarian establishment are fully aware and take into account that the countries of the Turkic world — Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Türkiye — are rapidly developing markets and key sources of energy resources.

– In one of your interviews, you mentioned that during his first term, Trump shook up the EU’s security system, leading to positive shifts. You also noted that you agree with this approach: let EU countries pay more for their security, but the system will work more effectively. How else, in your opinion, is Trump going to "shake up" Europe in 2025, pulling it out of its comfort zone, and how is Hungary, in this context, willing to help him?

– One way or another, it is important to note that one of the key areas of influence for the new U.S. president remains security. We have already seen how in 2017, Trump pushed for higher military spending among NATO countries, and today, most countries are approaching the target of allocating 2% of their GDP for defense. Now, he is demanding an even greater increase in spending, which is likely to lead to further growth in military budgets, and Europe will have to dig deeper into its pockets once again.

But beyond security, his influence could be significant in several other areas, such as relations with China, internal ideological debates in Europe, and migration policy issues. On a number of issues, Hungary’s position is very close to Trump’s, and Budapest is ready to adopt his narratives and their implementation, fully understanding that this will only enhance the EU’s potential.

Another important point is relations with China. For the U.S., China is the primary strategic rival. The confrontation began during Trump’s first term, when he initiated a trade war against Beijing. This process will likely continue, and if the U.S. can resolve the issue with the war in Ukraine, their focus will once again shift to China. Europe, being one of China’s key trading partners, will come under pressure from the U.S., which will demand a reduction in economic ties with Beijing. However, China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner after the U.S., so European countries will need to find a balance between maintaining relations with America and preserving their economic ties with China.